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DIVINE ABUSE?  THE QUESTION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE IN 
RELATIONSHIPS WITH GODS  
 
JOSHUA MICHAEL RAITT 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The most well-known premises of this thesis are two realities of human 
relationality. The first is essential to many expressions of theistic religious faith: 
relationships with gods can become intimate. The second is tragic: intimate relationships 
(such as between parents and children or between romantic partners) can become 
psychologically abusive. Naming these realities at once raises the question: can 
relationships with gods become psychologically abusive? If so, how so? 
Psychologists of religion increasingly study experiences of psychological harm in 
relating to gods but have not formulated the empirical question of experiencing 
psychological abuse by gods. Meanwhile, this question has received serious and 
thoughtful consideration in the writings of theologians, philosophers of religion, and 
biblical scholars and appears online as the topic of various opinion pieces and blog posts. 
Several of these authors have argued by analogy and/or by anecdote that the God of 
Jewish and/or Christian faith—or some version of this God—is indeed abusive. 
But without further theorization, neither analogical arguments, however valid, nor 
anecdotal evidence, however vast, can guide empirical research into possible experiences 
of psychological abuse in intimate relationships with gods. The central argument of this 
thesis is for the possibility and prima facie plausibility of supposing that some individuals 
undergo psychological abuse in their Divine relationships. For this argument, I take 
 vii 
insights from psychodynamic theories of intimate Divine relationships and delve into the 
literature surrounding experiences of psychological abuse. For purposes of clinical 
interpretation and empirical research, I define and model Divine abuse. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
Intimate relationships with Gods imagined and experienced in religious faith can 
become very powerful forces in the development of a Self.  These intimate relationships, 
like any but in ways somewhat unique, can powerfully affect health and happiness for 
better or worse. Although I am not the person of religious faith I once was, I will never 
fail to appreciate the power of this phenomenon.  
The person I have become by now is unappreciable otherwise. The Non-
Denominational Evangelical Christian enculturation I underwent naively in childhood 
and zealously undertook through adolescence focused intently on the development of my 
relationship with God and the development of myself into a Godly person, so much so 
that even now, to know me well, one must know the intimacy of the relationship I had 
with this God from a very young age but eventually ended in doubt. I continued in my 
religious faith and relationship with this God as I started emerging into adulthood, 
frequent difficulties of doubt notwithstanding. In the culture of my coursework at a small 
liberal arts college in West Texas, my faith finally found an intellectually freer home. 
Significant changes to my life and to my theological thinking caused my faith in this God 
to falter in agnosticism and fall more weightily down to earth as I defaulted to absurdist 
convictions formed during the ensuing crises of personal identity, freedom, goodness, 
meaning in life, ultimate purpose—crises of all these vitally interrelated notions at once.  
By graduation, I had become comfortable in agnosticism as well as confident as an 
atheist in a limited sense: not rejecting all forms of theism, but most assuredly rejecting 
the God in whom I used to believe and all Gods alike.  
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I can tell the story of my de-conversion from Christian Evangelicalism (not an 
unusual sort of story) in another less intellective, more relationally concentrated way. The 
strength and vitality of my relationship with God weakened until it became too weak for 
me to continue sustaining by means of my own overwhelmingly world-weary faith.  My 
beliefs about the relationship had become too beleaguered by doubt to enable me to 
experience the relationship and to compensate for my undoubtedly felt lack of God. 
The existentially tremendous feat of letting go of God was made somewhat easier 
by realizing that the relationship had become experientially unreal apart from my own 
imaginative efforts. In other words, the continuation of the relationship seemed entirely 
dependent upon me, even while I was, in many ways, dependent upon God.  
I started to feel as though God had already left without letting me know (despite 
taking to heart the notion that God would ‘never leave nor forsake’ me and believing 
theologically that God is omnipresent).  I imagined that if I were to stop trying, nothing 
would happen. So I did, and nothing did. God never showed up again.  That was that.   I 
often look back.  But I rarely if ever look for God again because I feel no need to find 
God again. Of course, the God I felt I knew could find me again. But I am not waiting 
around either. I have moved on. Even if I were to seek God again, I would need to seek a 
very different kind of God, at the very least, one I could believe is real. However, staying 
within my current thinking, this kind of God is far from being a being, much less a 
personal being, and so is not the kind of God I could either seek or be found by. Even 
while I might develop significant ideas and feelings about this “God,” we will never have 
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a relationship like those I have with other people.  I would call it “God” only for lack of a 
simpler word for the most ultimate reality of everything. 
Now over three years after claiming the fact that I had de-converted, while I still 
claim to be agonistic and atheistic in the same respects and for the same reasons, my 
current worldview is more fully described as “Religious Naturalism.” By the definitions I 
most like, Religious Naturalism is a version of Scientific Naturalism first and foremost. 
Scientific Naturalism involves some kind of methodological commitment to science, 
some kind of ontological commitment to naturalism, and, due to both of these 
commitments, the rejection of all notions of supernatural realities as implausible if not 
also incoherent.  The adjective “Religious” in “Religious Naturalism” typically signals 
the virtue-evocative recognition of value inherent in the very constitution of the cosmos 
and the capacities of humans to respond to this recognition of value with religious-esque 
experiences of awe or wonder that instill humility, reverence, even greater compassion 
for other human and non-human species. Learning this worldview, I have mostly been 
studying evolutionary biology and psychology and thinking through science-minded 
philosophical cosmologies. That is about as theological as I get nowadays. But although I 
enjoy my ongoing efforts to understand and think through this worldview, most of my 
interests turn back into the ambit of relationships to gods believed in supernaturalistic 
theistic faith of exactly the sort I used to have.  
Once being an insider to supernaturalistic theism, however, I know there is much 
within it that Religious Naturalism cannot reveal from its vantage. I am voluntarily and 
likely forever an outsider. But repeatedly through my studies I find myself returning to 
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the periphery of this supernatural world in observation (and memory of myself), curious 
and admittedly still critical, in order to understand again, or perhaps anew. What I 
especially want to understand is the development of selfhood through becoming intimate 
with an Other worshipped as Ultimate. Meanwhile my awareness has increased of others’ 
experiences in relationships with their gods comparable to what I remember was mine. 
Moving from Abilene, TX to Boston, MA to pursue graduate studies mainly in the 
psychology of religion, I was not sure whether to expect this. 
Knowing from people here, there, and elsewhere numerous stories of the 
beginnings and ends, ups and downs, twists and turns, of relationships with Gods, I know 
that while many go very well, others go very badly for the human person in the 
relationship.  I have become intrigued with questions, none of which admits simple 
answers, about the causes and the consequences of individually varying experiences in 
Divine relationships, not least the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of ending bad ones. 
 I wonder why many relationships with Gods last more or less happily until death 
(or, as many theists would insist, even beyond death), but many others die; why, for 
some, the dying of God in their lives is prolonged and extremely painful, while for others 
it feels quick, easy, timely; why some do not so much happen to lose as decide to leave 
their Divine engagements; why some who lose or leave these engagements suffer 
ongoing difficulties—the aching pangs of nostalgia for the allure and solace of loving and 
being loved by God, or the deep resentment and sheer embarrassment of having this love 
betrayed by the experienced evils (or unreality) of God,  or the angst-inducing confusion 
about oneself and dereliction in life in the absence of God, or the misery of mourning the 
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loss of God and the life meant for God; why, for others, an overwhelming sense of relief, 
an equanimous sense of peace or the exhilaration of final liberation are the most salient 
feelings in the mixture or the only feelings that matter; and why some whose supernatural 
relationships seem to be going badly for them do not believe so and seem likely stay in 
them no matter what happens. 
The complexity and endless contingencies of answering these sort of questions 
invites me into further questioning. But just suddenly I am dislocated and distanced by 
the simple fact that I am now a non-supernaturalist questioner. I am not involved in any 
relationship with any god anymore. In comparing experiences, even if my intuitions and 
interpretations are onto something, I should be wary of the influence of any resistance-
based biases I might have. An intimate relationship with a believed supernatural being is 
a unique and difficult relationship to evaluate, whether from the inside or outside.  
On the outside, the situation I am in is not unlike being asked for romantic 
relationship advice (Should we break up? Should we get married? Should we get back 
together? etc.) when I am biased by the fact that the only relationships from which I have 
learned wisdom worth sharing with my friend who is now asking for it, have all ended. 
Almost always, I confess that, of course, I cannot say for sure.  Sometimes I just offer 
unhelpful clichés in awkwardly non-romantic scientific wording, such as “Well, there are 
always too many variables involved to predict what will happen,” or, “You’re lucky so 
far. In the long-run, the odds are always against you two” or “Every relationship ends or 
never ends—do you have sense of which category this relationship will end up in?” But 
whenever I am willing to risk sharing my honest thoughts, as I imagine good friends 
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should, I often ask questions about the healthiness of the relationship, about their 
wellbeing in the relationship. I at least try to help them be honest with themselves about 
what, if anything, they are able to say, with some surety, feels ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for them. 
 When friends tell me about their experiences of struggling in relationships with 
their Gods, the emphasis of their questioning is often questioning the goodness of 
themselves in the relationship rather than the goodness of their Gods. Rarely do they 
seem to question the healthiness of the relationship overall. If the healthiness question is 
asked, it is usually asked likewise in terms of their own insecurities and infidelities of 
faith in the relationship, not in terms of their God’s.  
Questioning the relationship in ways that negatively implicate god is theologically 
nonsensical for many of these people I know. Questioning the goodness of their Gods is 
questioning their very existence. But I am suspicious that assuming the theological 
nonsensicality of questioning Divine character, will, or behavior can conceal the anxiety 
of realizing that such questions make sense to ask and, for one’s own sake, need to be 
asked. They make sense to ask when glaring disparities appear between the ongoing 
experience of the relationship and the theology of what the relationship is supposed to be 
like. They need to be asked insofar as one is being harmed in the relationship. Some 
people have relationships with their Gods in which they feel safe and free to vent their 
frustrations and voice their grievances, to contest or even protest against their Gods, to 
test the presence of God or threaten its existence with their own doubts. 
In these cases, I am much less worried about the self-shaping power of the 
intimate Divine-human relationship.  In any case, relating to Gods is both similar and 
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different than relating to other people. Neither the similarities nor the differences should 
be minimized. But in general what I hope for my friends’ most intimate relationships 
with other people, such as with their romantic partners, is the same as what I hope for 
their relationships with gods whom they also say they love. I hope they can find help to 
ask honest questions, find honest answers, and follow those questions to whichever 
answers (or further questions) they lead, and in whatever direction they lead, whether 
further into or further away from the relationship. 
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Part I. The Question of Divine Abuse 
 
Purpose and Thesis 
My curiosity to understand these intensely intimate relationships with gods is now 
motivated by a serious and specific concern, psychological in focus but inevitably 
involving theological criticism: namely, that some theistically developed intimate 
relationships with the Divine can involve behavioral dynamics of psychological abuse 
and even become psychologically abusive relationships overall, despite their importantly 
appreciable differences from abusive relationships among humans. This concern can be 
expressed here initially in the form of two basic questions: is it possible that Divine 
relationships can become psychologically abusive? If so, is anyone, in this sense, 
Divinely abused? I want to persuade readers that it is both possible and prima facie 
plausible that some individuals undergo psychological abuse in relating to their gods. 
In arguing for the possibility and prima facie plausibility that some individuals are 
psychologically abused in relating to their gods by explaining how, I selectively 
extrapolate relevant insights from traditions of psychodynamic theory, mainly from 
clinically studied Object-Relations Psychology and empirical research in Attachment 
Theory. The tenets and teachings of these theoretical traditions or research programs 
often converge but also importantly diverge.  The terms of each are not always easily 
translatable (Gill 1995; see also Goldberg 1983). The models they have produced are not 
always commensurable or compatible. I attempt neither the elaboration of one tradition of 
choice nor the eliding of several together, but rather try to reflect insights from multiple 
relevant sources in creating a theoretical framework for empirically researching 
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psychological abuse in Divine relationships.  Furthering this purpose, my arguments 
result in conceptual and minimally operational definitions and models. Their main 
function is clarification of the phenomena in question—Divine abuse—in order to 
facilitate first of all the recognition of dynamics of psychological abuse in Divine 
relationships, and secondly to facilitate empirical hypothesizing about variables 
associated with these experiences. 
 
Outline and Argument 
 
Part I: The Question of Divine Abuse 
 
 In the remainder of this introductory Part (Part I), after outlining what follows, I 
try comprehensively but compactly to review the available literature in the vicinity of the 
question I am asking and the answer I will argue (though Parts III, IV, and V). Most of 
the literature I review is from empirical social-science, mostly the psychology of religion, 
where the question of supernatural abuse has not quite been raised but, arguably, could 
and should be raised. This review also includes non-scientific (not therefore negligible) 
literature found in religious and philosophical discourse, where the question has 
frequently been posed and continues to receive thoughtful attention. The majority of the 
material I reference is scholarly, but I also refer to writings found in popular, apparently 
more conversationally generative venues.  
This introductory overview of the literature around the question is meant to move 
the conversation beyond the mere analogy between human-human and Divine-human 
abusiveness that is made often enough to theorizing about actual experiences thereof, 
 	  
10 
therefore also moving beyond the anecdotal evidence found in popular writing (and 
elsewhere) to formulating researchable empirical versions of the question.  I conclude 
this introduction by briefly specifying my intended senses and references of some of the 
variously connotative words I use throughout the ensuing discussions: “natural” versus 
“supernatural;” “supernatural” versus “Divine;” and “God” versus “god.” 
 
Part II: Psychologizing Divine Relationships 
Before trying to exposit the import of existing research of supernatural 
relationships for considering possibilities of Divine abuse, I pause to deliberate 
complicated methodological questions. Defining two crucial metapsychological 
antimonies (natural v.  supernatural and intrapsychic v. intersubjective), I 
contradistinguish four methodological orientations in which researchers or clinicians 
might approach problems arising from allegedly supernatural sources (Figure 1, p. 42), 
critically assessing the hermeneutical inclinations predisposed in each orientation.  
I contextualize these metapsychological-methodological differences amid 
controversies in the psychology of religion over the integration of psychology and 
theology and in reference to recent movements within psychoanalytic theory that take the 
“Intersubjective Turn” (Gerhart and Sweetnam 2001; Gerhart, Borton, and Sweetnam 
2003) in order to overturn the enduring intrapsychism of early psychoanalysis in turning 
to the (human) subject.  Against the insistence of certain theistic psychologists and 
demurring from the implications of intersubjective psychoanalysis for studying 
relationships with Gods, I argue that the psychological study of theologically believed 
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supernatural and intersubjective relationships is limited to their natural and intrapsychic 
entailments—regardless of whether or not the relationship moreover is supernaturally 
intersubjective as theologically believed.   
Therefore, in the following Parts III and IV, I assume in principle that evidence of 
psychological abuse occurring in these relationships is noticeable within this limited 
naturalistic and intrapsychic scope of analysis. I widen the scope of my own analysis only 
in order to include theologies of the (supernaturally intersubjective) relationship as 
represented in (naturally intrapsychic) object-relations of human subjectivity. 
 
Part III: Psychology of Divine Relationships  
The Third Part is the first part of the argument for my central thesis that it is 
possible and prima facie plausible that some individuals undergo psychological abuse in 
relating to their gods. My discussions are mainly in terms of Attachment Theory (AT) 
and Object-Relations (OR) and are meant to underscore the fact—already evident but not 
duly considered—that the most basic psychological conditions necessary for the 
possibility of psychological abuse in any relationship are present in relationships with 
gods. To elucidate these conditions, I expound various empirical and clinical studies of 
the content, origins, functions, and effects of Divine relationships.  
Accordingly, I speak of one’s “god” (lower-case ‘g’) as an intrapsychic “object” 
made of various cognitive-affective, conscious-unconscious representations of one’s 
“God” (capital ‘G’).  For short, I call this entire psychological subsystem a supernatural 
relational schema and, more particularly, a Divine relational schema whenever referring, 
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as usual in my discussions, to a god of theistic faith. Through relating to such an 
internalized representational “god,” one’s “God” can function symbolically and 
significantly as an “attachment figure” (Bowlby [1969] 1982). 
  I insist not only that it is possible for an individual to undergo Divine abuse, but 
also that it is prima facie plausible that some individuals have undergone and are 
undergoing Divine abuse. I infer this conclusion specifically from the empirically shown 
(and long well-known) psychological power of intimate relationships with gods uniquely 
and severely to effect wellbeing for the worse through the ways in which these 
relationships are represented intrapsychically and experienced harmfully.  I further 
demonstrate the plausibility of this thesis according to the definitions and models 
(Figures 2 and 3) of psychological abuse for which I argue in Parts IV and V.   
 
Part IV: Psychological Abuse 
In Part IV, I carefully glean from literature surrounding psychological abuse in 
the contexts of caretaking and intimate partnerships. My main focus throughout is 
comparing and evaluating other researchers’ attempts to define “psychological abuse,” 
and my purpose is thereby to clarify and justify my own attempt to do so. I sort through 
and decide upon several of the conceptual difficulties that researchers have routinely 
encountered while trying to increase definitional consensus. I discuss four major ones at 
length and spend extra space discussing the fourth—the conditions in which 
psychologically harmful behaviors should be considered psychological abusive 
behaviors, and, correspondingly, the conditions in which a psychologically harmful 
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relationship should be considered a psychologically abusive relationship. The conceptual 
decisions I make in each of these discussions premise the definitions I stipulate at the end 
of the section for “psychological abuse” (and cognate terms) in order to name necessary 
and sufficient conditions of actual psychological abuse.  
 
Part V: Psychological Abuse in Divine Relationships 
The Fifth and final substantive Part relies on the discussions of the previous Part 
(IV) and follows straightway from the definitions explicated at the end. I first define the 
concept of Divine abuse and its cognate concepts, simply adding specifications in terms 
of Divine relational schemas as explained in Part III to the definitions for psychological 
abuse as worded in Part IV. I turn these conceptual definitions of Divinely abusive 
behaviors into two preliminary conceptual models designed to prepare future empirical or 
clinical studies by presenting what I think, theoretically, should be identified in 
interpreting whether a Divine-human relational scenario involves psychological abuse.  
 The first model is a typology of general types and several specific subtypes of 
Divine behavior tantamount to psychological abusive behavior (according to the 
necessary and sufficient conditions in my definition). In the second model I place all of 
these Divinely abusive behaviors at one end of a continuum of severity of 
psychologically harmful Divine behaviors. This model is also categorical in that I also 
qualitatively differentiate each concept I placed along the continuum in terms of primary 
effect-types of Divine behaviors on the human person and associated secondary effect-
types in the dynamics of the relationship. Because the believed Divine subject and its 
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Divine behaviors are not directly interpretable in psychological inquiry (as explained in 
Part II), all of the above must be interpreted indirectly in the human subject’s cognitive-
affective, conscious-unconscious representations of the Divine (as explained in Part 
III)—including representations of Divine behaviors—comprising part of his or her Divine 
relational schema, along with representations of oneself in the relationship. 
 
Part VI: Summary and Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, I summarize the contributions of the foregoing five Parts to my 
central thesis, showing how I have attempted to defend the thesis within the logic of the 
theoretical frameworks I used and by the conceptualizations, definitions, and models I 
proposed. I then discuss limitations and point in directions for future research.  Lastly, I 
reiterate the importance of research into these experiences. 
 
Overview of Relevant Literature 
Social-Scientific Research: Almost Asking the Empirical Question 
 
While religion and/or spirituality (R/S) is an invaluable “resource” for numerous 
people, in the lives of a “significant minority,” R/S has become a huge “source of 
problems” (Pargament and Lomax 2013, 28). Critical summaries and analyses of 
quantitatively demonstrated correlations of R/S to problems which diminish wellbeing 
are most fully provided in sections of large handbooks for R/S and mental health (e.g. 
Hood, Hill, and Spilka 2009, 456-59; Paloutizan and Park et al. 2013, 519-60; for more 
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concise overviews, see Koenig et al. 2012, 53-73 and Koenig 1998, 34-47; for R/S in 
connection to specific mental disorders, see Loewenthal 2007).  
The vast majority of this research is formulated in terms of “negative” (i.e. 
maladaptive) “religious coping” (e.g. Pirutinsky et al. 2011; Bowland, Edmond, and 
Fallot 2013; Lee, Roberts, and Gibbons 2013) and religious or spiritual “struggle”/ 
“strain” (e.g. Pargament et al. 2005; Exline 2002; Exline and Rose 2005; Ano and 
Pargament 2012; Fitchett et al. 2004; Fitchett, Winter-Pfändler, and Pargament 2014; see 
reviews by Ano and Pargament 2013, 419-421; Harris et al. 2008). Much of the research 
in religious or spiritual struggle has focused on the mental health correlates and 
consequences of struggling with doubting, in part or whole, one’s faith-based belief-
system. But increasingly researchers are focusing their attention on psychologically 
distressing disturbances in relationships with supernatural beings. Sometimes this is 
called “Divine struggle” (for reviews of this literature, see Pargament et al. 2005, Ellison, 
Fang, Flannelly, and Steckler 2013 or Abu-Raiya, Pargament, and Exline 2015). Slightly 
adjusting the initial categorical scheme in which “spiritual struggles” were introduced 
into the literature, distinguishing “interpersonal,” “intrapsychic,” and “Divine” struggles 
(Pargament et al. 2005), Abu-Raiya et al. (2015) have recently renamed as “supernatural” 
the third category of “Divine” struggles to include both “Divine” and “demonic” 
struggles. 
Several scales have been validated for measuring individual differences in 
attitudinal and emotional variables that moderate struggles with the Divine (e.g. Wood et 
al. 2010; Exline et al. 2014). For example, these studies have examined “anger” towards 
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God (Exline et al. 2013; Exline et al. 2011; Snow et al. 2011; Exline, Grubbs, and 
Homolka 2014), feelings of “disappointment” with god (Exline, Yali, and Lobel 1999; 
Strelan, Acton, and Patrick 2009), or “fear of god’s disapproval” (Exline et al. 2014), as 
well as  whether “protest” is considered an appropriate form of responding to God, and if 
so, which forms of protest (Exline et al. 2012), or the unique difficulties  of “forgiving” 
God (Exline, Yali, and Lobel 1999; see Webb 2014 for thoughtful Christian reflections 
on the theological implications of this psychological research into struggles with 
forgiving God). Such struggles might involve or influence pathological relational 
developments measurable in degrees of “spiritual instability” or “spiritual grandiosity” 
(Sandage and Crabtree 2015; Paine and Sandage 2015) vis-à-vis “the Sacred”—defined 
as “object or objects of ultimate devotion, not limited to or exclusive of a particular deity 
or entity” (Paine and Sandage 2015, 224). 
These empirical studies show what many people already know full well from 
personal experience or knowing the experience of others: that R/S, including, often 
centrally, the psychodynamics of intimate relationships with the “Sacred”, can become a 
source of significant help and/or significant harm (Abu-Raiya, Pargament, and Krause 
2015; see also Pargament and Lomax 2013). This research into the complex phenomena 
of R/S struggle and especially “Divine struggle” I will explain more expansively in Part 
III as involving negative attitudinal and emotional variables as well as variables of 
negative theological concepts and images of the Divine (e.g. Alavi, Amin, and Savoji 
2013; Zarrabiha 2013; Greenway, Milne, and Clark 2003; Tagney and Dearing 2002). In 
all the variations on this well-researched theme of concern with psychological damage 
 	  
17 
from R/S, researchers have been encircling while not explicitly asking the question of 
Divine maltreatment through abusive psychodynamics. 
 Of course, much research concerning abuse between human beings has been and 
is being done. There can never be enough. A decent amount of research in the last two 
decades has studied the roles of R/S factors in experiences of abuse, both positively (e.g. 
facilitating healing from abuse) and negatively (e.g. predisposing people to abuse or be 
abused). Regarding the latter, recent studies have investigated “religious abuse” or 
“spiritual abuse” (e.g. Ward 2011; Conly and Wood 2014; Super and Jacobson 2015), 
“religion-related abuse” (Maxine 2015; Simonič, Mandelj, and Novšak 2015; Novšak, 
Mandelj, and Simonič 2012), terms designating interpersonal abuse that occurs in R/S 
settings and is attributable significantly to R/S beliefs, behaviors, or belongings (for a 
short, Christianly narrated story, see Damiani’s “Spiritual Abuse within the Church: its 
Damage and Recovery Process,” 2002). Some of the most extreme cases are experiences 
of traumatic “ritual abuse” (e.g. Epstein, J. Schwartz, and R.W. Schwartz 2011).  
 Meanwhile, several books, some primarily autobiographical, have been written 
for a much wider readership to increase public awareness of R/S dangers and damages 
and offer means of self-help to those at risk or already suffering in the midst or in 
recovery.  Several of these non-professional but no less compelling accounts are 
explicitly in terms of abuse, and many others of varying extents bespeak the abusiveness 
of the experiences recounted. Notable examples include L. Kramer’s The Religion that 
Kills: Christian Science: Neglect, Abuse, and Mind Control (1999), K. Wright’s 
Religious Abuse: A Pastor Explores the Many Ways Religion Can Hurt as well as Heal 
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(2001), Lalich and Tobias’ Take Back Your Life: Recovering from Cults and Abusive 
Relationships (2006), and the pseudonymously authored Crooked Cross: A Journey Out 
of Religious Abuse (2012). 
The titles of these books—let alone what is expressed in their pages—stress the 
simply sad truth that even many of the most intently religious or spiritual know full well: 
experiences in these settings can be severely injurious or ruinous to one’s health and 
happiness.  For the most part, researchers have been inattentive to all the religiously or 
spiritually induced abuse that these writers have exposed and decried with indignant 
impatience over the last two decades. The appearance of the above-mentioned research is 
finally starting to bring together professional and popular literature around this serious 
topic. 
Another almost entirely un-researched construct that seems very applicable in 
understanding consequences of severe religious/spiritual abuse is “Religious Trauma 
Syndrome” (RTS) (Winell 2003, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c; see also the interview of Winell 
[2013] by Valorie Tarico). The syndrome and etiology presented in Winell’s model of 
RTS would include cases of ritual abuse as well as traumatic processes of religious 
deconversion or disaffiliation (as suggested by the title of her book, Leaving the Fold), 
usually from cults or conservative or fundamentalist evangelicalism (Tarico 2012; Tarico 
2014; c.f. Wright’s [1991] analysis of the deleterious effects of “cult withdrawal” using a 
model of marital divorce, based on  Vaughn’s [1986] Uncoupling: Turning Points in 
Intimate Relationships).  
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Virtually all of the research exploring connections between R/S and trauma 
measures the ways in which being religious or spiritual can help persons cope with and 
heal from traumas originated in other, non-R/S sources through, for instance, fostering 
post-traumatic personal growth, or otherwise, in “negative” religious coping, worsen 
outcomes in the aftermath of trauma (Pargament 1997). Summing up the current state of 
research into “religious trauma” simply as the surprising lack thereof, Alyson Stone, in 
apparently the single research article mentioning this construct, accurately notes, “...there 
are relatively few references to religion’s negative impact and virtually no references to 
religious trauma.  In fact, a search for articles on “religious trauma” yields studies on the 
use of religion to recover from trauma rather than religion as a source of trauma.” (Stone 
2013, 323).  The results obtainable now by the same search are dismayingly no different. 
The fact that popular writing about these matters is in no small measure outpacing 
social-scientific research surely “...suggests that professional literature does not yet 
accurately reflect potentially harmful impact of religion and spirituality or the abundance 
of concerns people have in these areas” (Stone 2013, 323; Masters 2010 and Griffin 2010 
are two other especially important exceptions). Social-scientists importantly continue to 
research the psychological and sociological corollaries of both adaptive and maladaptive 
forms of R/S coping in response to trauma. But so far no empirical studies have 
investigated how, and how much, the psychological entailments of powerful religious 
identifications and features of religiously formative social contexts can be causal 
precursors to, or factors within, traumatizing experiences.  
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Carrie Doehring’s Internal Desecration (1993) remains a unique and invaluable 
empirical study of experiences of traumatization involving aspects of internalized gods 
and the theologies internalized with them.  She stresses the “bi-directional nature of the 
relationship between traumatization and god-representation,” that “God representations 
may shape the severity of traumatization” and vice versa (120), and she repeatedly speaks 
of negative God representations becoming associated with experiences of interpersonal 
abuse. However, Doehring does not quite begin to discuss whether a relationship with an 
internalized god-object can itself become a source of trauma nor whether these 
relationships can in any sense become psychologically abusive. Even so, she seems to 
have come closer to asking these questions than any other empirical researchers to date. 
Her article, “The Absent God: When Neglect follows Sexual Violence,” published 
in the same year (1993), is an illustrative case-study where a client and therapist become 
able together to “take on the gods,” these gods being “powerful unconscious, internal 
representations that coalesce in the aftermath of sexual violence and [Divine] neglect,” 
through empathy as “both the context for and means of confronting” these gods (8; the 
model she elaborates for this empathic-confrontational process is Schlauch’s [1990]).   
In this article, Doehring and the client of the case, dis-identified by the name 
“Tara,” clearly do ask a crucial part of the question of psychological maltreatment in 
relationship to the Divine: the question of Divine “neglect,” god’s being “absent” during 
the event of, and painful aftermath of, trauma, when one’s need for Divine help and 
healing is most desperate. The consequences of such neglect by the absence of needful 
caretaking, and the meanings thereby communicated, can be lastingly detrimental (Hart 
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and Glaser 2011, 761; Horner 2004, 349; Clausen and Crittenden 1991, 14; c.f. Lau et al. 
2005, 547-48).  Data from a study by Lee, Roberts, and Gibbons (2013) details some of 
the therapeutic complications of cases like Tara’s. In their words, summing up and 
commenting upon their statistical results: “Recurrent thoughts of God’s punishment and 
abandonment, however, were moderately associated with both grief reactivity and 
recovery patterns. This kind of spiritual struggle is particularly potent because it reflects a 
ruptured relationship with God during a time where God’s support is sorely needed…” 
(300).  As will be discussed (in Part IV), punishment, neglect, abandonment, and several 
other types of behavior can be considerably abusive under certain conditions and with 
certain effects. 
 
Religious and Philosophical Studies: Arguing Over the Analogical Question 
Almost all the literature that contends explicitly with the abusiveness of a theistic 
god are theological and/or biblical in focus and method, Jewish in tradition, Hebraic-
biblical and post-holocaust in historical context.  Still the most substantive and instigative 
effort is a book written two decades ago by David R. Blumenthal, Facing the Abusing 
God: A Theology of Protest (1994) which quickly became the cynosure of diverse 
reflections on the abusiveness of YHWH (c.f. Tilley 1995; Solomon 1997; Lemke 1995; 
Rike 1997; Jung, 1994; Bloom 2008; Madsen 2001; see especially the series of 
exchanges between Dr. Blumenthal and his doctoral student Julie Shoshana Pfau [2000]). 
Several articles in the study of the Hebrew scriptures have also contended, to 
varying extents of explicitness, with this question of whether relating to God revealed in 
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these scriptures can be abusive (Bier 2014; Erickson 2013; Schlobin [1992] reading Job; 
Diamond [2008] reading Jeremiah; Houck-Loomis [2012] reading Lamentations—hers is 
an entirely unique Kleinian object-relational interpretation of the rhetorical-ideological 
function of the book to deal with the “loss of one’s primary love-object,” YHWH, who 
became a “damaged introjected object,” “loved but hated” [701]; De Villiers [2013] 
discusses the ideological ramifications of learning how to relate to God from biblical 
texts that reveal God’s “Divine terror” [3]). One of the principle approaches to biblical 
criticism taken in these analyses is “ethical criticism” (see the annotated bibliography of 
more sources by Froese 2011). Walter Brueggemann, renowned biblical scholar of the 
Hebrew scriptures, remarks that the eternal covenantal relationship of mutual loving trust 
between YHWH and Israel “[…] is deeply impinged upon by violence legitimated and 
enacted by this God, which is experienced in the tradition as Divine neglect and named as 
Divine abuse” (2014, 50). Continuing, Brueggemann rightly notes, 
[…] the [Jewish] tradition itself has always known that and struggled with [Divine 
neglect and abuse], long before the atheists came to the issue. The critiques made 
against this theological narrative are best known by its adherents and long known 
before the present challenge. Serious faith recognizes that the fidelity of God as 
agent of judgment and restoration is marked by a wildness that cannot be denied 
or explained away (50). 
 
Fewer but noteworthy Christian theological discussions of abuse in relationships with 
God have focused on the abuse of others (e.g. Polner [1991] addressed the “theological 
problem” of whether patriarchal ideologies in Christian theologies contribute to men 
abusing their family members) and self-abuse resulting from the influence of internalized 
theologies. James Clark (1995), citing Blumenthal (1994) and referring his own 
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autobiographical reflections to the story of Job as exegeted by Roger Schlobin (1992), 
speaks of abusing himself in relationship to an abusive god who could not accept, but 
rather condemned, his homosexuality. Dorothee Soëlle (1984), Brown and Parker (1992) 
and Lawer (1988), in ways comparable to Clark’s account, each discuss the sadistic 
abusiveness implied in the common penal-substitution/satisfaction understanding of 
Christ’s atonement and often associated Christian masochistic self-abuse (for a recent and 
thorough analysis of this association, see Lofuto 2012, 37-60).  
In responding to this question of Divine abuse, several of these theological 
writers, Jewish and Christian, have encouraged therapeutic strategies which involve 
acknowledging complicated emotional ambivalence or straightforward and outright 
hatred for this god, responses sometimes called “dystheistic” (i.e. loving and hating god 
at once; read, e.g., Lipner 2006) or “misotheistic” (i.e. god-hating, Schweizer 2011), 
respectively. Other authors less expressly concerned with confessional and god-relational 
implications of Divine abuse have also compared the god of the biblical scriptures to a 
human abuser (e.g. Young 2007; Schweizer 2011), as have notable atheist writers (e.g. 
Hitchens 2007).  
The question of Divine abuse has also received interest among philosophical 
theologians and philosophers of religion in the context of theodicy and belief-ethics. The 
most pertinent example is Divinely Abused: A Philosophical Perspective on Job and his 
Kin by Nehama Verbin (2010) (see reviews by Anderson 2010; Penchansky 2011; 
Madigan 2012). Jan-Olav Henriksen (2013, 115-176) provides the most recent, 
interdisciplinary, and psychoanalytic study of this sort that deals with the question. 
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Wesley J. Wildman, by making the analogy in what he calls the “Argument from 
Neglect” (2007, 278-297; c.f. responses by Phillip Clayton and Stephen Knapp 2011, 45-
67), sharpens to a finer point the traditional anti-theodical challenge against the 
plausibility of god as a morally comprehensible and perfect being.  And Mark Johnston 
(2009) very briefly but luridly brings the question into relief when speaking of the 
prophet Jeremiah’s agonized plea, found in Lamentations 3, against all of his Divinely 
caused suffering:  
It is a heartbreaking confession of faithfulness in the face of overwhelming reason 
to give up. Children of abusive parents would rather inhabit a hell in which those 
parents are still present, than a heaven in which they are absent. Just as such a 
child deserves better parents, Jeremiah deserves a better God (65). 
 
Apparently the only other place where the case against a god of theistic faith on the 
grounds of abuse has frequently been made is in the blogosphere, most often by openly 
atheistic or otherwise secular writers  (Cline  2015; Hayward 2014; Eugene 2012; 
Schweizer 2011; Fester 2011; Craig 2010; Spruce 2009; Fuego 2009; Never Going Back 
2007; Conway 2006; “Is the Christian ‘Relationship with God’ Healthy?” n.d.; “How Can 
You Tell the Difference Between Christianity and an Abusive Husband or Boyfriend” 
n.d.; “God: The Abusive Boyfriend” n.d.; Mehta 2014 c.f. Jones 2014 and Moglia 2014; 
Packham 1999). In most of these entries, the argument, or at least the makings of an 
argument implied in making the comparison, is from analogy between a theistic (in all 
these examples, Christian) god and an abusive human parent or romantic partner. The 
commentary sections below each of these various entries are certainly worth reading for 
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additional anecdotal evidence of agreement with the analogy and/or actual experiences of 
Divine abuse. 
 
 
The Importance and Difficulty of the Empirical Question  
Without new empirical data obtained through implementing some construct of 
Divine abuse, how can the psychological importance of these theological and anti-
theological interpretations of Divine abusiveness be understood better?  How can 
psychologists, theologians, pastoral psychologists, religious leaders, lay religionists, and 
whomever else it may concern, gain insight into the self-destructive vicissitudes of these 
experiences? What exactly is going on these relationships that makes them go so badly? 
That some individuals suffer in ways psychically inseparable from their gods is 
already obvious anecdotally and is becoming increasingly understandable with the social-
scientific evidence of the severity of some Divine struggles. It is crucial to recognize the 
central role that dysfunctional Divine-human relationships can have in R/S struggles. 
Likely for some, most of the psychological damage that results from R/S, or some of the 
worst of it, is from one’s own intimate relationship with the Divine. Noticing also that 
philosophical and theological arguments for an abusive god have been made by many 
authors (of theistic faith and not), it makes intuitive sense to raise specific empirical 
versions of the question of whether the dynamics of Divine relationships can indeed 
become abusive.  Divine abuse might be yet another definitive way in which R/S factors 
configure potentials for serious harm, notwithstanding all of the empirically apparent 
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positive associations between dimensions of R/S and dimensions of personal wellbeing 
(see reviews in Koenig [2004] and criticisms of this research by Sloan [2008]). Increasing 
empirical data indicating various salubrious effects of being religious or spiritual has 
established a basis for critiquing pathologizing (or otherwise patronizing) explanations of 
R/S inherited from classic psychoanalytic traditions (see Soreson 2004, 65-72; Jones 
1991; Meissner 1996).  However, in reacting critically to this tendency, religion-friendly 
researchers have sometimes perpetuated the confusion of “functions with effects” of 
religion that Michael Stausberg (2009, 5) keenly sees and disambiguates:  
The former notion [function] is normative; the latter [effect] is empirical…Based 
on their normative notions, protagonists of functionalism will claim that the 
religions showing these effects are atypical or malfunctioning. In addition, finding 
empirical evidence for effects should not be confused with analyzing functions. 
There may be ample evidence that being religious has positive effects for mental 
health (see Koenig, 1998), but this is not the same as saying that it is the function 
of religion to promote mental health. The effect of religion on health, i.e. a 
positive correlation, may well be a by-product of some other trait in or function 
of, or associated with, religion. (5-6) 
 
In whatever ways religion is normally ‘supposed’ to function for human societies and 
individuals (according to normative notions, e.g., taken from some theoretical account of 
the evolutionary history of religion, or from a theological account of Divine revelation in 
a particular religious’ tradition), what concerns me at present is, vaguely speaking, the 
effects of individuals’ ‘religious or spiritual variables’ on his or her ‘wellbeing variables.’  
Now it is well-known by those versed in the research to date that the relationship 
between R/S variables and their effects on variables of wellbeing is quite complex, more 
than the majority of empirical research in last few decades might have led readers to 
believe (see Lawrence 2010, 110-114). Stoope, Draper, and Whitehead (2013) note that 
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this realization of the complexity of R/S effects on wellbeing is consistent with the results 
of many sociological studies obtained besides these psychological studies of religion or 
spirituality. The complicated data in their own study, for example, showed significant and 
independent effects of “loving god-images” on particular dimensions of wellbeing, 
generally exemplifying the uniquely salient effects of “beliefs about God’s character” on 
“mental health outcomes,” while also “[supporting] the claims of sociologists of religion 
that the effects of ‘religion’ are multifarious…” (35). Likewise, Steven J. Sandage and 
colleagues are challenging those “viewing spirituality in a metaphysical fashion as ‘all 
good’” to take a “relational and empirical approach to spirituality” in order operationally 
to inventory “ways of relating to the Sacred” that involve “pathological” psychodynamics 
(Sandage and Crabtree 2015, 690; Paine and Sandage 2015).  
Psychoanalytic, clinically-based generalizations about the immature or maladaptive 
character of religion are overgeneralized just as easily as the more recent, more 
empirically-based generalizations about the health-supporting effects of R/S. The mistake 
of overgeneralizing about the R/S-wellbeing relationship might allow oversimplifications 
of the complexity of possible psychological effects of being religious, not to mention of 
having an intimate relationship with God. Acceptance of these oversimplifications might 
preclude subtler discernment of ostensible psychological consequences of R/S for 
individuals whose wellbeing seems overall augmented or overall diminished by R/S. 
The empirical question of Divine abuse must first be asked at the level of individual 
cases, whether clinically presented or not. The answers indicated by the data will decide 
whether it makes sense to start asking questions at the inter-individual level. Hence, here I 
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am concerned with the hypothetical individual’s relationship with his or her god. Is this 
relationship that this person has with this god healthy for him or her? If unhealthy, how 
unhealthy and unhealthy how so? Is this relationship unhealthy in psychologically abusive 
ways?  
As down-to-earth as these questions can be rendered for psychological purposes, 
to believing clients or research participants, they might implicate R/S questions of the 
transcendental sort that psychologists are not in positions to answer (at least not in their 
assumed roles). Moreover, these questions closely attend theoretical questions of the sort 
Brian D. Vandenberg and colleagues have carefully approached: for instance, the obscure 
diagnostic problem of distinguishing delusional from non-delusional religious ideation 
(Vandenberg 2012), and the ideological problem of prejudice in clinically identifying 
religious ideation as pathognomonic (O’Connor and Vandenberg 2005). 
Empirical evidence indicates the prevalence of difficulties on the part of therapists 
who do not share their clients’ R/S beliefs when undertaking to understand health 
problems originating from the R/S genre of sources. It is common for religious or 
spiritual clients of psychotherapy not to be very forthcoming in sharing about their R/S 
struggles (Pirutinskey, Rosmarin, and Pargament 2009). Meanwhile, as O’Connor and 
Vandenberg (2005) report, clinicians in aggregate are less religious or spiritual than 
average and “therefore, may be more likely to interpret religious ideation as pathological 
(Lukoff et al., 1992),” interpreting which is always replete with ambiguities (Vandenberg 
2012), and “…. while education in cultural diversity has become common in graduate 
psychology training programs, training in religious and spiritual issues is not typically 
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addressed” (2005, 611). Furthermore, empirical research has revealed that therapeutic 
practitioners are often under-trained for (Lukoff, 1998; Walker, Gorsuch, and Tan 2004) 
and/or uncomfortable with (Smidt et al. 2010) addressing problems which their clients 
have adverted to supernatural causes.  Psychologists and psychoanalysts have keenly 
debated the appropriate responses to R/S beliefs, behaviors, or belongings that seem 
conducive to clients’ psychopathologies (e.g. see Helminiak 2001a, reviews by Watts 
2001, Silfe and Richards 2001, and Marquis, Holden, and Warren 2001, and Helminiak’s 
replies to each in turn [2001b]) and the issues of countertransference often involved (see 
contributions to the symposium, “The God Representation in the Psychoanalytic 
Relationship: When is Three a Crowd?” by Spero and Cohen 2009a, 2009b) in dealing, 
so to speak, with “God” in the room. The experience that I am calling Divine abuse (and 
will clarify in Parts III-V), if included in the DSM-5, would likely be classed somewhere 
among the “Other Conditions that May Be the Focus of Clinical Attention” (APA 2013). 
Most obviously, experience of Divine abuse would be categorized as a “Religious or 
Spiritual Problem” (V62.89 Z65.8). Peculiarly, in theory, it might also manifest effects of 
suspected or confirmed “Adult Psychological Abuse by Nonspouse or Nonpartner” 
(995.83 or .82). 
 
Some Terminological Notes 
Natural vs. Supernatural 
The worldview “Naturalism” is somewhat difficult to define. Various mutually 
resembling but subtly differing worldviews share the name (Ritchie 2009). By calling 
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something “natural,” I mean that its existence is fully included within the processes of 
cause-and-effect as understood through current science (c.f. Clark’s definition 2007). The 
definition of the worldview “Naturalism” derives from this definition of “natural”. 
According to Naturalism, everything that exists, exists as part of this casual nexus 
(whatever the philosophical account of causality that is assumed).  Naturalism thus 
defined would mean that human subjects are just as much included in the causal nexus of 
nature as everything else—everything else, since, in this worldview, it is nonsense to say 
something exists non-naturally. Reality is not divisible into distinct realms. There is no 
‘higher’ order of reality, no other kind of nature above the scientifically investigable 
nature in which we ‘live and move and have all our being.’ Nature is equated with the 
whole of reality. Thus, the adjective “natural” is not, for the Naturalist, contrastive, 
except whenever notions of supernatural realities are concerned. 
 I do not mean to entail in this definition of naturalism the philosophical doctrine 
of reductive materialism or physicalism—that all reality is only material/physical stuff 
(c.f. Clark 2007, just cited, who seems to do so). This doctrine indeed is naturalistic, but 
there are other non-physicalist naturalisms (such as the dual-aspect monism of Spinoza, 
the neutral monism of Dewey, or Whitehead’s “philosophy of organism”). 
Supernaturalism is obviously much easier to define having defined naturalism.  
The prefix functions in contrast to naturalism. According to this definition of “natural,” 
by calling something “supernatural” I mean:  something not fully included in nature. By 
viewing something “supernaturally,” I mean viewing it as somehow, in some respect, to 
some extent, above or beyond nature. This simple definition conforms to the etymology 
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of the word “supernatural,” deriving from the Medieval Latin supernaturalis: literally, 
super- (above/beyond) naturalis (nature) (Harper 2016); for a current and complete 
dictionary definition: “of or relating to an order of existence beyond the visible 
observable universe; especially of or relating to God or a god, demigod, spirit or devil” 
(Merriam-Webster Dictionary 2015). 
Naturalism rejects all such beliefs. There are no gods, no spirits, no angels or 
demons, no ancestor ghosts, no grand spirit or mind—nothing the existence of which is 
believed to be in any measure exceptional to the causal ‘rules’ that structure the events or 
occasions of nature (whether these ‘rules’ be conceived as inalterable laws, law-like 
‘regularities,’ evolving, more or less stable cosmic ‘habits’, etc.). “Supernaturalistic” 
religious faith is that which posits the existence of any such realities. 
 
“Supernatural” vs. “Divine” 
In these senses of the words “natural” and “supernatural,” I will follow the 
terminology that Abu-Raiya et al. (2015), mentioned above, use to differentiate types of 
R/S struggles. Accordingly, when I use the word “Divine” (e.g. “Divine relationship” or 
“Divine abuse”), I am referring to supernatural deities, and when I use the word 
“supernatural,” I am either speaking more broadly of both “Divine” and “demonic” 
phenomena or otherwise accentuating the believed supernatural status of the Divine 
phenomenon in question. Here I am concerned just with conceptualizing the experience 
of Divine abuse, not, perhaps, demonic abuse.  
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What I am calling (and will define in Part V) “Divine abuse” can be considered an 
especially worrisome manifestation of “Divine struggle,” except insofar as connotations 
of “struggle” are assumed to indicate the salience of psychological conditions (discussed 
in Parts IV and V), such as awareness or agency in struggling against Divine abuse, that 
might instead be subdued in and by the experience. 
 
“God” vs. “god” 
 I center the “supernatural” because I am especially interested in versions of 
religious theism (particularly Christian, Jewish, or Islamic versions) that are oriented 
around a belief in a Divine being whose understood relationship with the rest of the 
world, including human beings, is firstly distinguishable from other forms of religious 
theism by this adjective “supernatural” (as in “supernaturalistic theism”). The standard 
cosmology of “supernaturalistic theism” I have in mind is described well by Wesley 
Wildman (2008): 
One view is a supernatural cosmology, in which the world of nature is open to 
influence and control by beings beyond the natural world. On this view, typically 
there are Gods or there is a God, and perhaps lesser discarnate entities, with 
determinate features such as intentions and plans, feelings and responses, and 
powers to act in the world. This means that the natural world may have its causal 
rules but that they are not absolute: the normal flow of causal connectedness can 
be interrupted at any time for reasons having nothing to do with antecedent 
conditions in nature. The interruptions may be miraculous, in the sense of 
abrogating natural laws, or they may be somehow consistent with natural laws by 
working in causal gaps within nature, if such gaps exist, but they express 
supernatural intentions in either case. In the theistic version of this supernatural 
cosmology, one omnipotent deity with determinate features is the ultimate reality 
who creates everything and interacts with the world according to Divine purposes 
(199-200) 
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Throughout the following, the word “God” refers to the popularly given proper name to 
the Divine being in question, namely, a God understood through these theistic faiths. 
Thus, the frequent capitalization and singularity of the word (as well as similar words, 
e.g., “Divine”) will not indicate my own, but rather a religious theist’s belief that some 
such Divine being exists. My use of the lower-case “god(s)”, in its religious reference, is 
generic (referring to anyone’s “god”). In its psychological reference (as I explain in Part 
III), “god(s)” are psychically real representations of “Gods” who may or may not be real 
themselves. Where the Divine subject in question is named “God” the representational 
object mediating the relationship is called “god.” This duality emphasizes at once the 
abstract distinction (whether for the psychologist or the theologian) between the object 
and the subject and the lack of such a distinction consciously in relationships with 
Gods/gods. 
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Part II. Psychologizing Divine Relationships 
 
 
Between Psychology of Religion and Theology 
 
This inquiry about experiences of psychological abuse in Divine relationships is 
intentionally psychological, not theological, in orientation. But experiences in 
relationships with Gods always involve theology. For someone whose Divine relationship 
has become an intense struggle, certain theological understandings are at issue or at stake. 
At least to the extent of these theological understandings, the psychologist should try to 
think theologically in order to understand the experiences. But in what sense might the 
non-theistic psychologist take theistic theology seriously while not believing it sincerely? 
 Several methods are typical. Non-theistic psychologists might bracket theological 
questions off from their investigations at the outset and ensure along the way that their 
stated inferences do not implicate the veracity of others’ theologies. This method is 
frequently the one of choice in social-scientific scholarship as well as in psychoanalysis 
(see Spero and Cohen 2009b) because it is most prudent. It is often unclear whether such 
prudence reflects appropriate modesty or inappropriate timidity when encountering God-
related alterity of another person. Justifications for this limitation of analysis might vary. 
Perhaps the psychologist is not in the position to engage these questions epistemically. 
Perhaps to do so is just not practical for purposes of psychotherapy or psychological 
research. Perhaps to approach such sacredly important questions as the very existence of 
the problematic Divine relationship is disrespectful encroachment. If not out-of-place, 
ethically speaking, perhaps raising the question crosses a line of comfort.  
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Just as careful methodologically but less stinting of theological analysis, the non-
theistic psychologist might try to entertain the existence of the God in question as fully as 
possible in imagination (I read Rizzuto [1979] and Jones [1991], [1995], for example, as 
interpreting cases in this way) and interpreting problems in the relationship accordingly. 
This strategy has the advantage of not ignoring the implications of theistic convictions for 
understanding the Divine relationship and even enables some exploration of these 
implications—implications which make significant differences for interpretation. The 
question of the existence of the God in question is still bracketed, but bracketed in a way 
that keeps this God in rather than out of the focus of analysis. 
To believe that the Divine being is not merely an internal relational object of the 
human subject, but a real subject—or the Ultimate Subject founding all subjectivity—
increases the range of interpretation to theological proportions.  Many theistic 
psychologists have therefore wanted to infuse theology into psychological interpretations 
of these relationships. This non-bracketing method is of course especially apt for theistic 
or otherwise theologically-inclined psychologists, while not reasonable or even feasible 
for non-theists who are not at least capable of entertaining theistic faith for themselves. 
Theological accounts of the psychodynamics involved in the relationship could expound 
the relational implications for understanding human experience of a certain theological 
model of God, for instance, Trinitarian (Miner 2007 especially; c.f. Houser and Welch 
2013, and Sandage, Jensen, and Jass 2008). An implication, often intended, of articles 
such as these is that in order to understand Divine relationships, not only must theology 
learn from psychology but also vice versa.  
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  The use of this both psychological and theological method of analysis can be 
seen in the seminal work of many authors to integrate their particular theological 
perspectives with the psychoanalysis of religion, especially Object-Relations (McDargh 
1983, Meissner 1984, and Spero 1993 are exemplary attempts). The integrative effort is 
understandable and worthwhile but difficult insofar as the primary motivation for this 
effort is evidential, and only secondarily integrative (rather than the reverse). These two 
motivating interests both seek empirical data from scientific work. But the primarily 
evidential interest requires a more thoroughgoing scientific epistemology in evaluating 
theology—allowing empirical data to impact the plausibility not just of psychological 
theories but also of theologies (treating theologies like all other theories). A scientific 
approach to theology requires the adjudication of competing explanatory theories of the 
phenomena in question and therefore requires plausibility judgments be made in response 
to empirical feedback on the theological frameworks used (see criticisms of common 
integrationist agendas by Shults 2012).  
Some would criticize scientific evaluations of theological belief-systems as 
theoretical frameworks overextending psychology beyond boundaries it should respect 
for the sake of its own integrity and the integrity of its subject-matter.  Those who are not 
deterred by this criticism might proceed to challenge all “theogonic” habits with 
“theolytic” insights (lit. “God-bearing” and “God-dissolving,” terms neologized by Shults 
2013).  Dissolution of the theological problems involved through dissolution of the 
theology is an appropriate method for non-theists who, like Shults, want to understand 
the phenomenology of religion but believe that our species will benefit, as a whole and in 
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the long-run, without supernaturalistic religiousness (some tactics for implementing this 
method are more appropriate and effective than others; see Shults’ discussion [2013] in 
the fifth chapter). Those who are critical of theology-integrative methods in psychology 
are usually non-theists like LeRon Shults and are inclined to use these science-minded 
methods instead. Neither of these methods brackets questions of the ‘truth’ of theologies. 
Both directly engage these questions but with opposing agendas. 
The argument against integrating psychology and theology often follows from the 
commitment to empiricism that is concomitant in committing psychology to naturalism: 
psychology can deal directly only with what is natural, and therefore only with what is, at 
least in principle, empirically investigable. The supernatural is super-empirical, so, at 
most, only the human person’s internal supernaturalistic representations—never their 
supernatural referent, whether real or unreal—can be studied. This usual argument 
remains the most intuitive for a secularist such as myself and I would maintain that the 
argument is valid and to the point. Psychoanalysis of allegedly supernatural and 
intersubjective relationships must be kept within intrapsychic and naturalistic limits, 
whatever the theological beliefs of the psychologist or the psychoanalyzed.  
But in responding to challenges posed by certain theistic, theologically-minded 
psychologists, I will try to account for the assets and liabilities of assuming the 
hermeneutical adequacy of this view where the relational behaviors of the alleged 
supernatural being are in question by clients or research participants, situations of the sort 
where the question of Divine abuse could be raised.  
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To pursue this question of the ‘truth’ of theologies in light of what psychoanalysis 
or psychological research reveals would require venturing scientifically into the 
interdisciplinary arena of philosophical theology and the philosophy of religion. 
Contemporarily, much work in these disciplines shares wide interface with scientific 
naturalism and applies the same evidentialism. Sources mentioned in the previous chapter 
are wonderful forays into this intricate fray of faith and reason (Verbin 2010; Wildman 
2007; Phillip Clayton and Stephen Knapp 2011; Henriksen 2013).  
Certainly, pursuing this question is one intriguing direction the present inquiry 
could take. But here my purpose is different. By helpful contrast with the methodology 
Henrikson (2013) explains in his book, Relating Self and God: A Dynamic Interplay, of 
drawing upon literature in the psychology of religion in order make a compelling 
philosophical case about the implications of relational theology—I am considering 
problematic religious experiences psychologically with occasional reference to 
philosophy of religion or theology. 
Accordingly, I will avoid the promising temptation to pursue the question of the 
evidential implications for Gods of theistic faiths when confronted with countervailing 
appearances of Divine maltreatment in ways that cannot easily be explained away by 
theodicies and that necessitate significant adjustments to theological systems. Deciding to 
bracket such philosophical and theological questions aptly limits the present inquiry to 
the psychology of religion, but this decision is not, in my opinion, not justifiable for 
purposes of responsible theological or philosophical discourse. Still, because theistic 
theology is inextricable from the psychodynamics of relationships with Gods, my 
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discussions in this section remain located at the confusing intersection of psychology and 
theology. There I will examine the ways in which basic presuppositions influence 
interpretations of the experiential phenomena of a Divine-human relationship.  
 
Metapsychologies in Psychology of Religion 
These methodological choices and conflicts should detain inquiries into 
experiences purported to involve supernatural realties. Experience, as I intend the word 
here, is whatever is lived through—however consciously or not—and leaves 
impressions—however conscious or not.  In which perspective(s) should experiences of 
Gods be viewed? Different perspectives taken differently influence how experiences of 
harm, let alone abuse, in supernatural relationships are ontically categorized and causally 
understood. These differences in hermeneutical inclinations seem to turn first of all on 
metapsychological questions of whether the supernatural Other in question (“God”) is 
regarded as real ontically or merely phenomenally (only real in and for the human subject 
as an experiential phenomenon), that is, not ‘really’ real as theistically believed. 
Classically Freudian forms of psychoanalysis participate in the Modern 
philosophical “Turn to the Subject” (à la the infamous Descartes). Chris R. Schlauch 
narrates succinctly the metapsychological results of this philosophical Turn in the early 
history of psychoanalysis. In formulations of psychoanalytic theory as well as technique, 
this Cartesian subject-centrism facilitated the tendency of turning “away from that which 
is not-subject,” away from “others,” and thus analyzing the subject “in isolation, as if it 
exists in isolation,” (Schlauch, 1999, 107). The fixation of analysis on the single subject 
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presenting the problems coincided with a set of guiding assumptions or implicit criteria 
for the newly emergent discipline of psychoanalysis.  First, the subject’s problems are to 
be analyzed only in psychological ways (“as contrasted, for example, with theological, 
philosophical, or ethical”) (107). Furthermore, the sources of these problems are 
presumed natural (“as contrasted with supernatural or transcendent”) and their locus 
intrapsychic (“as contrasted with interpersonal and public”) (Schlauch 1999, 107). Within 
these limits of analysis, the “traditional psychoanalyst studies neither communities nor 
relationships, but investigates a person’s experience of him or her self and others 
[emphasis mine]” (107).  
These three metapsychological delimitations (“psychological,” “natural,” and 
“intrapsychic”) in classical psychoanalysis have been paradigmatic in various Freudian 
and Neo-Freudian “Drive-Structural” models of personality (Greenberg and Mitchell 
1983). Against the classic “intrapsychicism” of psychoanalysis perpetuated in these 
Drive-Structural models, various “Relational” (Mitchell 1988) or, in a more philosophical 
vein, “Intersubjective” (Benjamin 2004) metapsychologies have been argued in critique.  
This contemporary shift in theoretical psychoanalysis has implications for 
thinking about the nature of problems avowed to involve supernatural beings. Regarding 
such problems, the controversy is usually expressed over the criterion of naturalism, 
wherever its criterion is assumed, as usual, to rule out the supernatural from reality—or at 
least from analysis. And this exclusion of the supernatural is associated with 
understandings of what psychology is about or what it is supposed to do. It is not—need 
not and cannot be—theological, most psychologists would say. But, of course, many 
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psychologists and their clients or research participants are theologically minded theistic 
believers. Hence this psychological criterion is also debated in the context of theology, 
usually in the form of debating the classical natural and intrapsychic criteria. 
For purposes of organizing my discussion in this section, I will use the two 
Classical metapsychological criteria that Schlauch (1999) named “natural” and 
“intrapsychic” as simple lines of distinction for a simple scheme of four ways 
psychologists might view relationships with claimed supernatural realities: (1) 
intrapsychically and naturally, (2) intrapsychically and supernaturally, (3) naturally and 
intersubjectively, or (4) intersubjectively and supernaturally. 
 Psychologists approximate these views in degrees, not necessarily consistently, 
and more nuanced sub-specifications are conceivable.  Still, in my imagination, any 
definable and psychologically-guided way of viewing another person’s supernatural 
relationship can either be placed somewhere in one the four ‘quadrants’ of this scheme, 
based on these two axes. Or, rather than divided into quadrants and more illustrative of 
the comparison of perspectives I want to undertake, these perspectives can be ordered 
according to the size of the ontological scope that is used in interpreting a person’s 
Divine relational problems—in other words, the amount of possible variables one is 
prepared in each perspective to take into account in trying to interpret the problems: 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
In this overly simplifying visual scheme, I am not portraying the principle of ‘the 
more the better.’ As a naturalist, in the way I defined above, I do not believe there is any 
kind of supernature and thus I do not believe that supernatural relationships are in fact 
supernatural. Thus I cannot interpret the involvement of any kind of supernatural 
subjectivity in human struggles (4) as supernatural, nor can I interpret any kind of 
intrapsychically supernatural reality (3) as supernatural. 
At most, interpreting human problems under the assumption that supernatural 
realities (however intra- or –intersubjective) do not exist, I am limited to interpreting the 
human subject’s representations of the believed supernatural being’s subjectivity. These 
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representations—not the realties they represent—are all intrapsychic, existing within the 
subjectivity of the human person. So, in short, within the metapsychological limitations 
of my current worldview, I view any relationship with any supernatural reality (such as 
“God”) as though coextensive with representations thereof. 
Of the four scopes I am contrasting, the only ones I can use, so long as I stay 
imaginatively within my current (provisional, mutable, fallible) worldview, are the first 
and third—both naturalistic. I tend to prefer the second for interpreting inter-human 
relationships: intersubjective and naturalistic (2). However, because I do not believe 
there really are supernatural relationships, I turn to intrapsychic and naturalistic (1) 
theories in order to try understanding the experience of the other person.  And yet, if I 
want to understand the person’s phenomenally very real experience of this Subject 
(whose reality, ontically, I doubt), I must also somehow try to see the experience from 
within his or her supernaturalistic worldview wherein God is also ontically very real (4). 
This hermeneutical effort requires somehow switching between these ways of seeing. 
Of all five sensory root-metaphors—sight, scent, hearing, touch, taste—those of 
sight are the most frequently used in discussing matters of interpretation. Historically, 
Western philosophers and theologians have tended to privilege metaphors of sight over 
those of other senses in using them to metaphorize abilities of the intellect (humanity’s 
glory and, of course, God’s). In a psychotherapeutic setting, perhaps auditory metaphors 
are more apt. After all, what most psychotherapists do more than anything during 
sessions is listen, and try to listen well.  Interpretation, in audial metaphors, occurs by 
tuning-in to affect, picking up higher and lower frequencies of meaning, hearing the 
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timbre of others’ experiences, and so on. In the Gospels, Jesus often says imperatively, 
“He who has ears…” or “the ears to hear… let him hear!” Seeing or hearing experiences 
of Divine abuse in psychotherapy or in psychological research will never be as striking as 
witnessing a man crucified exclaim in agony “My God, why have you forsaken me?” I 
am asking, in auditory metaphor, how can the experience of abuse by God be heard?  
 
Interpreting Problems in Divine Relationships  
At the dialogical interface of the disciplines of psychology and theology (perhaps 
competitive, perhaps complementary, perhaps both in different respects, whether trying 
to overcome one with the other or integrate the insights of each—etc.) the expressed 
concern in the literature often regards the naturalistic criterion. Meanwhile, among 
competing psychological theories (whatever the naturalism or supernaturalism of each), 
the expressed concern is often over the intrapsychic criterion.  
I will briefly explore these two main areas of tension in the psychology of 
religion, first in terms of the “classical” way (Schlauch 1999; Gill 1995) of 
psychoanalyzing problems in supernatural relationships naturally and intrapsychically, 
and then in terms of “contemporary” counter-emphases: the explicitly supernaturalist 
emphasis of some theistic theologians, and the intersubjective counter-emphasis that 
would be consistent with the explicit emphases of contemporary Intersubjective 
psychoanalysts regarding inter-human relationships. 
My question in this section is about presuppositions determining interpretations. 
What is presupposed in approaching these problems intersubjectively, as inextricably 
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bound up in two mutually influencing subjectivities at once—one natural (human), one 
supernatural (Divine)—versus just intrapsychically, entirely within one subject, or, 
between the subject and his or her internal object that ‘stands in’ for the Divine subject?  
Psychoanalytically speaking, all relationships with other subjects, human or Divine, are 
mediated by internal representations of them. These “objects” representing “subjects” 
function to support selfhood.  An experientially bidirectional subject-subject relationship 
is, in this understanding, a bidirectional object-object relationship. For the theistic 
religious person, object representations of Divine beings are representations of relating to 
really existing Subjects, whose intentionality and activity must be taken into account in 
order to understand any problems in this subject-subject relationship. 
 
Supernatural Problems Interpreted Naturalistically 
From the cosmological contrast I made earlier between Supernaturalistic and 
Naturalistic worldviews, the sole and simple point I now want to reiterate is the 
metapsychological difference this contrast makes when interpreting problems in 
relationships claimed to be supernatural. A Naturalistic metapsychological criterion 
(Schlauch 1999) inclines the psychologist to interpret problems in relationships with 
allegedly supernatural Gods as, in reality, only natural. This assumption cannot be 
defended only with reference to psychological evidence, although arguably relevant. 
Making the claim goes beyond psychology into philosophy or theology. 
Assuming the naturalism criterion limits study of the supernaturalistic theist’s 
relationship with his or her “God,” a Divine Subject, to the study of the psychical or 
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phenomenal reality of the “god” representing this “God.”  In psychoanalytic jargon, the 
“god” in question is not the “God” whose subjectivity in relation to human subjectivities 
is understood and interpreted theologically but the internal god-object made of the very 
same makings of the human subject’s psychology, interpreted psychologically. 
 Conversely, naturalism prevents viewing the alleged relationship with this God in 
a larger context ‘above or beyond’ that of the supernaturalistic theist’s all-too-human 
subjectivity, as though in the context of the God’s subjectivity. A naturalistic view of the 
alleged supernatural relationships thus ‘naturally’ shifts the focus away from the “not-
[human]-subject,” away from the “[Divine] other” (Schlauch 1999, 107), to the 
intrapsychic, to the realm of inner objects and inner relations with them. 
 
Intersubjective Problems Interpreted Intrapsychically 
Most psychoanalytic meanings of the term “object” (albeit varied; see Goldberg 
1983) post-Freud have retained the meaning in Freud’s usages that objects need not really 
exist (as ontically independent of the human subject) to fulfill their psychological 
functions. So long as the human subject is under some impression of its existence, the 
object can play the intrapsychic roles for which it is naturally attractive: satisfying 
instinctual drives. Even objects intensely cathected with affect might consist merely in 
unconsciously originating, wish-fulfilling delusion (Freud [1927] 1961). 
For Freud, all believed supernatural objects, while illusorily ‘real’ for the subject 
(in their wish-fulfilling efficacy), are delusory distortions of reality due to neuroses 
(Freud, [1927] 1961). Objects of experience that have existence only within the subject, 
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not extending beyond this intrapsychic context, are only phenomenally, not ontically, 
real. Phenomenally real experiences are illusory, in Freud’s sense, and may or may not be 
ontically real. If not, they are delusory, in Freud’s sense ([1927] 1961). 
Whether interpreting Divine relationships naturally or supernaturally, and 
accordingly as unreal or as real, such an intrapsychic emphasis likewise turns the focus of 
analysis entirely upon the human subject and invokes a principle (implicitly naturalistic; 
see Jones 1995, 97-100) that equivalently distinguishes unreal from real.  
The intrapsychic criterion does not require disbelief in the existence of the other 
Divine subject, but has the same effect of focusing analysis upon whatever internal to the 
psyche of the human subject is relevant to the (really existing or not) supernatural 
relationship. Accordingly, whether viewing alleged supernatural phenomena as natural, 
as intrapsychic, or as both natural and intrapsychic, the perspective is focused upon the 
human subject and its internal object representing imaginations of the supernatural. The 
result is the exclusion of questions of how supernatural beings (having conscious 
awareness, intentionality, and agency) are relating the human being.  
The human subject’s presenting problems with the Divine being are thus 
presumed by the analyst to lie somewhere within the psyche of the human subject—not in 
the intersubjective dynamics of a Divine relationship.  For understanding subjective 
experiences of Divine relationships, this classic sort of “natural” and “intrapsychic” 
theorizing precludes recognition of another Divine subject in the relationship.  
Any God of religious theism is regarded not as having subjectivity of its own, but 
rather is regarded as a mere phantasmagoric object with no existence except as part of the 
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experiential world of human subjectivity. This view, my view, is naturalistic and 
intrapsychic (Scope 1). As Schlauch observes, in a later essay, “these assumptions 
impose certain limitations on research and study,” (2003, 52). Several of the limitations 
he mentions are pertinent to quote in application to supernatural relationships with gods: 
 (1) everything is natural. Whatever is not natural or cannot be recast as natural is 
ignored; (2) everything about ‘external reality’ —the environment, even other 
persons, is to be understood in objective (‘objectified’) terms, as an object. 
Whatever is not an object or cannot be recast as an object is ignored. Features of 
the other as ‘subject’ are bracketed (see Benjamin, 1992; Spero, 1992); (3) given 
the fundamental distinction and gap between the (human) subject and the world, 
the nature and quality of a relationship, interaction, or contact between subject 
and what is not-subject is neglected; (4) the dynamically unfolding process of 
mutually-informing actions between subjects may be rendered invisible… (52). 
 
Supernaturalizing Psychology of Religion? 
Some Christian theistic psychologists of religion have tried to overcome these 
metapsychologically imposed limitations of both naturalism and intrapsychism in arguing 
that psychological inquiries should take seriously the theological belief, for both its 
theoretical and therapeutic ramifications (for Christian theists, not mere belief but Divine 
revelation), that God is indeed a real relational Other (Miner 2007, 2009; Hall 2007a). Of 
course, this view is consistent with the vast majority of Christian theists’ views of their 
own relationships to God: supernaturalistic and intersubjective.  
Studying the psychological processes by which theologies are developed and 
function for individuals but not thinking through the theological perspectives of these 
theologies, psychologists risk reducing the full existential robustness of others’ theologies 
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believed sincerely to reflect the deepest realities of their experiences. Such is one of 
Maureen Miner’s (2007, 2009) challenges to psychologists of religion.  
Worries and warnings against reductionism are perhaps the most usual sort 
expressed in a phenomenological spirit in the work of religious studies generally (and are 
not, of course, any less important for their usualness). When limiting assessments of other 
subjects’ religious experiences to their own professional or disciplinary competencies, 
researchers should always be wary not to reduce R/S experiences to experiences that 
instantiate the abstract categories of their theoretical apparatuses.  
In critiquing the relevance of theologian Walter Kaufmann (1968, 1981) to 
understanding intimate relationships with the Christian God (critiquing also Lee 
Kirkpatrick [2005] for applying Kaufmann’s liberal theology to the study religious 
experience via Attachment Theory), Miner seems to verge vaguely on reducing the 
reductionism of scientific explanations of religious experience to improper reductionism. 
By necessity for its explanative success, even regarding R/S experience, all science must 
be properly reductive (for summaries of various contemporary scientific theories of 
religion, see Stausberg 2010; Van Riel and Van Gulick [2016] provide an excellent 
philosophical introduction to rationales and issues of scientific reductionism; for 
reductionism in psychoanalysis of religion, see Jones 1995, 114-154). 
 It is not necessarily improper reductionism to view relationships with putative 
gods as natural and intrapsychic. Interpreting whether improper reductionism is involved 
requires evaluating explanations made from this viewpoint against the empirical. 
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However, the supernatural is super-empirical, i.e. not open to empirical study, as virtually 
all psychologists and theologians would agree.  
That is the reason why Miner also argues (2007, 2009) that without the help of 
theology, psychologists of religion cannot account but one-sidedly for the dynamics of 
human relationships with their gods.  Christian theistic psychologist, Todd Hall (2007a) 
seems to share Miner’s worries about biases of reductionism and one-sidedness and has 
similarly emphasized the importance of psychotherapists to think theologically, or at least 
to have better acquaintance with spirituality, so as not to interpret the phenomena of 
clients’ relationships with God only intrapsychically: 
…as Christians, we take seriously the “Otherness” of God—that He can and does 
break into our clients’ relational matrices. That is, our clients’ relationships with 
God are not the sum total of their early human relationships, or the internalization 
of those relationships. While seemingly obvious from a theoretical perspective, 
extensive training in psychoanalytic psychotherapy, without complementary 
experience in the spiritual disciplines and spiritual direction, likely biases us toward 
reducing our client’s “God” to the internalized mother or father. Without intentional 
training, experience, and dialogue with our colleagues, this becomes the implicit 
lens through which we view the clinical, spiritual world (18).  
 
Like Hall and Miner, non-theistic psychologists of religion tend also to reason that only 
the side of the psychology of the human being can be studied psychologically because that 
side is empirical, empirical because it is natural, whereas the supernatural relationships is 
super-empirical and admits only of theological study.   
But they might nonetheless accuse Miner of begging the question in her complaint 
that the situation is really one-sided. The claim that un-theological psychology of religion 
is one-sided is itself super-empirical because its truth is contingent upon a super-empirical 
premise in which she believes: the existence of God. Un-theological psychology of religion 
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is one-sided if indeed the Divine being in question exists. But this belief is not shared by 
non-theists. So reception by non-theistic psychologists of religion of this criticism is 
unlikely due to this metaphysical difference in belief.  
However, Miner’s insistence on both of these claims, psychology’s reductiveness 
and one-sidedness in explaining religious experience, and her emphasis on the real 
subjectivity of the Divine, re-introduces into the vast literature produced through social-
scientific approaches to religion some important theological counter-emphasis against long 
dominant non-theological or anti-theological trends. This counter-emphasis is strongly 
reinforced through her provision of a coherent, albeit particular, theological account of 
“fully inter-subjective attachment relationships between a person and God” (121) (c.f. 
Houser and Welch [2013] who seem largely to agree with Miner’s theological account but 
try to improve upon her argument in empirical terms). But, again, how can non-
supernaturalist psychologists encountering the power of such relationships in clinical 
settings, or studying as I am religious relationships of attachment to Divine figures, be 
availed of theologies of the Divine nature? How can non-theistic psychologists take theistic 
theology seriously, if at all, for their purposes as psychologists? 
 
Intersubjectivizing Psychology of Religion? 
 
Interestingly, this theological effort on the part of non-theistic psychologists is 
consistent with concurrent major emphases among “Intersubjective” (Benjamin 1992; 
Atwood and Stolorow 1992) psychoanalysis, often considered (Gill 1995; Benjamin 
2009) an especially philosophical version of “Relational” psychoanalysis (Mitchell 
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1988).  Intersubjective theories of psychoanalysis turn the understanding of personhood 
in classic psychoanalytic theory into that of a subject who is fundamentally related to 
other subjectivities for its very being and therefore is never definably isolable. 
As Freud was advancing psychoanalysis, William James and George Herbert 
Mead, two equally eminent theoreticians advancing the American Pragmatist tradition, 
presaged this intersubjective turn against the intrapsychism of Freudianism in their social 
psychologies. Defining “social selves,” James said, “Properly speaking, a man has as 
many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him 
in their mind. To wound any one of these his images is to wound him” (James [1890] 
1950, 294). Mead spoke of the Social Self (1901) as comprised of ‘I’ and ‘Me’, the latter 
of which is formed through an interpersonal “communication of gestures” evincing 
others’ imputations of meaning, to which the ‘I’ responds (Mead [1934] 1962). 
Many post-Freudian traditions have also attempted to make the shift away from 
overly intrapsychic models of personhood, albeit to varying degrees and with different 
trajectories (Greenberg and Mitchell 1983). The Interpersonal Psychology of Sullivan, 
the Self-Psychology of Kohut, and the Object-Relations Psychology of Fairbairn or 
Winnicott are notable examples. All of these theorists and still others (such as Loewald, 
Kernberg, and Mahler) are significant influences, continually, in the development of 
contemporary Intersubjective theories (see Gerhart and Sweetnam 2001 and Gerhart, 
Sweetnam, and Borton 2003 for studies of the influence of Bollas and Ehrenberg, 
respectively, in encouraging psychoanalysis to take the “Intersubjective Turn”).  
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Intersubjective psychoanalysis has radicalized these efforts to remodel the earlier 
psychoanalytic constructs of human selfhood by problematizing especially their inbuilt 
assumptions that the self is intrapsychic, entirely internal to the subject, since much of it 
is always inaccessible to other inquiring subjects. “Relational theorists… have 
provided…extensive criticism of an exclusive theoretical and clinical focus on 
intrapsychic phenomena,” in the words of Stolorow, Orange, and Atwood (2001, 472), 
three of the main psychoanalysts writing on behalf of Intersubjective Psychoanalysis. 
Rather than speaking of intrapsychical inner workings, “We should speak instead” 
argue Stolorow et al. (2001) “…of a contextual psychology in which experiential worlds 
and intersubjective fields are seen to mutually constitute one another… as they form and 
evolve within a nexus of living, relational systems… exquisitely context-sensitive and 
context-dependent” (480). Theistic psychologists would seem well-poised to take (if not 
already taking) this Intersubjective Turn in understanding Divine-human relationships. 
Theories that fully include the reality of the Other, in this case, the Divine Other, 
constituting the Self in “continual flow of reciprocal mutual experience” (Stolorow and 
Atwood 1992, 18), must attend exquisitely to the fact that “particular dyadic systems 
[are] formed by the reciprocal interplay between worlds of experience (i.e., 
intersubjective systems)” (Stolorow 1997, 338). The belief in reciprocal interplay 
between human and Divine subjectivities, if true, has significant implications for 
interpreting any problems in these relationships.  An obvious implication is that 
psychoanalysis requires some amount of theology to understand the problems. 
 	  
54 
Theologians could contribute the kind of analysis that Intersubjective 
Psychoanalysis would seem to support: a theological analysis of the other supernatural 
subject in the relationship, e.g. God. Theology would theorize for Divine-human 
relationships what philosopher and psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin says Intersubjective 
psychoanalysis theorizes of inter-human relationships: “psychoanalytic theorizing based 
on the epistemological assumptions of the subject-object opposition… can be situated in 
a framework that includes the alternative paradigm of subject-subject relations,” 2006, 
117).  The theological counter-emphasis merges with Benjamin’s here in emphasizing 
that “… the other must be recognized as another subject in order for the self to fully 
experience his or her subjectivity in the other’s presence” (Benjamin 1992, 45). This 
‘‘felt experience of the other as a separate yet connected being with whom we are acting 
reciprocally’’ occurs within this mental third that ‘‘mediates ‘I and Thou’’’ (Benjamin 
2004, 8), and therefore, the interactions “between two or more beings… however 
asymmetrical, is never one-sided—as opposed to a one-way direction of effects 
[emphasis mine]” (Benjamin 2006, 116). As discussed, this one-sidedness of 
psychoanalysis in dealing with the supernatural has been a theological critique.  
Noticing this current inattention of Intersubjective Psychoanalysis to supernatural 
experience, one might wonder if these theorists, who tend, like Benjamin (1992) to want 
to replace all talk of “objects” with talk of “subjects,” can account for Divine-human 
relationships on these terms without deferring to some theological theory, validating the 
point theistic integrationists have stressed.  
 	  
55 
If relationships with, say, God, are indeed intersubjective, can these relationships 
be studied through non-theological psychology? Can the Divine-human relationship be 
analyzed as a “subject-subject” relation unless the Divine is recognized as a subject, such 
that their relationship is recognizable as a “co-creation of patterns by two active subjects, 
not one subject and the other object” (Benjamin 2006, 117)? If not, and if, as Benjamin 
says, this theoretical change is precisely “what distinguishes… the recently emergent 
intersubjective psychoanalysis… from traditional intrapsychic theory,” can 
intersubjective psychoanalysis be contradistinguished so significantly from intrapsychic 
theories when it comes to the supernatural, to someone’s God (117)?  
Applied to supernatural relationships, this Intersubjectivized Object-Relational 
way of thinking would at least require viewing the phenomenon naturally and 
intersubjectively, if not becoming theistic and thus viewing it within a supernaturally and 
intersubjectively. But what could an intersubjective but naturalistic interpretation of 
experiences in supernatural relationships reveal? Interpreting supernatural relationships 
within the limits of naturalism, is one not already interpreting the relationship 
intrapsychically? Is supernaturalistic theology the only way to avoid ignoring the 
believed Divine Subject when analyzing human subjectivity? 
What I have argued so far in this section implies so. Yet I believe these 
conflicting perspectives can be interposed in a certain phenomenological mode of 
interpretation. The ability to relate conflicting perspectives likely depends on the 
hermeneutical mentality in which the psychoanalyst enters into the context of the 
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supernaturalistic experience of the other person and the lability of the psychoanalyst’s 
interpretive “mood” in response to alterity of the person’s supernaturalism. 
 
Phenomenological? 
 
The meanings and uses of “phenomenology” in psychological theory are diverse 
and sundry, often confusingly incongruent (see Spiegelberg 1978). Still more confusing, 
in both theological and psychological literature concerning religious or spiritual 
experience, one can find various distinct approaches or methods all described as 
“phenomenological.” While I am not trying to implement any specific method here, my 
approach to supernatural relationships might be characterized as phenomenological in the 
minimal sense often emphasized in psychological discourse. That is: describing and 
interpreting the phenomena afforded uniquely to the consciousness of other persons first 
and foremost in ways consistent with the ways they describe and/or interpret the 
phenomena while making sure not to lose, ignore, misplace, or distort this 
phenomenological information in explaining the phenomena.  
Avoiding the eidetic and transcendentalist connotations of traditional 
phenomenology, the approach I am suggesting is perhaps more aptly described as 
“phenomenographic” (Marton 1968) since it focuses on the experiential realities of 
individual subjectivities and not in order to find evidence for the universal structures of 
subjectivity (c.f. Langbridge 2007; Scalambrino 2016). The difference in the 
phenomenological attitudes of these strategies can be conveyed by inverting Husserl’s 
terminology for the classic phenomenological method he formulated in Ideas I ([1913] 
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2014). For my purposes here, I want to bracket beliefs in the existence of supernatural 
realities (such as “God”) in a genuinely interested rather than “disinterested” way 
(Husserl [1913] 2014). This means, in other Husserlian words, placing God “in” rather 
than “out” of assumptive “action” (Husserl [1913] 2014). The investigations to follow 
therefore will not involve any “phenomenological reduction” (Husserl [1913] 2014) of 
the religious theist’s assumption that a supernatural God really exists to some other 
reality thought to be the most fundamental (for Husserl, transcendental consciousness; for 
the naturalist, nature). On the contrary, I am interested first of all to understand how 
“God” is given to the individual empirical consciousness of the supernaturalist theist. 
Thereby the consequences, for better and worse, of having certain kinds of relationships 
with certain kinds of gods might become more evident.  
In the discourses of religious studies, the adjective “phenomenological” also 
names a distinctive approach or style of approaching religious experience, as in the 
known sub-discipline called “the phenomenology of religion.” Phenomenological 
approaches can be clarified by contrast with the “functionalist” approaches which are 
typically dominant in social-scientific theories of religion. Religious Naturalist Michael 
Hogue, admitting slight risk of oversimplification, succinctly distinguishes these two 
general approaches: 
“On the one hand, phenomenological theories of religion argue that religion is 
best understood from the inside, from the point of view of the experiences of 
those who are religious. To understand religion phenomenologically requires 
getting inside of it sympathetically. It entails imagining and feeling and then 
describing as accurately as one can what it is like to be oriented within a 
particular cultural complex of religious belief and ritual…. sympathetically to 
inhabit the existential and social worlds of those who are religious. On the other 
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hand, functionalist theories of religion argue that religion is best understood from 
the outside… The point of view often taken by functionalist theorists is not the 
point of view of a sympathetic inquirer but of a dispassionate critic. The the aim 
of the functionalist theorist, in contrast to the phenomenologists, is not understand 
religion as it is experienced on the inside but to explain religion in relation to its 
external contexts” (57) 
 
 Proponents of each approach tend to set them in opposition. But most Religious 
Naturalists, Hogue notices, seem to disregard this opposition or insist that it sets up a 
false dichotomy that promotes unproductive polarization in the theorization of religion—
separating modes of description and interpretation, on the one hand, from explanation on 
the other (Hogue 2010, 55-72): “One of the distinctive theoretic signatures of religious 
naturalism concerns the way in which these thinkers employ phenomenological theories 
of religion within rather than in opposition to functionalist theories (63). These are indeed 
different approaches, but they are combinable and importantly so. The main way this 
combination occurs is when a phenomenological approach facilitates a more appropriate 
functionalist explanation of the phenomena. 
 For instance, philosopher of religion Mark Johnston (2009), whose 
argumentation in Saving God has much in common with Religious Naturalist 
worldviews, takes a “phenomenological approach” to evaluating monotheistic theologies 
(53). By “phenomenological,” Johnston means “[taking] the foundational 
experiences…on their own terms, and then [looking] at the implied character of the 
spiritual beings who ostensibly appear in these experiences” (53). Johnston is not content 
merely to describe and interpret these experiences as experienced. He is also explaining 
the origin and functions of the theologies that mediate them and thereby criticizing these 
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theologies. Saving God is saving God from all supernaturalistic forms of theism. These 
Johnston deconstructs with theological tools found within the Christian tradition, 
demonstrating their incoherence in demonstrating their idolatrousness. Thus I read 
Johnston as combining, in Hogue’s words, “phenomenological sympathy with 
functionalist suspicion” (2010, 67). 
 Whether for authorial or clinical purposes, this simultaneous maintenance or 
agile alteration between these two hermeneutical approaches requires attending to 
complex issues of countertransference that must be explored in order to interpret non-
reductively the other’s religious experience, which may include being in relationships to 
some supernatural reality (Hall 2007a; Helminiak 2001). And yet this sympathetic mode 
of interpretation need not preclude explanatory interpretations which involve suspicion. 
The importance of this distinction between, and combination of, 
phenomenological and functionalist approaches can be re-stated somewhat more aptly as 
the distinction between “subjunctive” and “sincere” modes of interpretive activity 
(contrasting terms I extend from Seligman et al. 2008). Interpreting phenomena in the 
“subjunctive” mode is interpreting as if or as though the phenomena in question reflect 
reality as is; interpreting in the “sincere” mode is interpreting the phenomena by 
reference to reality as is (as believed to be). To some extent, interpreting problems 
experienced in supernatural relationships subjunctively, one imaginatively goes beyond 
the impasse that obstructs interpretive passage from sincerely suspicious and skeptical 
interpretations to the theist’s sincerely believing interpretations.  
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In the sense of committedly subjunctive but insincere presumption of the 
supernatural and intersubjective reality of relationships with Gods, this phenomenological 
spirit guides the following discussions, starting with how people come to know and relate 
to their gods in the ways they do. Understanding the experiences of these individuals is 
trying imaginatively to inhabit their religiously pervaded “life-worlds” (Husserl [1936] 
1970), where Gods are very real and powerful agents, having definite, momentous effects 
on their lives and crucial relevance in their interpretations and integrations of experiences 
in developing as persons. Because these ultimate referents of clients’ religious beliefs—
their gods—can become existentially problematic, the roles they play in their lives is 
worthy of concern to clinicians and researchers alike. Imperceptible and unverifiable 
though these beings are, relationships with them are operative in consciousness (and, as 
various psychoanalytic thinkers have long argued, in unconsciousness too).  This 
subjunctive mood of engagement with the theological questions is the best a sincerely 
non-supernaturalist, non-theistic, non-theological interpreter, such as myself, can try. 
Thus, I am raising the question of abusive relationships with the Divine in the subjunctive 
mood but the very fact that I am raising the question owes something to my sincere 
conviction that the Gods in question do not exist. Another way I have hinted at this 
distinction already is in saying that gods are undoubtedly real phenomenally (for those 
experiencing them as real Gods). They can be interpreted as such, even if their ontic 
reality—their existence beyond the phenomenon—is denied. 
An intersubjective metapsychology would seem more conducive than an 
intrapsychic metapsychology to the incorporation of supernaturalistic theology into 
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psychoanalysis, but only if also theistic and theological. One cannot psychologically 
study relationships to purported supernatural and thus superempirical subjects without 
reverting to or reiterating to more intrapsychic models of objects representing subjects. 
Even so, in studying supernaturalism, the psychologically required naturalistic focus and 
the naturalistically required intrapsychic focus (in an otherwise wider Intersubjective 
view) is not necessarily reductive of supernatural experiences or disproportionately 
focused on the human subject.  On the contrary, the psychoanalyst might subjunctively 
presume (without sincerely believing in) the reality of supernatural subjects relating to 
human subjects as theologically understood and, as needed, can try to interpret the 
relationship accordingly. 
Psychoanalytic theories of Object-Relations have, far and away, contributed the 
most enduring insights into the phenomenal reality of intimate relationships with Divine 
objects of theistic faith. Contemporary research with Attachment Theory especially has 
made these relationships amenable to empirical analyses, with intriguing results. These 
are the two theoretical frameworks I use in next Part (III). 
Understanding through theories of Object-Relations Psychology how it might 
happen that a human self, in the very nidus of its development during childhood, can 
develop representations of, and relations with, his or her Divine being, discloses the 
generative origins of the adaptively or maladaptively transformative power of these 
relationships (see Sandage and Shults 2006) later in life, where virtually all of the 
empirical research concerning intimate attachment to, and struggles with, gods is focused. 
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Attachment Theory too derives initially from observations of infants, but most of 
the contemporary Attachment research regarding relationships with supernatural beings 
concerns post-childhood, usually adolescent, young adult, or adult samples, occasionally 
“emerging adults” (e.g. Kimball et al. 2013; Anderson 2014) or elderly samples (e.g. 
Cicerelli 2004). Considering literature regarding both childhood and mature relationships 
is important for my purposes here for two reasons: first, the sort of supernaturalistic God 
I have in mind is frequently metaphorized both as a Divinely caretaking parent to 
children as well as a Divinely romantic lover or spouse; second, the vast majority of 
literature in psychological abuse typically concerns these two relational contexts.  
Psychodynamic theory and particularly Attachment Theory has also been invaluable for 
understanding the predictors and outcomes of psychological abuse of children by their 
caretakers (e.g. Thomas, 2003, 2005; Sullivan and Lacey, 2010; Kim, 2010) and 
psychological abuse between romantic partners, usually dating or married couples (e.g. 
Landolt and Dutton, 1997; O’Hearn and Davis 1997; Henderson, Bartholomew, and 
Dutton 1997; Saunders and Ellison 1999; Bartholomew, Henderson, and Dutton 2001; 
Anderson and Suanders 2003; Goldner 2004; Henderson, Bartholomew, and Trink 2005, 
Dutton, Nicholls, and Spidel 2005; Gormley and Lopez 2010; Mills [2009] uses the term 
“intimate violence” synonymously; c.f. “attachment abuse,” Stosny 1995). Having some 
theory about relationships with Gods in both contexts should prove helpful in making the 
transition to questions of Divine abusiveness. As reviewed in Part I, the question of 
Divine abuse has already been raised in religious and philosophical fashion by various 
authors sincerely concerned with the theological problem of evil (and putting the onus of 
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this problem on God). But the question has yet to be framed within a theoretical 
framework of psychology that is conducive to empirical research.  
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Part III. Psychology of Divine Relationships 
 
 
Representing and Relating to Divinities 
 
To the extent that the psychodynamic workings of relationships among human 
beings reveal how relationships ought to work with Divine beings, some simple 
likenesses between these relational scenarios can be assumed.  It is reasonable to assume, 
for instance, that one cannot become intimate with, let alone love, a Divine being whom 
he or she does not know in some sense. It also makes sense to assume that one cannot 
know a believed Divine being intimately except through representing the Divine being to 
oneself. Even though, in general, Divine beings are theologically assumed to exist 
independently of human persons, they are not sensibly experienced as such—not seen, 
not heard, not felt in tactile ways, except, purportedly, in moments of special Divine 
revelation. A fortiori, one must internally represent the Divine just as one must internally 
represent externally existing human beings in order to know and develop relationships 
with them. Philosopher of religion and theologian Jan-Olav Henrikson (2013) takes this 
stance in stronger metaphysical terms:   
God is not in any way an entity, and therefore also not “part” of our experience of 
the external world. This point is underscored by the theological and philosophical 
point that any such experience would make God into a kind of finite being—
which God is not. Therefore, given that this is the case, any experience of God 
must be indirect and mediated by some finite element [such as through 
representations of God, or what Henrikson, with close synonymy, calls “symbols” 
of God] (7). 
 
Henrikson’s metaphysical claim seems ubiquitously accurate as a phenomenological 
description of experiencing God. Notwithstanding the theistic belief that God exists apart 
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from human selves, the experience of God never occurs as though God in fact exists as 
something external to oneself. God is experienced finitely as part of one’s subjective 
world.  Perhaps because intuitively encountering this limit in their supernatural 
relationships, many religious adepts of virtually all faith traditions turn inward, delving 
into the depths of their proverbial souls, in order to seek the Divine presence, 
countenance its character, or discern its will. The utmost reaches of the contemplation or 
mediation are at once the innermost.  
Especially for the mystically-inclined, these processes can necessitate the negation 
of various cognitive representations of God as idolatrous falsifications of the ultimate 
reality of God. Even the most habitual assumption of having a real self (that could exist 
in relationship with God) might too be negated. For some, the ultimate reality of God is 
discovered through this loss of both God and Self as represented to oneself. But even this 
moment is finitely mediated, finally always limited, and experienced, that is, experienced 
somehow by some Self. “Christian apophaticism,” Hollingsworth (2015) explains, 
 …while often highly philosophically rigorous, is at the same time usually shot 
through with affectively and relationally salient, ideational motifs and linguistic 
forms. Negative language (and thus, the corresponding apophatic contemplative 
mind) oscillates between the ecstatic and the agonistic as it tries to think toward—
and, crucially, be united with—the unthinkable. The Divine abyss, although 
unreachable, is nevertheless desired and loved, often being addressed 
appellatively and doxologically as ‘You.’  (4). 
 
Even at this furthest abstractive remove from representations of other humans and even 
when consciously negated, these mystics’ experiences of God are still of relating to God, 
still “I-Thou” (Buber 1924), “affectively and relationally salient… ecstatic and 
agonistic… desired and loved” (Hollingsworth 2015, 4). For all their apophaticism, these 
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Christian mystics continue to experience themselves, at least implicitly in the underlying 
affectivity that is provoked in this process, as relating to God. Although these Christian 
mystics are led along their journeys to a place where they can fully accept their inevitable 
failures to think and speak of God, “this apophatic loss can also be linked to positive 
emotion—passionate love, for example, or unitive stillness. Thus does St. John of the 
Cross, in The Dark Night of the Soul II.XI, speak of the “fire of love” that takes hold of 
the soul even in the midst of its “night of painful contemplation” (Hollingworth 2015, 1). 
Seeming to lend incidental credence to this reading of these mystical texts, Pehr 
Granqvist and colleagues have found that even among those religious or spiritual 
individuals who do not conceptualize ultimate reality as an ultimate deity-like entity, 
attachment behaviors are evident (e.g. New-Age spiritualists—Grangvist, Hagekull, and 
Ivarsson 2007; Granqvist, Mikulincer, and Shaver 2010; Granqvist, Hagekull, and 
Ivarsson 2012).  Some psychoanalysts have insisted that even individuals who have 
consciously discontinued relationships with their former gods unconsciously persist in 
relating, albeit very differently, to these Divine introjects they have rejected (Aron 2004, 
444; Grand 2013, 459-60). Thus Moshe Halevi Spero and Miriam Cohen (2009a) argue: 
 … object representations exist or have “being” whether one actively believes in 
them or not. Repressed representations, for example, or other types of “objects” 
(e.g., autistic objects) whose existence is marginal to the psychic system 
altogether, and yet whose existence is confirmed through symptoms, 
countertransference, and the like, still have being. By the time one is sentient 
enough to experience one’s belief as belief, or certainly to inquire into belief 
critically, the objects of one’s belief have already been established in ancient 
ground. Moreover, ceasing to believe in such objects, or adopting an agnostic or 
atheistic stance toward them, does not make them suddenly cease to be… (4) 
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The non-mystical majority of religious people in the world today relate to their gods in 
whom they earnestly believe in ways not so extraordinary as those pursued by such 
mystically-inclined religious “virtuosi” (Riesebrodt 2009), though still extraordinary by 
comparison to their normal human interpersonal relationships. Most religious theists tend 
to relate to God in very kataphatic ways (averring truths of God’s nature or character), 
representing God as an ultimate being who obviously must be superordinate to all other 
beings, but not as “Being-Itself” (Tillich 1952), and also as having personalistic qualities 
(as having awareness, intentionality, and agency, as well as various moral attributes—to 
perfection, theists usually believe), rather than as impersonal. 
Very much in the spirit of the Christian apophatic understanding of the role of 
language for expressing what is known or not known at various stages of questing, it also 
seems generalizable (again, of Divine-human relationships just as of human-human 
relationships) that not all of one’s knowledge of this relationship is representable. All one 
knows which one can say he or she knows, must be representable—and the saying itself 
is representative. Yet one always know more than one can say.  Some knowledge of 
another, Divine or human, cannot even be cognized, much less articulated, even while 
remembered unconsciously and having relational consequences. 
While relating to God might be experienced more readily with affect insofar as God 
is represented as personalistic, the intensity of affect, positive or negative, likely varies 
with the seriousness of ones’ involvement in the relationship, along with other factors. 
Combining “radically intense religiosity” (Cassibba et al. 2008, 1762) with kataphatic 
personalism in theology might especially enable a person to experience relational 
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intimacy with God, but just as well to experience problems in this intimacy such as 
“attachment injuries” when God seems or feels unlike who God is theologically 
understood to be (Johnson 2002, cited in Shults and Sandage, 2006, 226; see also 
Johnson, Makinin, and Milliken 2001).  The slow disintegration of Mother Teresa’s 
relationship with her God is a clear case in point. Abu-Raiya et al. (2015) cite her 
posthumously published private journals in which she confesses having intense Divine 
struggles in the painfully felt absence of God: 
“[Mother Teresa’s] deep religious devotion may have made her many years of r/s 
 [religious or spiritual] struggle especially painful, as we hear in these words: ‘The 
 place of God in my soul is blank. There is no God in me. When the pain of 
 longing is so great—I just long and long for God—and then it is that I feel—He 
 does not want me—He is not there.... The torture and pain I can’t explain’ (p. 
 201).   
 
Such well-known experiences of “The Dark Night of the Soul,” named and 
autobiographically narrated by the Carmelite friar, St. John of the Cross (mentioned 
earlier) can be very detrimental to wellbeing, meanwhile prompting “Seeking” (Shults 
and Sandage 2006) behaviors in relationship to God.  Yoko Baracca recently completed a 
quantitative dissertation with retired Presbyterian (USA) ministers and their spouses. 
They were required to take the “Secure-Base Script Test” along with surveys about their 
Dark Nights of the Soul. Just as the classic writings of Christian mystics reveal, Baracca 
sees in the evidence of the study that “the dark night of the spirit…is an agonizing 
process of total transformation” and, vitally, that such total transformation is the 
“expected” result of the agony (2015, 12).  
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 Other psychologists of religion have discussed the ways in which Dark Nights of 
the Soul are “dark containers” for spiritual transformation, “crucibles” in which the self is 
melted down and remolded through intense heat and pressure into something stronger or 
purer (Shults and Sandage 2006; Sandage, Jenson, and Jass 2008). But the result of this 
process is not always so ideal. Rather than being positively transformed in relationship to 
God, others end up existentially unsettled in “spiritual wandering” (Shults and Sandage, 
2006; Sandage, Jenson, and Jass 2008). Attachment Theory suggests that those who are 
likely to take such risks are likely to be more secure in their relationships with their 
gods—or at least initially, considering that during or after the painful rigors of 
transformation, the person might become very insecure in the relationship. 
Earlier empirical research comparing religious or spiritual “Questing” with 
Gordon Allport’s “Intrinsic” and “Extrinsic” orientations (e.g. Batson, Schoenrade, and 
Ventis 1993; Ventis 1995) can be read as already indicating that R/S maturation can 
heighten R/S struggles. Associations between R/S maturity and mental health found in 
particular cases are likely not very widely generalizable. This research reveals that 
individuals deemed by their R/S communities to embody the most consummate 
saintliness nevertheless can experience R/S struggles, and intensely so, entailed in what 
their faith requires or resulting from their desires and efforts to be devout. In some ways, 
the most devout might be at the most risk for deleterious R/S or Divine struggles. 
One researcher who has contributed importantly to validating and revising the 
“Quest” construct, Richard Beck, has shown (2006, 2008) that two dimensions of 
relationships with God that might sound inversely related, “Communion” (“the degree of 
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intimacy, closeness, dependency, and trust in the God-relationship”) and “Complaint” 
(“the degree of disappointment and/or frustration involved in the God-relationship”), 
rather appear orthogonal and therefore high levels of both Communion and Complaint 
can concur in God-relationships (2006, 43)—what Beck calls the “Winter Experience” of 
faith (2007).  Beck explains further: “Given that these dimensions are orthogonal, these 
factors do not represent polar opposites where the love relationship with God simply 
oscillates between periods of Communion and periods of Complaint. Rather, Communion 
and Complain can coexist, intermingling to create a rich tapestry of experiences. That is, 
Complaint can occur in the presence of Communion….” (2006, 51). Beck suggests that 
these experiences of wounded love in God-relationships, in which one’s desire for 
communion with God is aggrieved or affronted by God’s relational behavior, are the kind 
of experiences that make the psychodynamics of struggles in intimate Divine 
relationships so similar to the those experienced in human intimate relationships (2006, 
51). 
As Ursula Goodenough, esteemed biologist and exponent of religious naturalism, 
says in her widely read book, The Sacred Depths of Nature: “Given the complexities of 
human relationship, an enormous attraction of the monotheistic religions—Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam—is that they offer the opportunity for intimate relationship with a 
deity. Indeed, they suggest that the most stable and fruitful outlet for passion and 
dependency is in relationships with the Divine” (1998, 135-36). In her view, the most 
significant aspect of religiosity oriented around a Divine being is that through taking to 
heart Divine revelations, people participating in these religious cultures can (if I may 
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reuse my own words from the introduction) develop intimate relationships with the 
Ultimate.  Sincere believers can take full advantage of this “full range and complexity” 
(Meissner 1984, 158) of Divine-human relational possibilities. 
 
Who and Whose God? Salient Themes in Theistic Theologies 
The sort of God I am thinking of particularly is the one in whom numerous 
Protestant Christians jointly and severally believed.  The sort of God-concepts 
represented by American Evangelicals are especially salient in my mind. But I am also 
thinking of Protestant Mainline, Catholic, Jewish, and Islamic traditions. More generally 
speaking, I am interested in the theologies involved in what Jewish psychoanalyst Moshe 
Halevi Spero nicely termed “God-Oriented Religiosity” (1992). 
 Rather than consulting additional sources for descriptions of salient themes in 
theistic theologies, I will briefly rely upon my own expertise from lived experience in 
Protestant Evangelical Christianity, while not assuming that I can accurately reflect all 
Evangelicals’, let alone all Christians’, experiences of their Gods.  
My lived experience along these lines is mainly as follows. I have been an active 
and thoroughly involved member of multiple Evangelical churches (mega-sized to 
miniature), I have attended a Baptist-affiliated Christian university comprised of a 
predominantly Evangelical student base, I have seriously dated two Evangelical women, I 
still have many Evangelical friends, and in the first place I was raised by Evangelical 
parents within an extended family approximately half-Protestant, half-Catholic. Most of 
these Protestants friends and family would identify as Non-Denominational, but many 
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would identify as Baptist in some form or fashion. Apparently the dominant theological 
proclivities of their beliefs and practices are Reformed/Neo-Reformed or 
Charismatic/Neo-Charismatic. Most of these Evangelicals are on the conservative end of 
the spectrum, though some might consider themselves Post-Conservative or Progressive 
Evangelicals. I am not trying to list credentials for speaking about these theologies so 
much as acknowledging whence I make the following representations of the God-
concepts that seem particularly to influence the dynamics of relationships with God:  
First, God is personalistic, i.e. person-like, believed to be conceivable and/or 
describable as having certain person-like qualities or attributes (whether literally or in 
some sense analogous to the way in which a human person has them)—yet to perfection. 
Second, God’s perfection means God is omnibenevolent, omniscient, and 
omnipotent—unlike humans whose morality, intellect, and power are far from perfect. 
Third, God’s omnibenevolence, omniscience, and omnipotence mean God is 
absolutely willing and absolutely able to do what God absolutely knows is best for the 
person. This God therefore relates to each person with perfect love. 
Fourth, God develops a unique and private relationship with each person. That is 
to say, God does not relate to humanity only universally, but also relates to each human 
being uniquely, with uniquely focused intentionality at the deepest levels of his or her 
unique selfhood. 
Fifth, relating to God is similar-but-different than relating to other humans. It is 
often said in these contexts that God is relatable in basically the same ways as one would 
relate to another person, yet with qualifications due to human finitude versus the 
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infinitude of God (this is why I prefer to describe this God as “Personalistic” rather than 
“personal”—the latter might connote too much similarity and too little difference). 
This description of salient Christian theological themes in understanding the 
relationships between God and human beings is accurate enough, I believe, of theologies 
popular far and wide in the U.S. These aspects of God are understood and internalized in 
terms of a cosmic-sized biblical, gospel-focused narrative context that includes various 
other theologically indispensable ideas, especially those having to do with God in/as 
Jesus and in/as Holy Spirit (the in/as ambiguity owes to the ambiguity of the doctrine of 
the Trinity). The narrative I, for one, internalized went something like this:  
 Humans are sinful—whether inherently so or only inevitably, depending on who 
is asked—and their sinfulness both immediately causes and eternally merits separation 
from God (whether in unending torment, unending silence, or some other afterlife 
scenario—again, depending on who is asked). Humans therefore exist forever in 
desperate need of God’s saving grace and sanctification. God, in Jesus, has lovingly 
sacrificed Himself/His Son to save each person from his or her sinfulness. One must have 
genuine faith in this truth in order to be saved. This Divine sacrifice was a gift of pure 
grace, the natural but nevertheless gratuitous effluvium of God’s perfect love for 
humanity, totally free, totally opposite of what humans deserved (death or hell). 
Convicted with this realization that one already lives by the love of God, one becomes 
able and willing, in spite of sin, to begin loving God. Upon salvation (at whatever point it 
occurs) one is indwelt by God via the Holy Spirit which, perhaps having led the person to 
the moment of conversion, proceeds to “live” inside, transforming his or her identity 
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through a lifelong process of “sanctification” in Godliness, meaning that that God is 
consistently involved in the making of the self into the likeness of God. 
Obviously, insofar as this theological narrative along with the abovementioned 
attributes of the nature or character of God are believed to be true, the question of God 
harming a person or, worse, abusing a person is nonsensical to ask. The question would 
proceed from false premises about God and the nature of God’s relationship with human 
beings. Without significant qualifications or emendations, such a theology cannot admit 
such questions and thus is brought into question itself.  
In spite of such a theology, relationships with God are rarely so simple or so ideal. 
Experiences in relationship with this God are not fully determined by one’s theological 
ideas or beliefs, as I have explained, and the former can be at odds with the latter. 
According to this kind of theology, a devout follower would be perfectly well if not for 
the fact that God, in God’s perfect wisdom and care, allows, if not directly inciting, 
struggles, even severe struggles, for purposes of greater sanctification (whatever this is 
believed to mean).  In my Evangelical experience, for example, talk of sanctification 
through suffering emphasized increasing prioritization of dependence upon, humility 
before, commitment to (etc.) God over all other relationships. What is involved in this 
process of making God the primary Other with whom to relate intimately? In what sense 
can one develop an intimate relationship with God?  
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Attaching to Gods: Psychodynamic Research 
 
Psychodynamic theories have guided the most active research programs in the 
psychology of religion. Attachment Theory has been central in the psychology of religion 
since the early 90s (Grimm et al. 2012, 11). Lee Kirkpatrick and Phillip Shaver (1990) 
were right to claim, in first announcing the relevance of John Bowlby’s theories (along 
with Mary Ainsworth’s [1989] studies of “styles” of infant attachment and Hazan and 
Shaver’s [1994] studies of attachment in intimate adult relationships) to religion, that 
Attachment Theory is a “potentially powerful framework for the psychology of religion” 
(315). The ensuing research has demonstrated the power of Attachment Theory for 
understanding intimate relationships with Divine beings (see the review by Granqvist and 
Kirkpatrick 2008). The question of whether supernatural beings meet the criteria of 
functioning as “attachment figures” (Ainsworth 1989; Bowlby and Ainsworth 1991) is 
now positively answered by numerous studies repeatedly confirming the validity and 
predictive utility of this theoretical framework in the study of religion.  
People can experience their deities as “secure-bases” from which to explore new 
experiential territory, “safe-havens” to which to retreat for refuge, most basically 
engaging in “proximity-seeking” behaviors in order to keep their deities near (and 
themselves dear to the deities), and, conversely, react to separations or absences of their 
deities with increased anxiety, fearing the loss of them (Kirkpatrick 2005). These are the 
functional criteria differentiating “attachment figures” from other people with whom one 
is significantly intimate. Empirically, the safe-haven function is more clearly evident than 
the secure-base function, but support, to varying degrees, has been found for the latter in 
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several studies (Beck, 2006a; Sim and Loh 2003; Kimball et al. 2013; Jankowski and 
Sandage 2014; Baracca 2015).  
Humans cope with experiences of the unavailability or unresponsiveness of their 
caretakers through hyper-activation or deactivation of their “attachment systems,” i.e. up-
regulating or down-regulating their primary proximity-seeking behaviors as secondary 
strategies to mitigate the emotional pain and fear of losing their caretakers (Mikulincer 
and Shaver 2010).  One’s relationships with beloved romantic partners can become 
emotionally dysregulated through basically the same dynamics (Hazan and Shaver 1987, 
1994), although the contexts are different and key biological, psychological, and social 
variables have changed greatly since childhood. 
Attachment Theory in the psychology of religion hypothesizes that people tend to 
attach to their gods in ways that either correspond to (Kirkpatrick 1992; Kirkpatrick and 
Shaver 1992), or compensate for (Kirkpatrick 1992; Kirkpatrick and Shaver 1990), the 
quality and style of attachments in prior significant attachments. Empirical research has 
supported both of these main hypotheses. Most of the debate concerns how to interpret 
this mix of data, how to model the variables hypothetically involved in attaching to 
Divine beings, and how to test the relative predictive or explanative values of these 
models.  Several researchers have integrated these two main hypotheses into “complex” 
models that validate both under different conditions (e.g. Hall et al. 2009; Granqvist, 
Broberg, and Hagekull 2007; Moriarty, Hoffman and Grimes 2006). Correspondence and 
compensation have been modeled, for instance, as two possible pathways of attachment 
to Divine beings (Granqvist et al. 2012) or as two possibly simultaneous processes of 
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transference on different levels of awareness (Hall et al. 2009). All of these models of 
attachment to Divine beings are premised upon Bowlby’s theory of “internal working 
models,” ([1969] 1982) as as well as upon theories of the development of “god-
representations” stimulated especially by Rizzuto’s The Birth of the Living God (1979) in 
the Object-Relations tradition. 
The intra- and inter-individual data is multifaceted, but it is clear that 
relationships with gods can uniquely and powerfully affect wellbeing through attachment 
processes. In a study by Miner (2009), attachment to God predicted psychological 
wellness independently of the security or insecurity of attachments to parents. In a similar 
vein, Bradshaw, Ellison, and Marcum (2010) found that measures of insecure 
attachments to gods—levels of “anxiety” and “avoidance”—more robustly predict 
psychological health than various other indices of religiosity.  Almost always the research 
subjects in these studies are theists and Christians, precisely because their theologies 
most overtly encourage believers to relate to God as an attachment figure.  
A recent dissertation by Sister Mary Patrice Ahearn (2013) features exemplary 
cases of intimacy in attaching to God. She assessed Catholic sisters’ relationships with 
Jesus Christ, using Attachment Theory to “conceptualize and treat attachment patterns of 
women religious in the context of their supernatural vocation as a spouse of Jesus Christ 
and in their community life” (2).  Entering into vocational wedlock with Jesus requires 
taking “vows” of devotion to Jesus. Ahearn insists that the significance and consequence 
of this vow-taking, as everything else in the relationship, can only be “theologically 
understood” and hence, that a “purely psychological approach to the problem” [i.e. 
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“struggling with attachment concerns” in relationship to Jesus”] is inadequate” (9). Yet, 
“to use the language of psychology, one can say that Jesus must [that is, by virtue of their 
vows] be the sister’s main attachment figure” (2013, 9). 
In Jewish and Christian traditions, as well as in the Hebrew Bible and New 
Testament, God is often represented metaphorically as an ideal parent or ideal lover.  
Both God-as-parent and God-as-lover are prevalent.  By “ideal,” I mean, in theologian 
Walter Kaufman’s words that Kirkpatrick cites (2005), God functions as an “absolutely 
adequate attachment figure” (53). This theological idealization suggesting the potential 
compensatory functions of attaching to God by comparison to human attachment figures, 
who can be so woefully or horribly inadequate.  Bradshaw et al. (2010) explain: 
In other words, the perceived availability and responsiveness of a loving God is a 
fundamental dynamic underlying Christianity and other world’s religions. In these 
religious traditions, individuals proceed with the faith that they can directly 
interact—through prayer, a proximity-seeking behavior—with a God who will be 
available to protect and comfort them when danger threatens. This is an obvious 
haven of safety. It may also be the case that the mere knowledge of God’s 
presence and accessibility allows many religious individuals to approach the 
problems and difficulties of human existence with confidence and security, an 
example of the secure base function of attachment relationships (132). 
 
But, for some God is not experienced as an absolutely adequate as an attachment figure, 
but rather, as absolutely inexcusable or evil. For some, I am suggesting, God is an 
abusive attachment figure. At least in principle, all else equal (e.g. the special, distinctive 
features of supernatural relationships), if God can function as an attachment figure—even 
as a “primary attachment figure” such as among Catholic sisters (or nuns for that 
matter)—and if the dynamics of relationships with God can be inconsistent with 
theologies of God who always intends and behaves perfectly well, such that God is 
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perceived to be behaving harmfully to the person in the relationship, then some intimate 
relationships with God have the potential to become psychologically abusive. 
 
Unique Features of Supernatural Attachment Figures 
Yet even the most intimately personal gods are typically regarded, in both 
theological and psychological thinking, as qualitatively different relational objects than 
other human persons. One might say, to use again religious naturalist Ursula 
Goodenough’s perspicuous words, empirical research in Attachment Theory has revealed 
that “Belief and faith in supernatural Being(s), when deeply wrought, are as intensely 
personal and individual and dynamic as our earthy relationships…” and yet “…they add 
another dimension, another opportunity for relationship, to be sure” (1998, 140).  
What makes relations with internal objects representing a god of theistic faith like 
and unlike relations with objects representing other human beings? What is this other 
added “dimension” of human relationality? Miner (2007) rightly complains on behalf of 
the importance of this question: “Psychological theories of attachment to God have 
developed as analogues of human attachments, with little attention paid to ways in which 
God might be different from human attachment figures” (112).  
One obvious difference, already stated, is that supernatural beings are normally 
(except, purportedly, in special experiences) imperceptible entities with which to relate. 
This does not make internal objects representing them unique among other object-
relations, some of which likewise do not have perceptible referents in the external world. 
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But it does make the gods themselves unique among potential attachment figures, which 
in all other cases are other earthly, flesh-and-bone human beings. 
Kirkpatrick (1999) explains this exceptionality of attaching to gods by referencing 
Ingre Bretherton (1987). Bretherton’s close observations of the attachment behaviors of 
children led her to conclude that the type of proximity maintained with parental 
attachment figures necessarily changes as the child matures. Although infants need 
comforting psychical contact from caretakers in order to feel secure, as they grow older, 
they develop the cognitive ability to maintain intimate bonds with their caretakers 
through seeing and being seen by the caretaker, later by communicating verbally, and 
“eventually can depend just upon knowledge of where the mother can be found…this 
idea has been extended in a consideration of lifespan attachments” (Cicerelli 2004, 372) 
as well as to attachments to God. As Kirkpatrick (2005) explains: 
Beyond infancy and early childhood, then, the efficacy of an attachment figure 
 depends not on physical but, rather, psychological proximity. And if such ‘mere 
 knowledge’ of an attachment figure’s accessibility and responsiveness can suffice 
 under most circumstances, it seems only a small step to suggest that a 
 noncorporeal deity can function fully as, and offer the psychological provisions 
 of, an attachment figure. (57) 
 
This unique feature of attaching to something imperceptible is not exceptional to the 
more general rule of how human transference works, insofar as relating to gods as 
attachment figures is indeed psychoanalytically understandable as modes of transference 
from attachment patterns developed in earlier relationships with humans (Gurney and 
Rogers 2007)—whether correspondingly, compensatively, or both. 
 	  
81 
Psychoanalysis has long understood that transference occurs not only with other 
human persons but also with non-human, impersonal, and even intangible objects, such 
as transcendent ideals (Becker 1971, 1973, 1975; Divraj-Kizkuk 2014). This notion has 
been widely accepted in theoretical social psychology as well, especially within the 
“symbolic interactionism” tradition (Mead, [1934] 1962; Blumer 1969; see Pollner 1989 
[93] citing especially Caughey 1984 and Sunden 1965). Attaching to God is a form of 
“symbolic attachment” (Homan 2013; Cicerelli, 2004, 372) and “As demonstrated in the 
present studies and elsewhere, there is now sufficient evidence to conclude that many 
believers’ relationships with God function as symbolic attachments, even at implicit 
levels of processing” (Granqvist et al. 2012, 816). 
Bartholomew and Horowtiz (1991) the authors who demonstrated “disorganized 
attachment,” another distinct style alongside “secure” and “avoidant” or “anxious-
ambivalent” insecure styles, also spoke of attachments to “Generalized Others” that 
“transcend specific relationships” (Sim and Loh 2003, 374). Other researchers have also 
theorized internal God-representations as functioning like a “Generalized Other” (e.g. 
Stoope, Draper, and Whitehead 2012). And Cassidy (1991) described the nature of 
attachment as always to one who is “perceived as stronger and wiser,” an observation that 
might make developmental sense in terms of psychoanalytic theories of supernatural 
relationships, such has Shafranske’s, or in terms of Terror-Management Theory (Divraj-
Kizkuk 2014). Sim and Loh (2003) note another insight from Cassidy that is particularly 
relevant for understanding attachments to Gods: 
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Cassidy’s further point that ‘[a] person can be attached to a person who is not in 
turn attached to him or her’ (p. 12) is also highly compatible with both the 
contention that God can serve as an attachment figure as well as the belief 
systems of many religions, in which God is often an impersonal and distant being 
or ‘force.’ (375) 
 
However, the thoroughly symbolic mediation of supernatural attachments need not 
convince religious theists that relating to God is merely an existentially worthwhile 
symbolic activity. The relationship is ultimately real, they believe, transcending the 
symbolic even as human participation in the relationship must involve symbolization. 
Thus, one similarity between human and Divine relationships that Miner stresses, citing 
evidence of empirical research on attachment to gods (Granqvist 2002; Hall et al. 2005; 
Kirkpatrick 1997b, 1998), is that “[…] people do not consider God to be a symbol, nor an 
impersonal object of devotion, but rather a personal being who is held to interact with 
humans” (2007, 114). Yet there is a second difference here due to what Kierkegaard 
called the “infinite qualitative difference” between the self—finitely limited—and God 
([1836] 1973). Because God is infinite, relating to God likely requires more 
thoroughgoing symbolization than knowing other finite human beings (Stoope, Draper, 
and Whitehead, 2012). Given the “Ultimate Boundary Conditions” of human existence, 
engaging God through highly symbolic engagements, however abstractly or concretely, 
in terms of stark “finite/infinite contrasts,” is necessary (Neville, 2002, 2014, 2015, 
2016). 
I have just identified two unique and interconnected features of supernatural 
relationships of theistic attachment to gods by comparison to inter-human attachments: 
(1) gods are imperceptible and (2) therefore the sustenance of the very relationship and 
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the development of intimate attachment in the relationship require greater efforts of 
symbolization (however abstractly or concretely) than inter-human relationships require.  
In principle, other than these two rather obvious differences, the dynamics of the 
object-relations involved in supernatural relationships might otherwise function similarly 
to those in human relationships. However, varying from one religiously imagined 
supernatural being to another, as well as from one individual religious person to another, 
there are various additional specifications of these two unique features of the supernatural 
relational schemas that make significant differences in outcomes. 
What differences in the quality of supernatural relationships might these unique 
features of supernatural relational schemas make? An important study by Exline, Yali, 
and Lobel (1999) is enlightening in this regard. They sought to discover whether 
struggling to “forgive God” is associated with negative affect, found such associations, 
and tested the relative significance of three factors that might mediate the associations: 
“general difficulties with forgiving, feelings of alienation from God, or low religiosity 
more generally” (367). Interestingly not supporting the first explanation, their data 
“demonstrated that difficulty forgiving God is an important problem in its own right, not 
reducible to a more general problem of forgiveness” (373).  
So what is unique about the effort to forgive one’s God? The authors identify 
several differences in trying to forgive one’s God as compared to forgiving oneself or 
other people. Two are especially noteworthy and seem to result from the two 
abovementioned unique features of relating to God as compared to relating to self and 
others. First, people cannot “…gain the same insight into God’s motives or actions as 
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they can with their own, nor do they have the same type of tangible, face-to-face contact 
with God that they have with other people” (374). This might make a significant 
difference in forgiving: 
For example, people should be more likely to forgive themselves if they can 
convince themselves that their intentions were not malicious. They will also find 
it easier to forgive a perpetrator who offers an apology or a sensible explanation 
(e.g. Darby & Schlenker, 1982). However, people are unlikely to perceive such 
direct insights or concessions coming from God. Instead, they must come to terms 
with their anger and confusion based primarily on their own faith and their 
interpretation of the distressing event (374). 
 
This difference seems to be a specification of what the two unique features of 
supernatural relationships might entail in cases where one has experienced harm as a 
result of God’s apparent behaviors. Human subjectivity, including intentionality, is 
difficult enough to illuminate, the subjectivity of a Divine being even more so. The 
means of trying to understand God’s intentions is often highly symbolic, for example, 
“People may attempt to communicate with God through prayer, meditation, or reading 
holy texts” (374). 
The authors identify another important unique feature of supernatural 
relationships with God: that forgiving God can have quite different “meanings and 
consequences” (373) than forgiving other people or oneself. The authors note that “anger 
at god may tap into core beliefs about about life’s purpose, the existence of evil and 
suffering, and the nature of the Divine….” and thus, “to the extent that such religious and 
existential issues are salient in a person’s daily life, difficulty forgiving God could have 
substantial psychic costs” (373-374). There are other senses in which difficulties in 
relationships with Gods can have “meanings and consequences” not of concern, or of so 
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much concern, in relationships with other human beings. These unique meanings and the 
potential consequences they signify, in any case, are associated with meaningfully 
internalized theological ideas. Some might make lessening or leaving the struggles more 
difficult. 
At least the three unique features of supernatural relationships that I have noted in 
this section should be minded: (1) gods are imperceptible, so researchers cannot observe 
visible actions of the divine or discover the intentions of the divine through research; (2) 
because Gods are imperceptible and regarded as ultimate, attachments people have to 
their Gods are highly symbolic; (3) the “meanings and consequences” (Exline, Yali, and 
Lobel 2015), to attach or detach from Gods is likely different in salient respects than with 
regard to human attachment figures. For these reasons, psychodynamic theory as well as 
theology are are necessary if abuse in these relationships can be understood. 
 If experiencing “difficulty forgiving God could have substantial psychological 
costs,” (Exline, Yali, and Lobel 2015), how much more psychologically costly is 
struggling to forgive a God experienced as abusive? As soon as this question is asked, 
another is abruptly important: should one try to forgive this God? What is the cost of 
even confronting this God in protest against God’s maltreating behaviors? Of rejecting 
this God? But rather than addressing these questions about ending a relationship with 
God (I will address them briefly in the last section of this Part) let us begin at the 
beginning and ask: How, in the first place, do people know their Gods so as to relate and 
attach to them? 
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Divine Relational Schemas 
 To reiterate some initial assumptions: one must somehow know those to whom one 
relates; in order to know them, one must represent them to oneself, however consciously 
or unconsciously. If these assumptions are true of also of relationships with supernatural 
others, the question of how one represents God is obviously critical to ask when 
considering the healthiness or harmfulness of the relationship.  This question is 
psychological, but the purpose in asking it is to learn how theologically-involved 
experiences are internalized in individual psyches. A basic postulate of John Bowlby’s 
Attachment Theory is that as human beings grow they form “internal working models” 
(IWMs) of their caregivers and continue to do so throughout life with all significant 
others ([1969] 1982; 1973). Accordingly, relating to God as a significant other and 
especially as an attachment figure, one forms internal working models of God. 
The psychological study of how individuals know “gods” through conscious and 
unconscious modeling processes has introduced a number of closely associated constructs 
in the literature alongside continuing use of Bowlby’s IWM construct. In a recent review, 
Davis, Mauch, and Moriarty (2013) have carefully sorted through these constructs, 
distinguishing in the same fashion as Ana-Marie Rizzuto (1979) “god-images” and “god-
concepts” and designating both as forms of “god-representation.” Davis and colleagues 
think Rizzuto’s distinction accurately delineates two basic modalities of representing 
supernatural beings. Gods are represented in images as well as concepts, and anyone’s 
god-representational system is comprised of, and revised through, both.  
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God-images are acquired incidentally, not purposely, through tacit ‘experiential’ 
learning of what to expect in relating to significant others (i.e. parents, close relatives and 
friends, romantic partners) as well as to God. This dimension of the learning process in 
relationships, and the result of it, these researchers and others call “implicit relational 
knowing” (Hall, 2007b; Hall et al. 2009; Davis et al. 2013, 51; citing Stern et al. 1998). 
“Encoded mainly in sub-symbolic and non-verbal-symbolic representational code,” god-
images begin to function as “implicational religious cognitions” and are not usually made 
very explicit (Davis et al. 2013, 52). 
 God-images are sensitive to contextual changes and are often tinged or heavily 
laden with affect, positive (e.g. images of “loving” god, Stoope, Draper, and Whitehead 
2013) or negative (e.g. images of a “controlling” god Wiegand and Weiss 2006; c.f. 
Steenwyk et al. 2010, who found that correlations to mental health outcomes of a 
controlling god-image varied significantly with gender). Altogether, these god-images 
“underlie one’s embodied, emotional experience in relationship with the Divine 
attachment figure” (Davis et al. 2013, 51). Some researches emphasize the affectivity of 
these god-images so much as to equate the term simply with elements of affect arising in 
the relationship (Schapp-Jonker et al.2002): “[…] the term ‘God Image’ can be described 
as an individual’s affective experience of God or the internal, mental representation of 
God.  It is important to note, that the term refers to emotional experiences in general, not 
specifically to visual experiences” (55). 
 By contrast, god-concepts are believed ideas about the attributes and characteristics 
of a god. Included in a god-concept would be other notions of how God “relates with, 
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thinks about, and feels toward humans (including the self)”and vice versa (2013, 52). 
Whereas the relational knowing represented in god-images is tacit and implicit, this kind 
of relational knowing is often very explicit and is more capable of abstraction and 
communication. Whereas god-images are implicational cognitions, representing the god 
in more tacit, instinctive and emotive ways, god-concepts are more expressly intellectual 
in content and the way in which they are possessed is more doxastic. They are 
“propositional” and represent the god “as theologically understood” (52.). Like god-
images, god-concepts are context-sensitive, but they are “mediated primarily by explicit 
thoughts, memories, and knowledge,” acquired mainly through purposeful learning, and 
“encoded mainly in verbal-symbolic representational code” as opposed to the “sub-
symbolic and non-verbal-symbolic” encoding of god-images (52). At least one team of 
researchers has used the term “god-concept” more broadly to refer to “affective or 
evaluative aspects of the mental representation of God” (De Roos, Miedema, and Iedema 
2001, 607).  
In sum, god-representations are complex, involving both affective and intellective, 
both unconscious and conscious, contents.  There is always plenty of interplay between 
images and concepts of gods (Gibson 2006; Davis 2010). This interplay should be 
appreciated, for it implies that the features which these authors have specified as 
differentiating god-images and god-concepts are not so absolute in the actual mind of a 
religious person. The images, as psychic flashes from bodily-stored memory of what has 
been experienced of and felt about that God, can either coalesce with or contradict the 
concept (see the classic paper, “Theological Correctness,” by J. Barrett 1999). The 
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psychical coherence of associations of images and concepts of God can vary over time, as 
can their accessibility or presence in consciousness on a level where curious, deliberative 
thinking proceeds. 
Wherever there appear contradictions between images and concepts, or images and 
other images, or concepts and other concepts, vexing ambiguities result and can become 
existentially problematic (Zahl and Gibson 2012; Matlby and Hall 2012, 304). Moreover, 
because images and concepts have unconscious associations too, some contradictions 
might persist deep in the psyche as “unthought knowns” (Bollas 1987).  A number of 
dissertations of have dealt with the affective ambivalence, conscious or unconscious, that 
can arise from these inconsistencies in relationships to gods. Lipner (2004) explored 
theologically and psychoanalytically religious Jews’ “unconscious ambivalence towards 
God” (title) and concludes the chapter devoted to this exploration by summarizing: 
 […] aspects of the development of the God-imago... all are influenced by, and 
simultaneously engender strong feelings of love and hate, fear and awe that each 
individual experiences towards God, at least on an unconscious level. These 
conflicted ambivalent feelings continue to shape and to be shaped by the 
unconscious relationship with God as the individual develops. (44). 
 
Similar in emphasis to the definition of god-images by Schapp-Jonker et al.  (2002) stated 
above, Kokoris (2011) empirically studied correlations between self-forgiveness and god-
images under the rubric, “emotional experience of God,” which “…addresses the 
intellectual knowledge, emotional information processing, and quality of relationship 
with God” (31). Like Lipner (2004), Kokoris acknowledges that divergences within an 
individual’s emotional experiences of God can occur simultaneously in a third “mixed” 
type of emotional experience of God: 
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Although one’s emotional experience of God is generated from these different 
components, each aspect may not always be congruent with the others (Moriarty 
and Hoffman, 2008). Therefore, one’s emotional experience of God can be 
positive, where the intellectual and emotional understandings of God are both 
positive, or it can be negative, where the [intellectual and emotional] 
understandings of God are both negative. Finally, emotional experience of God 
can be mixed, where the understandings of God are incongruent and produce 
conflict” (31). 
 
Illustratively, Davis et al. (2013) mention the case of “Hyun,” who typically experiences 
God “emotionally as close, caring, and compassionate, these images are the most 
“chronically accessible,” neuro-cognitively, in her repertoire, and fortunately they are 
very positive (59). Yet even she “at times she experiences God emotionally as distant, 
and at other times she experiences God emotionally as harsh” (59).  Like Hyun, 
“Jermaine” also experiences considerable emotional variance in his relationship with 
God, according to particular “state-dependent” and “trait-based” factors: “when he is 
around his friends and coreligionists (e.g., when he attends worship services), he tends to 
experience himself, others, and God in positive ways…However, when he is at home by 
himself, he frequently feels depressed and experiences feelings of self-loathing and 
loneliness; at such times, he usually experiences God emotionally as distant and 
unresponsive” (59).  Hyun and Jermaine are described overall as having emotionally 
ambivalent relationships with their gods.  The root of the term “ambivalence,” ambi- 
(“both”) indicates this situation of having opposing God-representations simultaneously. 
If “ambivalence” denotes acute tensions, the term Doehring (1993) uses, “multivalence,” 
reflects more extensively the complexity of God-representations in emotionality. 
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 That these experiences of affective or emotional ambivalence or multivalence in 
relationship gods can become deleterious to mental health is understandable given one of 
the most important findings in this research: that god-images seem to shape self-images 
(e.g. Schapp-Jonker et al., 2002; Greenway, Milne, and Clark 2003) so much so, some 
researchers postulate, that “one’s self-image is not independent of God images nor the 
interaction between God and self” (Hall and Hill 2000, cited in Kwon 2003, 12). Zahl and 
Gibson (2012) found significantly differences among Christian young adults (N=415) 
between “what they ‘should believe that God is like’ and what they ‘personally feel that 
god is like,’” specifically finding that “Experiential God representations were found to be 
less positive than doctrinal God representations” (216). Most claimed to experience God 
positively, “Although participants’ reports of what they had personally experienced God 
to be like tended to be positive, their description of what they should believe that God 
was like was considerably more positive than their experience” (222). Earlier, Wheeler 
(2008), found basically the same general disparities among women diagnosed with eating 
disorders (N=48) between “how they thought they should experience God and how they 
actually experienced God,” in terms of believing that God accepts them yet not having 
the commensurate “emotional experience of God’s acceptance” (43, 46). Approximately 
50% of the variance in the degree to which these women experienced God’s acceptance 
(as measured by the God Image Scales) was mediated by measures of religious 
commitment, attachment to God, and attachment intimate others. Moreover, god-
concepts, as defined above, can significantly influence god-images (Hoffman 2004) 
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indicating the importance of understanding the particular theological beliefs a person has 
about his or her god for understanding the emotionality involved in the relationship. 
These sort of cases require awareness of the emotional complexity of relating to 
gods, particularly of god-images. Moriarty, Hoffman, and Grimes (2006) urge this 
caution with a view to healing harm that has transpired in supernatural relationships:  
Oversimplifying how clients experience God can have strong, negative 
implications for treatment planning and the treatment process. Just as human 
relations are complex with a mixture of conflicting feelings existing at once, the 
same can be true with the experience of God. Assisting individuals as they 
attempt to make sense of these complex emotions oftentimes leads to a healthier, 
more genuine spiritual relationship (49) 
 
Going forward, for the sake of simplicity, I will refer to these complex psychical 
subsystems in their entirety as supernatural relational schemas. By any standard 
definition, “relational schemas” are integral to an individual person’s normal 
psychological functioning. Relational schemas are defined, for instance, as “cognitive 
structures representing regularities in patterns of interpersonal relatedness. The elements 
of a relational schema include an interpersonal script for the interaction pattern, a self-
schema for how self is experienced in that interpersonal situation, and a schema for the 
other person in the interaction.” (Baldwin 1992, 461). Defined in other, fewer words, they 
“consist of assumptions regarding the nature of the self, other people, and social 
relationships” (Simmons et al. 2012, 79). 
 Relational schemas are based on experiences in relationships, and ongoing relational 
experiences can “give rise to variations in such schemas” that, because these assumptions 
of which they consist are affectively momentous (Holmes 2002), can have 
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“consequences… for ensuing relationships, especially those involving romantic partners,” 
(79).  A relational schema is a supernatural relational schema inasmuch as it is 
comprised of images and concepts of supernatural realities. Apparently, the supernatural 
relational schemas of most who identify as religious theists involve a certain range of 
concepts and images of their gods. Where a person’s religiosity is “God-Oriented” (in 
Spero’s [1992] phrase), his or her supernatural relational schema can also be termed: 
divine relational schema. 
The Bowlbian construct of “internal working models” (Bowlby [1969] 1982; 1973) 
is virtually synonymous with this now more widely used construct of “relational 
schemas,” which has been used in theorizing and testing human attachment patterns 
(Holmes 2000), usually for testing insecure attachments (Simmons et al. 2012). Humans 
must create “internal working models” of those with whom they wish to relate in order to 
predict their patterns of behaviors and regulate their own feelings, thoughts, and actions 
accordingly, but these models are constructed upon the ongoing experiential basis of non-
representational knowledge of these others (“implicit relational knowing,” Stern et al. 
1998, or knowing in the mode of the “unthought known,” Bollas 1987). So too must one 
create internal working models of the Divine-human relationship.  
These models are called working models because they are not permanently fixed. 
They are always more or less stable, more or less malleable. God-representations are 
fashioned and refashioned in the course of human development under the influence of 
various forces forces (Hoffman et al. 2008; De Roos, Miedema, and Iedema 2001; Kwon 
2003, 2005) and are amalgamated of various kinds of materials found within the self also 
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beyond the self in society (see Kwon 2005, who criticizes Rizzuto for not explicating the 
influence of cultural factors comprehensively enough).  
In other words, god-representations originate both internally and externally, or 
perhaps, as Rizzuto believes, borrowing from Winnicott, within a “potential space” of 
creative illusion—a mental space neither fully internal nor fully external, but rather 
constantly and indistinguishably transitioning in-between internal and external worlds. 
There, gods are “found and made” at once (Winnicott 1971). For Winnicott, this space is 
the locus of the emergence of all culture, including all culture described as religion. 
In the following, with regard to “finding” the materials with which to make 
representations of God, I will emphasize sociocultural determinants in the development 
of selfhood. With regard to the process of “making” these found materials into 
representations of God, I will emphasize psychological determinants. The difference is, to 
reiterate, a difference in emphasis. The person one has become is not definable apart from 
(because never developmentally removed from) the influences of sociocultural realties. 
 
Sociocultural Determinants of the Development of Supernatural Relationships 
The socioculturally influenced psychical processes by which God- and Self-
formation occur in conjunction is to some extent scientifically investigable. Surely, in 
social psychologist Adam Cohen’s recent words, “…the myriad ways in which religion 
shapes individuals’ psychologies is a complex issue…” (2015, 77). But, given the power 
of religious enculturation to shape the self-formation of numerous individuals, whatever 
exploration of this complex issue might reveal is worth the researching effort. As I use 
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the term broadly, “sociocultural” includes along with religious variables, variables of 
gender, sexuality, ethnicity, race, or class, which are significant, socioculturally, in the 
development of selfhood. As much as it becomes possible to examine directions of 
causality between religiosity and individual psychology, Cohen argues, such research will 
reveal by example “how cultural contexts [of any sort, not just religious contexts] get into 
our heads in a variety of ways, via socialization, attentional processes, and emotional 
processes” (80). What other cultural phenomenon more than religion so clearly displays 
the power of the social-personal nexuses in which everyone develops? 
One of the intriguing complexities which Cohen thinks, with the support of the 
empirical evidence that he reviews to date, warrants special attention in research is how 
so powerfully “religion influences self-construals, which affect a range of psychological 
processes…” (77). Differences in self-construals, such as the difference Cohen 
discusses—between construing oneself as existing independently of, or interdependently 
with, other people—are “critically important because these self-construals affect a host of 
processes important to psychologists, including emotion, motivation, and cognition” (79). 
Differences in self-construals owe greatly to cultural differences (see Kwon 2005, 
for a culturally-based criticism of these self as construed by object-relations 
psychologists) and, moreover, the relationships between one’s culture and one’s self-
construal can be impacted and complicated by historically-graded changes, such as 
immigration and ensuing stresses of acculturation into the culture of a foreign country 
(Wei et al. 2012). In any event, perpetual enculturation (and/or acculturation) greatly 
determines self-construal. Moreover, “…one important influence on self-construal is 
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religion, so if we want to understand the self, we have to understand religion [emphasis 
mine]” (Cohen 2015, 79). 
 In theistic religion, specifically, according to the self- and god-representational 
research mentioned above, to understand how religion influences self-
construals/representations we must must also understand how various selves 
represent/construe the nature or character of, say, “God,” and relationships with God. An 
earlier study by Crane et al. (2009) is a good example of the exactly the kind of research 
that Cohen is so eagerly urging social-scientists to continue—research that explores the 
influences of religious (religious-cultural) factors within the nexus of culture and 
selfhood. Through a comparison between American groups of Christians and Buddhists 
in the Midwest, they sought evidence of whether or not there are clear parallels between 
religious construals of ultimate reality and self-construal, or, in their words, between an 
“individual’s concept of Divinity and concept of self” (10). The results were robustly 
significant, demonstrating very clear parallels. Most notably: 
 “All Christians and no Buddhists described the greatest spiritual force in the 
universe in distinction-based terms,” that is, in terms of the distinction of the self from 
God, whereas all Buddhists did so in “integration-based terms,” i.e. integration of the self 
with ultimate reality. Moreover, all Christians conceived of “sacredness” as centering on 
a “Spiritual Force or Entity,” usually a “Supreme Being,” and this was the “dominant 
association for this [Christian] group” (15). By contrast, for the majority of Buddhists 
(75%), “sacredness” was dominantly associated with “free-standing feelings like 
profound reverence, quiet, peace, or specialness” (15),” with only half as many Buddhists 
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as Christians (50%) also associating sacredness with a “Spiritual Force or Entity,” 
(equally as common as associations with meaningful “objects” (15). 
Given what is generally known of the differences between these Christian and 
Buddhist religious worldviews, these findings of correlated differences in their 
conceptions of ultimate reality and of the self are perhaps not surprising. Nor is it 
surprising, for instance, that Christians have been found in previous studies to conceive 
of reality hierarchically, in distinctions between hierarchically-ordered levels of 
ontological status, and accordingly are likely to think of humanity as “subordinate to the 
Divine” and themselves to “experience the idea that people are below god…” (10).  
 Intriguingly, the authors interpret the strength of the statistical link found in their 
study between these conceptions of self and ultimate reality as supporting the theory that 
“the two concepts,” self and Divine,” are not just statistically but also “psychologically 
linked, at least among practicing Christians and Buddhists living in the Midwestern 
United States” (18).  This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that all individuals in 
their sample had the same nationality and occupied the same geographical region. The 
data of this study thus provide “evidence that the independent and interdependent themes 
embedded within these religions [Christianity and Buddhism, respectively] have 
psychological reality in the minds of their adherents [emphasis mine]” (2009, 19). 
The authors suggest some causal explanations of how this might happen. One is that 
the link is established through the so-called ‘mere exposure’ effect: “…extended 
exposure to religious teachings that present The Divine from a particular perspective may 
render that perspective more mentally accessible in adherents’ everyday thinking and 
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increase the likelihood that they will apply it to human beings as well” (10). Another is 
that when thinking of something imperceptible and very abstract, such as God, human 
minds naturally resorts to more concrete metaphors—and what better concrete metaphor 
than one’s own self?  (10). Relevant to this explanation, Peck (2009) found evidence 
among Christians, majority LDS (Latter-day Saints/Mormon) that “Reported experiences 
with God led to more concrete perceptions of Deity, whereas descriptions without a 
personal sense of experience were more abstract and characterized by adjectives” (40).  
Perhaps some people are somehow influenced by their experiences of God as 
present to them to represent God in ways similar to how other people are present to them. 
Crane and colleagues (2009) do not mention another theological factor that might 
corroborate this causal interpretation: much Christian theology encourages the creation of 
this connection by stressing the validity of the analogy between understandings of God 
and understandings of Self (e.g. the popularly known doctrine of the imago dei, being 
made in the “Image of God”). Biblical scriptures, as well as the language of liturgies and 
the lyrics of music used in worship, frequently portray a God who is very person-like in 
many ways, often in spite of theological tension-sustaining caveats against overly 
anthropomorphizing God. One repeated experimental finding in the cognitive science of 
religion (CSR) is especially noteworthy at this point: the cognitive tendency—
theoretically thought to be ‘default’ as a result of human evolution—to 
“anthromorophize” experience, rendering experiences of non-human things, such pets or 
gods, more human-like, especially when under threat, such as when socially disconnected 
from other humans (Hawkey and Cacioppo 2010). 
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In trying to explain religious effects, usually one must inquire about religious 
functions in the normative sense (Stausberg 2007). And to explain normative functions of 
religious phenomena requires theorizing about their origin. I would digress too much to 
discuss evolutionary theories of the phylogeny of religious cognition species-wide (for a 
brief review, see Beit-Hallami 2015, 23-40). Instead, having discussed the content of 
god-representations, including internalized representations of God, Self, and the God-Self 
relationship, I will now discuss psychoanalytic theories of their developmental origins 
and functions in the individual person. The purpose of telling this ontogenetic story 
psychoanalytically is to have some understanding of the basis for the very possibility of 
developing intensely intimate relationships with gods, easily seen in the lives of other 
people but perhaps not so easy to understand if one has never had such a relationship. 
These psychoanalytic explorations of the deepest possible origins of God-representations 
might reveal reasons why representations of gods can so thoroughly moderate or mediate 
mental health effects associated with relationships with gods, and how Divine struggles 
(Pargament et al. 2005) are unique and why they can be so severe. Locating the source of 
this intimacy with God developed later in life (as studied mainly by Attachment Theory) 
deep within the process of developing a Self during childhood (as studied mainly by 
Psychoanalytic Object-Relations), underscores the possibility of developing of 
psychologically powerful dynamics in these relationships (e.g. McDargh 1983). 
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Psychological Determinants of the Development of Supernatural Relationships  
Object-Relational psychoanalysts of religion have, through personality theories and 
clinical studies, traced the origin of god-representations to the earliest stages of self-
formation in childhood. Edward P. Shafranske’s (1992) OR theory of the development of 
God-representations in childhood plumbs the psychic depths of relationships with God to 
a (theoretical) source as deep as the source of selfhood. Shafranske’s theory also 
underscores the self-destructive roles that God-representations can play in ongoing 
development. For these reasons, I especially take psychoanalytic cues from Shafranske, 
along with the the aforementioned Ana-Marie Rizzuto (1979), whose seminal work 
Shafranske basically relies upon but revises with his own insights as well as insights from 
Christopher Bollas (1986).  I will also make reference to some relevant empirical studies 
that have lent support to noticing the self-destructiveness of some god-representations. 
Ana-Marie Rizzuto’s The Birth of a Living God (1979) has been very influential in 
the psychoanalytic study of object-relations with Gods. In it, she theorizes that the 
formation of images and concepts of god happens through object-representational 
processes which start within the transitional arena first opened up through use of what 
Winnicott called “transitional objects,” (1971) which enable the child to cope with the 
anxious distress that ensues whenever left apart from the caretaker. Using these special 
objects that symbolically serve to take the place of the absent caretaker is the way in 
which the child mitigates or resolves several conflicts in orienting its nascent self within 
the world. According to Rizzuto, the first god-representation emerging imaginatively 
within this transitional space is a “new original representation” for the child. Because 
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they both incorporate and transcend representations of the parents, god-representations 
“can have varied components to sooth, to comfort, provide inspiration and courage—or 
terror and dread—far beyond that inspired by actual parents” (Rizzuto 1979, 46). God-
representations are originally potent, powerfully evocative of these feelings. Through a 
variety of psychological means, particularly remembering, fantasizing, and, later, 
abstractive processes of conceptualization, this complex representation of god becomes 
an internally enduring object within the growing child’s psychical world.  
Christopher Bollas (1986) posited that prior to the initial need for a transitional 
object to cope with the anxieties of “impingement” (Winnicott, 1971) felt in absence of 
the caretaker is the experience of world-transformation by the caretaker. As Winnicott 
had observed, the “good-enough mother” or caretaker is able to sustain this facilitating 
environment; but furthermore, Bollas observes, she will make significant alterations to 
it—while still ensuring its intactness and its safety from severe impingements—
alterations that allow opportunities for the child to experience significant developmental 
advances.  
 In that original relation (early on, merely a process of indistinctly self/world 
experience, not yet known as relation with another) emerges a “private culture that can 
only be inhabited by the two—mother and child—composed of a language of highly 
idiomatic syntaxes of gestures, sound, pattern, and mood that ensure its privacy, and 
emphasizes the sequestered ambience of this first relation” (Bollas 1986, 83).  There 
remains a “trace” in memory of this ongoing event of radical and positive alterations to 
one’s total environment, to one’s whole world (not yet separated into internal/external 
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and thus including oneself in its entirety). Conversely, “the failure of the mother to 
maintain provision of the facilitating environment, through prolonged absence or bad 
handling, can bring about ego collapse and psychic pain,” (Bollas 1986, 85). 
Knowledge of having experienced such positive self-transformation-through-the-
Other persists unconsciously but is effective in the behaviors of consciousness; it is what 
he calls an “unthought known,” which is unwarily but powerfully salient and is missed 
ever since (Bollas 1989). The wish to re-experience that transformation in new ways is 
most acute in times of distress or malaise. In Bollas’ developmental theory, this psychical 
trace runs alongside but also runs farther back than the trace of complete and exclusive 
intimacy with the first Other (the mother), the first relational object. As they occur, the 
self/environmental transformations are not understood by the child to be caused by 
another person, by some great object separate from and related to the child, but rather is 
undergone in an undifferentiated process of experience. With cognitive maturation comes 
the understanding that it was from a loving and more powerful other, and thus begins the 
search to be transformed anew by other objects, whether through relations with other 
special persons, or things, or activities, or encounters, or some other kind of experience. 
 The strongly felt need for the greater, loving “other that alters the self” (Bollas 
1986, 85) recurs frequently throughout life, impelling the continual search transformative 
objects. Because one seeks for such objects in order to be transformed by them, they are 
not objects one wants to possess, like the transitional objects Winnicott described, which 
would lessen or remove their potentially transformative power. One wants to “surrender” 
to the transformational object, and surrender to it not simply as one object to another 
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object but as an entire phenomenon, “as a process that alters the self,” that will 
transform it and transform it caringly, in a context of intense love (1986, 84).  
For the infant, the mother is the total environment without conceptual or even 
perceptual separation, wherein internal and external are not distinguished, and the 
transformation the infant experiences in that total environment is a transformation of its 
very being. The first transformational object was “identified with experientially... not yet 
as representation but as recurrent experience of being, a kind of existential, not 
representational, knowing;” (84) new ones found later in life, say, while adult, may be 
known in representational ways as well as in existential ways, but the dominant desire to 
have one’s being be given over to the transformative experience remains. It is when the 
first transformational object/process goes away that the need for a transition object is first 
felt. And so, Bollas believes, the original transformational experience is already 
underway prior to the original creative act of making a transitional object.  
 Shafranske (1992) agrees with Rizutto (1979) that transitional objects and 
phenomena typically have a definite and crucial role in reciprocally god-representational 
and self-representational processes throughout a person’s life, but additionally argues, 
agreeing also with Bollas, that the inclination to search for experiences of religious or 
spiritual object-relations is motivated psychologically by experiences undergone earlier 
in development—all the way back to the original transformative process Bollas had 
described (1986). God-representations, Shafranske maintains, “exist within the same field 
of influence as other internalized objects” and “in consort with all other internalized 
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object relations form an internal relational matrix on which a primary sense of self is 
endowed and interpersonal relations established” (59).  
As a result of this fact that the selfhood is founded on internalized objects, 
including, Rizutto and Shafranske both argue, internalizations of God, the failure of god-
representations can be self-destructive. Perhaps, to use again Bollas’ words about the 
powerfully determinative role of the caretaker instead in reference to God (often believed 
to be or experienced as a caretaker) “the failure of [God]… to maintain provision of the 
facilitating environment, through prolonged absence or bad handling, can bring about ego 
collapse and psychic pain,” (Bollas 1986, 85). 
 
Harmful Divine Relational Schemas 
 Can the failure of God-representations precipitate self-destruction? In what ways 
and to what extent? For whom? Under what circumstances? Transferring insights from 
Object-Relations theories of child-caretaker relationships to relationship with Gods, these 
questions are interesting and worth pursuing. The answers might vary according to the 
the age-related developmental needs of the person, the intimacy of his or her relationship 
with God, the content of theological concepts of God, affectivity of images of God, the 
maturity of the person’s style or stage of faith, or other factors.  
The results of research by Hall et al. (1998) on correlations between object-
relational development and their relational construct of spiritual maturity, “suggest that 
persons with less mature object relations development tend to have a more pathological 
relationship with God” (318). In another experimental study, Schapp-Jonker et al.  (2002) 
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tested the correlations between traits (clusters A, B, and C) of DSM-III diagnosed 
personality psychopathology of psychiatric patients with images of God. Interpreting the 
many findings and indications of their study, they theorize, “If a negative image of God 
can be considered as an early maladaptive schema,” then, “… like all early maladaptive 
schemas, a negative image of God leads to severe distress…”, meaning that some people 
“suffer severely because of their image of God,” (Schapp-Jonker 2002, 69). Alavi, Amin, 
and Savoji (2013) found that “pathological guilt” and “negative god image” decisively 
predicted depression among Iranian cancer patients (N=100). They interpret their 
findings as indicating that god images, such as god as “punisher” of oneself for 
sinfulness, inculcate “maladaptive” as opposed to “adaptive” feelings of guilt and shame. 
Exacerbated to pathological extents, these negative feelings cause one to become 
depressed, an interpretation consistent with Freud’s theory of depression following from 
“superego severity” that turns anger over moral failings against oneself (923). 
For another, perhaps more counterintuitive example of negative effects of god-
images, consider what the the implications might be for the representation of God as 
omnipresent, always everywhere and always watching, for a person who lives in terror of 
being seen by harshly judgmental or condemnatory others. Philosopher of religion Jan-
Olav Henrikson (2013) refers frequently to Stephen Pattison (2000), who studies the 
impact of shame in relationships, including relationships with gods, and, “while realizing 
that the notion of God’s omnipresence is comforting to many…” stresses the 
counterexample (5). For a person “who does not have a secure enough self to 
accommodate this idea, ‘there are no doors or boundaries that can shield one from the 
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gaze of an omniscient and probably disapproving deity who respects no boundaries or 
privacy’ (2013, 5). Henrikson tells the poignant story of giving a lecture on the the 
positive power of symbol of God as “light,” after which a woman from the audience 
critically objected that this symbol reflected her experience of Divine terror: 
The person in question said that for her, the conceptualization of God as light had 
 always been a fearful one, as it meant that God would then cast this light over all 
 who were in darkness. She, however, wanted to remain in the dark. God was 
 perceived by this listener as one who kept her under constant surveillance. This 
 exchange was a powerful reminder that in order to see the symbol of God as light 
 as liberating, one has to perceive God as being intimately related to oneself and as 
 one who loves unconditionally. Only on such a basis can a person experience 
 God’s light in his or her life as liberating. If, on the other hand, the God symbol 
 inhabits the mental space of the self as a judging superego God, whose basic 
 function is to approve or disapprove of one’s actions, then the basic possibility of 
 experiencing symbols of God as liberating may be harder to find. Consequently, 
 the way in which God is understood is closely related to the way in which we 
 understand ourselves, and how we engage with the world and with ourselves (8). 
 
God-representations are not, Shafranske clarifies, “necessarily uni-dimensional, all good 
or all bad caricatures along the motifs of a child’s fairy-tale protagonists” (1992, 58). In 
other words, they are usually Kleinean whole-objects in the internal world, having some 
parts ambiguous or seemingly bad and that might seem ambiguous as a whole from time 
to time. Similarly, Henrikson (2013) speaks of the positive and negative functions of 
symbolizations of God for the ongoing wellbeing of the self: 
It is possible to engage with this symbol [of God] in ways that are unhealthy and 
cause the resources needed for a good life to deteriorate, or in a way that may 
open a person up to sources that can sustain and enrich life in ways that are not 
accessible in the same way by means of a secular life. Here the relation between 
this and the first point becomes apparent: religion may present restrictive or 
expansive ways of being in the world, depending upon the mental space it allows 
us to develop (4). 
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Henrikson’s book, Relating Self and God: Dynamic Interplay (2013), combines 
philosophical models of selfhood (esp. Hegel and Kierkegaard) with psychological 
models (esp. Kohut and Winnicott) into the most thorough account to date of the 
development of what he calls “pathological theologies” in relating to God. Henrikson, 
like Shafranske, sees very clearly that “symbols” of god can “either contribute to the 
affirmation of the self, or serve to obstruct its development in such a way that it may 
damage the structures which are necessary for developing a sound self” (2013, 51). 
Henrikson would appreciate Shrafranske’s simple but still insufficiently explored 
intuition is that “such representations may serve to support or deride the individual....” 
(1992, 58) although, ideally, god-schemas should “serve a dynamic role in forwarding the 
psychological equilibrium of the individual” (59). Serving this role is why, on this 
psychoanalytic account, they formed in the first place. Henrikson insists that the 
development of selfhood does not, at any point, require the development of 
representations of God and that the reverse is true: one must have some construction of 
selfhood prior to constructing Divine selfhood. He calls this fact, psychologically viewed, 
the “asymmetry or difference between the self and God” (2013, 56); theologically 
viewed, this asymmetry seems reversed: “we, when we speak of God, speak of that which 
creates the possibility of there being a self in the first place (56).  
Regardless of which account is correct on this point (whether the formation of the 
self requires forming representations/symbolizations of God or not) Shafranske and 
Henrikson clearly both emphasize the power of God-representations/symbolizations to 
transform selfhood. Both authors acknowledge that representations of God are deeply 
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rooted in the growth of selfhood (as well as the reverse): the self can grow very deep 
roots in representations of God (whether or not the Self always grows out of God-like 
seeds of parental and other kinds). Other important psychoanalysts of religion whose 
work I have not made much space to review have also articulated versions of this 
symbiotic developmental scenario of god-and-self representations (McDargh, 1983, 
Meissner, 1984, Spero, 1992). As these psychoanalytic theories and relevant empirical 
research indicate (e.g. Cohen, 2015, Burns et al., 2009; Schaap-Jonker et al., 2002; Hall 
et al., 1998), God-representations influence self-representation and, inasmuch has selves 
are comprised of self-representations, this means that god-representations influence self-
formation. 
Rizzuto thought it was intriguing that, unlike other transitional objects related to 
caretakers, the psychical functions of God as transitional object tend to last throughout a 
person’s life by virtue of their unique features (Rizzuto 1979, 179).  As Doehring 
explains Rizutto’s theory, “Unlike other transitional objects the God representation is not 
de-cathected in the process of development. Instead, the meaning of this representation 
becomes intensified and can evolved as the self evolves. Its meaning is a rich and 
complex as all of the significant object representations of the internal world” (1993, 6).  
God is represented as transcending one’s circumstances and is ultimately 
powerful, has the ultimate ‘say’ about a person’s life. One’s representation of god 
contains “a statement about one’s relationship with all of existence” (Shafranske 1992, 
58), unlike representations of other people. Consequently, and this is critical to note, 
within the makeup of a person’s theological schema there “lies the possibility as well that 
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one’s religiosity may convey a negative sense of self and a disharmony with existence” 
(58). One’s representation of God, or in particular some problematic or ‘bad’ aspects of 
it, might make God “appear as persecutory or bereft of concern for the person” or prompt 
an anxious or despairing sense of “absence of an Other…In the extreme, if one’s creator 
is a malevolent force, one might wonder how this bodes for any expression of human 
relationship” (58). Encouragingly, a clinical study (Goodman and Manierre, 2008) of 
nine borderline women demonstrated the efficacy of psychoanalytically-oriented group 
therapy, focusing on representations of God, to enable active “re-creation” of images of 
God and oneself among those who imaged their gods negatively, e.g. as “harsh,” 
“punitive,” or “authoritarian,” and themselves in severely negative ways (5, 10, 12, 14).  
Discerning problematic aspects of one’s own supernatural relational schema, 
representations of God, the Self, and their relationship, requires developing what Todd 
Hall (2007b) calls “reflective spiritual functioning” (40). As the case of “Kevin” 
illustrates in Hall’s article, therapeutic help in developing this capacity can be vital to 
healing from harm in attachments to God: “Reflective self-functioning… puts a wedge, 
as it were, between my subjective experience of myself and my mental states…. Lacking 
this reflective capacity will make it difficult for clients to take their subjective 
experiences of God as an object of scrutiny in order to process them” (40). My 
discussions here are meant to facilitate precisely this capacity of “reflective spiritual 
functioning” about health or subjective wellbeing in relationships with Gods. 
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Who is to Blame? My “god” or my “God”? 
Before reviewing the relevant literature about psychological abuse in other inter-
human relational contexts, the methodological issues discussed in Part II can be recalled 
briefly to express a certain worry I have regarding the psychology and psychoanalysis of 
religion literature I have just used and my emphasis on supernatural relational schemas. 
By bracketing explicit theological questions about the goodness or existence of 
God, a psychological researcher might implicitly blame the victim of perceived Divine 
wrongdoings or evils: the human being. By focusing analysis of the supernatural 
problems solely on intrapsychic variables of the human subject, despite intersubjective 
theologies of the relationship in which God is a real subject, the victim is implicitly 
implicated as the source of the problems. Perhaps the blame is not focused on the 
individual but rather on his or her group, or the shared ideology, or sociocultural factors, 
or prior damaging interpersonal experiences.  
 Insofar as the relationship has become psychologically abusive to the human, or 
wherever the Divine being is experienced as psychologically abusing, the victim of this 
Divine abuse will be implicitly blamed by explanations of abuse in terms of, say, the 
under-sophistication of their theologies, the rigidity of their ‘styles’ or ‘stages’ of faith, 
the insecurity of their attachment behaviors in relating to their gods and so on. The 
implication that any harm in relating to God is due to maladaptive ways of relating to 
god. Certainly, any of these variables can be significant causal factors in specific cases.  
Moreover, these accounts might be accurate. Perhaps the variables they specific 
fully mediate the outcomes. To one who is skeptical of the supernatural (such as myself) 
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all unhealthy or harmful dynamics in relating to the Divine arise from problems in non-
supernatural, naturally human, realities. Nevertheless, for the supernatural theist who 
believes, knows, and feels that God is real subject relating to him or her, and for whom 
this God is abusive, such explanations would naively miss what is arguably, the most 
important initial realization for any circumstantial changes or processes healing to 
happen, e.g., “I feel like my God is abusing me” or “my God is abusing me.” Consider a 
client who feels him or herself to be relating maturely to God for their own part, but is 
experiencing the relationship is unhealthy or harmful and is starting to wonder if this is 
“not my fault” but “God’s fault,” that in spite of the sincerity and efforts of their 
devotion, God is relating harmfully to them nonetheless. Trying to help a person not to 
relate to God in maladaptive ways without questioning, in terms of their experiences, the 
ways in which God is relating to them, can discourage recognition of a maltreating God.  
Moriarty, Hoffman, and Grimes (2006) admonish therapists to allow some 
amount of their clients’ idealizing transference in attaching to them when it seems 
motivated by compensatory functions against the Divine attachment figure’s failures to 
be adequate.  In allowing this dynamic to “play out” in the therapeutic relationship, “The 
avoidant [avoidantly attached] individual,” for example, “will have the affective 
experience of feeling accepted by God. In addition, they will have the cognitive 
understanding that God cares for them and does not reject them” or perhaps “allow 
themselves to open-up or imagine God as closer and more intimate” (51). Surely this 
might happen in this way. But could not this experience also promote the exact opposite 
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understanding that some people (i.e. the therapist) “care for them and will not reject 
them,” unlike God, perhaps leading to a rejection of this God?  
The abovementioned story of Kevin told by Todd Hall (2007b) involves precisely 
this movement of withdrawing from God in response to God’s withdrawal. Hall casually 
interprets Kevin’s “experience of abandonment and subsequent withdrawal from God” as 
occurring “in response to a series of perceived rejections of his need for reassurance and 
comfort in close relationships after he demanded that they be met” (39). By contrast to 
cases like Kevin’s, it is entirely possible for someone with a usually secure attachment 
style (based on formation of positive internal working models of relationships with 
significant others) nonetheless to become insecure in relationship to God. 
 Although security, according to the research, mitigates against struggles and 
instability in relationship to gods, such relationships might still become insecure and even 
pathological, not due to prior or concurrent human relationships but due to the fact that 
God indeed, by all appearances, has been neglecting or has rejected that person—just as 
Kevin felt was the case. In any case, the hope is that the client can “take steps to 
experience their God image in a healthier manner” (54) and it is indeed conceivable that 
Moriarty and colleagues’ “Attachment integration therapy… provides a way for clients to 
change the way that they emotionally experience their God image” (54). 
But what if, within the bounds of the religious tradition or group of which one is 
part, there are no theologically viable options for making these changes in their imagery 
of God or in their associated emotionality in relating to God? Some individuals, rather 
than “taking steps to experience their God image in a healthier manner,” want or need to 
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take steps away from experiencing this or that God image at all. Some individuals might 
feel the need, and might be helped by caring others to recognize their need, to leave the 
relationship, to identify and let go of a bad God—not just to “identify and let go of their 
maladaptive way of relating” to this God, as the authors encourage clinicians in 
conclusion of their article (49). An intersubjective analysis of the situation, whether in the 
subjunctive mode of the non-theistic clinician or in the sincere theistic faith of the client, 
would require identifying a God who harms the Self. This failure of recognition of the 
behaviors of the other Divine Subject in the relationship might facilitate further damage 
beneath awareness by inadvertently reinforcing defense mechanisms of “spiritual 
bypassing” (Vaughn 1991; Welwood 1984; Masters 2010) meanwhile failing to support 
the development of values and virtues that are conducive to healthy spirituality (Izzard 
2003; Vaughn 1991; Welwood 1984). When one is undergoing psychological abuse in 
relationship to his or her God, not only changing representations of God but also ending 
the relationship must always be seriously considered for the sake of the abused person. 
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PART IV. Psychological Abuse 
 
 Conceptualizing and defining, not to mention measuring, psychological abuse is 
as important as difficult (Follingstad 2011; 2007b). Over various conceptual issues 
concerning the abuse of children by caretakers and/or abuse between intimate partners, 
researchers have disagreed and continue to lack consensus despite important attempts to 
stabilize these concepts by standardizing them (e.g. APASC, 1995, 1996, and 2002 for 
cases of child maltreatment). “Unfortunately,” Follingstad (2007b) explains, “…the 
impression that there is consensus about the concept of ‘psychological abuse’ is illusory” 
(440). Here is Follingstad’s assessment from almost a decade ago of the state of affairs in 
research into psychological abuse: 
“Psychological abuse” has been defined in a variety of ways…many important 
questions for defining “psychological abuse” … have not been answered, but 
rather it remains a superficial, undeveloped, and ambiguous concept. Seldom is 
the complexity of this phenomenon truly reflected or wrestled with in depth in the 
“psychological abuse” literature (440). 
 
Even including the important literature published since Follingstad made this statement 
(post-2007), my assessment of the state of research regarding the concept remains 
similar. The more consensus regarding the concept of abuse, the better, most seem to say. 
But there is also some wisdom in tempering the endeavor to increase consensus with the 
realization that achieving consensus in any final or total sense is likely not possible or 
even (if the motivations involved are re-prioritized) necessary. At least one researcher of 
child maltreatment, Garbarino (2008, 2010), believes the ideal of definitional consensus, 
not realized because unrealizable, futilely distracts research from more urgent and less 
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obdurate questions. Garbarino (2008) explains that the the usually attempted method of 
categorical definition by demarcation has not been adequately successful: 
I have learned that the task of defining child maltreatment is not simply one of 
listing specific behaviors that fall within the boundaries of the term or outside it. 
No simple list will be of much use because there are complex issues of intention 
[…] and consequence […] Many people find this approach to defining child 
maltreatment frustrating, of course. They would like a final list of what is and 
what isn’t child abuse and neglect. But I am convinced that there is no such list. 
(798).   
 
Instead, Garbarino encourages a more training-focused approach to defining the 
construct, seeking first and foremost to help those who must be able to identify instances 
of abuse to do so in ways which improve intervention. Similarly, but for different reasons 
and concerning different scenarios of psychological abuse, McHugh and colleagues 
(2005; 2013) have expressed pragmatism about defining the construct in the context of 
intimate adult partnerships, the difficulties of which, they say, accurately reflect the 
complicated intricacies of these experiences. Moreover, they suggest that the normal 
scientific ideal of increasing consensus to the point of properly excluding alternative, 
mutually competing definitions of psychological abuse is not necessarily better for 
purposes of research and treatment (2013). They conclude their discussions saying,  
…. different conceptualizations of violence and abuse can contribute to a 
pluralistic, complex, and multi-layered conception of intimate partner abuse. 
Reliance on a single measure that oversimplifies, reduces or reifies our 
construction of violence can be seen as problematic. A similar perspective needs 
to be applied to psychological abuse. The lack of a single consistent definition 
may indicate the multidimensional and complex nature of psychological abuse. 
Although we have argued here for the value of an agreed-upon definition and 
conceptualization of psychological abuse, not agreeing on the definition or the 
dimensions of psychological abuse can be seen as positive in that it prevents 
reification, and allow us to remain open to new conceptualizations (2013, 178). 
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These two statements represent much of my own attitude about the prospect of defining 
psychological abuse in the context of relationships with gods. I assume the endeavor is 
inevitably difficult; that abstractly defining psychological abusiveness in Divine-human 
relationships is best attempted for the purpose of facilitating situational recognition of its 
occurrence; and that definitions of psychological abuse should be proposed inquiringly, 
not irrefutably, acknowledging their reliance on provisional and fallible interpretations 
and remaining open to complementation and criticism.  Contrast this pragmatic attitude, 
for instance, with Pamela Auburn’s stark skepticism in what seems somewhat of an 
overstatement: “Until there is consensus regarding what behaviors are psychologically 
abusive there can be no meaningful investigations of their impact” (13, 2003). 
Encouragingly, some research has indicated substantial agreement among professionals, 
among non-professionals, and between professionals and non-professionals, in 
interpreting scenarios as evincing psychological abuse (McGee et al. 1995; Glaser 2002, 
701, cites Burnett 1993 and Shafer 1997).  I agree with McHugh et al. (2003; 2005) that 
interpreting situations of potential abuse with multiple theories and definitions in mind 
can be revealing while preventing accidental obscuration of the phenomena through 
reliance on one definition or another. Even so, the attempt to create better definitions, as 
Auburn stresses, can better reveal, rather than obscure, the phenomena.  
 Psychological abuse probably cannot be defined in such a way that no researcher 
might find objectionable in some respect, and it would require excessive digression here 
to try resolving every version in the literature of this basic problem. However,  premising 
my attempt to define and model of psychological abuse in Divine-human relationships, I 
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will discuss and decide upon several of the relevant conceptual difficulties in the 
literature: (1) the meaning of “psychological” in “psychological abuse;” (2) the 
conceptual relations of the terms “psychological maltreatment,” “psychological abuse,” 
and “psychological neglect;” (3) the classification of types and subtypes of psychological 
abuse; and, most importantly and complicatedly, requiring the lengthiest discussion, (4) 
the conditions under which psychological harm is psychologically abusive harm.  
These conceptual difficulties not the only questions vexing researchers and 
clinicians. But these ones seem to make the most critical differences in conceptualizing 
the phenomena of psychological abuse and each is important to consider in defining and 
modeling psychological abuse as it can happen in supernatural relationships.  
I stipulate each definition minimally, that is, in terms of what I believe are 
necessary and sufficient conditions for psychological abuse in supernatural relationships 
(necessary conditions: where supernatural abuse is occurring, certain conditions are 
therefore present; sufficient conditions: where certain conditions are present, supernatural 
abuse is therefore occurring). The types and subtypes of psychological abuse that I 
stipulate with more specific definitions are provided as examples of behaviors 
instantiating my definition of the concept of Divine abuse. 
 
Conceptual Difficulties in Defining Psychological Abuse 
 
The Meaning of “Psychological” in “Psychological Abuse” 
 
 One issue over which researchers have occasionally disagreed is whether the 
concept of “psychological abuse” should be distinguished from (O’Hagan 1995) or 
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instead considered synonymous with (Nelms 2001; Glaser 2011) “emotional abuse;” and, 
if distinguished, whether the former concept subsumes the latter. This issue of choosing 
the appropriate adjective, psychological or emotional, is the same where the term 
“maltreatment” rather than “abuse” is in question (e.g. Wolfe and McIsaac 2011). 
Notably, O’Hagan insists that “psychological” and “emotional” forms of abuse be 
distinguished, considering the occurrence of “rare exceptions” to the typical case where 
“emotional abuse” detrimentally effects cognitive abilities, to which the term 
“psychological abuse” refers idiosyncratically in his usage (1995). While indeed such 
exceptions, as O’Hagan describes them, are conceivable, using the term “psychological” 
to refer to cognitive abilities as somehow opposed to emotionality is at odds with more 
frequent and inclusive usage, inside and outside of the research literature, and is thus 
unhelpfully confusing. 
As Hart and Brassard (1987) (whose subsuming concept of “psychological 
maltreatment” O’Hagan critiques) rightly insist, the concept of “psychological abuse” can 
incorporate both cognitive and emotional consequences of abuse. These aspects of a 
person’s psychology are not distinguishable except in abstract, because “cognition and 
emotion are not independent of each other, cognitive appraisal of experiences 
contributing to the affective experience and vice versa,” (Glaser 2002, 698, seeming to 
criticize O’Hagan’s conceptualization for this same reason). Accordingly, the concept 
psychological abuse can subsume the concept of emotional abuse.  
Another noteworthy distinction regarding this terminological choice is that 
“emotional” abuse is more specific about what is, indeed, a major locus of abusive 
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harm—emotionality—and hence is less holistic than “psychological” (because, of course, 
not all of a person’s psychology is comprised of emotions). Furthermore, common 
connotations or psychologists’ denotations of the word “emotional” might involve a 
criterion of sufficient self-consciousness of being abused (sometimes this criterion is 
involved explicitly in distinguishing (less conscious) “affect” from (more conscious) 
“emotions”). But eliciting this connotation is problematic for the definition of 
psychological abuse if not all victims are fully aware of the depths to which they have 
been harmed through psychological abuse, and if not all would attribute the 
psychological harm they warily experience to the abusive behaviors of another person.  A 
variety of dissociative defense-mechanisms, revealed in numerous clinical material and 
psychoanalytic literature (Beti, Thornback, and Muller 2013; Thomas 2003, 2005; 
Blizard 1994, Blizard and Bluhm 2004; Young and Gerson 1991; Schafer 1984) function 
precisely to prevent awareness of these harms when doing so is, or seems to be, in the 
best interest of survival or thriving, which often entails the preservation of vital 
relationships of attachment. The condition of awareness therefore should not be included 
in definitions of psychological abuse, so as not to presume that the victim must not only 
show evidence of being psychologically abused, but also self-identify as such.  
Pipes and Lebov-Keeler (1997) designed a clever study to explore this exact 
connection between showing signs of psychological abuse and claiming that descriptor 
for oneself. The signs and the self-identifying claim are often discrepant, they found. As 
they introduce the question, they observe that “…it is a generally accepted assumption in 
the field that there is a continuum of awareness among victims concerning their abuse, 
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with individuals at one end being unaware that they are being abused,” (587) and yet 
many definitions do not adequately reflect this continuum of awareness.  
They hypothesized that, “Individuals who do not define what is happening to 
them as abusive are presumably much less likely to leave the relationship or take action 
toward changing the relationship. Thus, it seems important that research begin to address 
the relationship between measures of psychological abuse and perceptions by individuals 
that they are indeed involved in an abusive relationship” (1997, 587). Decades later, 
McHugh (2013), briefly raises the same still under-researched question: “Typically, the 
research has not examined the reported acts of abuse in context, nor did investigators ask 
either the men or women if they felt they had been psychologically abused…” (178).  
In examining the healthiness of Divine-human relationships, likewise, both 
noticing signs of psychological abuse and creating opportunities for self-reporting 
psychological abuse are important for interpreting whether it is indeed occurring. But 
perhaps using too much of either sort of index without comparison to the other might bias 
interpretations inaccurately. The fact that a person might not be aware enough of being 
abused to attribute the psychological harm they are experiencing to the abusiveness of the 
other person in the relationship, makes interpreting when and how much such a case 
involves psychological abuse more difficult.  
 
Psychological “Maltreatment,” “Abuse,” and “Neglect” 
  
Although some phrasing in the literature distinguishes psychological 
“maltreatment” (ΨΜ) from psychological “abuse” (ΨΑ), usually either (a) the terms are 
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used synonymously (e.g. Auburn 2003, Glaser 2011), or (b) ΨM is supposed to subsume 
ΨA along with the concept of psychological “neglect” (ΨN) insofar as these two terms, 
“abuse” and “neglect,” are also distinguished (Hart and Brassard, 1987; Claussen and 
Crittenden 1991; Glaser 2002; Wolfe and McIsaac 2011). In the synonymizing usage, 
ΨM could either be interchanged arbitrarily with ΨA (e.g. Hibbard, Barlow, MacMillan 
et al. 2012), or whichever is the preferred term could be used consistently instead of the 
other.  The usefulness of the subsuming concept of ΨM is lessened the less that ΨA and 
ΨN are conceptually distinguished. More often than not in the literature to date, notions 
of ΨN have been incorporated into concepts of ΨA as sub-categories. Those who use the 
term ΨM seem not to sub-categorize ΨN as a particular form of ΨA, rather thinking of 
ΨA and ΨN as, in some sense or measure, discriminable configurations of action both 
instantiating ΨM. Commonly, authors prevaricate over this decision, allowing the 
ambiguity to continue (as in the prevalent generic phrasing that conjoins the two terms, 
“abuse and neglect” (e.g. Glaser 2002, 2011; APSAC, 1995, 2002, 2008; APA 2013)  
If the concept of ΨN is subsumed into the concept of ΨA (e.g. Hibbard et al. 
2012, modifying the typology of Hart et al. 2002, and Brassard et al. 2006) as I think it 
should be (see my discussion in the next section), there remains the option of an 
alternative subsuming usage of the concept of ΨM which requires a slight change in how 
it has been used in the literature so far: not subsuming both ΨA and ΨN, each as distinct 
concepts, into ΨM, but instead conceptualized ΨA to include ΨN and subsuming it into 
the concept of ΨM, along with the concept of psychologically non-abusive but 
nonetheless maltreating behaviors To suggest this conceptual hierarchy involves making 
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two mutually implying stipulations: first, psychological neglect should be considered a 
form of psychological abuse; second, not all psychological maltreatment is abusive 
psychological maltreatment (i.e. psychological abuse), meaning that some manifestations 
of psychological maltreatment meet certain distinguishing criteria for abusiveness which 
other manifestations do not. The first position requires recommending a 
conceptualization of psychological neglect as indeed abusive. That I will do in the next 
section regarding the third conceptual difficulty of creating a typology of various 
psychologically abusive behaviors. The second position necessitates defining the 
difference between abusive and non-abusive ΨM, a difference which, I argue in the 
following section, makes appropriate sense according to particular criteria for measuring 
psychological abusiveness along a continuum or spectrum of maltreatment.  These 
criteria I will discuss in regards to the fourth conceptual difficulty of establishing a 
threshold of abusiveness.   
 Because this version of the concept of psychological maltreatment subsumes a 
distinction—according to certain criteria—between the types of ΨM that are abusive 
(AΨM)—i.e. “psychological abuse” (ΨA) —and the types of ΨM that are non-abusive 
(Non-AΨM), the latter can be referred to simply as i.e. “psychological maltreatment” 
(ΨM). The former includes the more specific typological concept of “psychological 
neglect” (ΨN).  
Translating the conceptual-definitional choices just made into terms of Divine-
human relationships, one might speak of “Divine maltreatment” as including 
maltreatment worthy of the more specific name “Divine abuse” one form of which is 
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“Divine neglect.” Again, the sort of maltreatment/abuse/neglect in question here is 
always psychological, assuming that Divine-human relational dynamics are constituted 
psychologically and not (or at least not normally) by the interaction of spatially located 
bodily entities, so it is unnecessary to insert “psychological” into the terminology. But 
nonetheless, as a reminder and stressor, hereafter I will sometimes insert the Greek psi 
symbol (Ψ) for “psychological” whenever I abbreviate the terms (following Rogers and 
Follingstad 2014), where psychological refers to “the psychological domain,” (Hart and 
Glaser 2011, 760-61), cognitive-affective, conscious-unconscious, as I discussed earlier. 
In the models to be described and visualized below, I conceptualize all Divine 
misbehaviors along a continuum of Divine psychological harm to a human person—
ranging in seriousness of potential harm to those behaviors constituting what I will soon 
define as DΨΑ. Therefore, I must introduce some categories of less seriously harmful 
Divine behaviors further toward the other end of the spectrum from Divinely abusive 
behaviors, although I am mainly interested in the latter. This continuum will be presented 
at the end of this section after Divine abuse is defined (Figure 2, p. 150). The categories 
can also be arranged in a vertical conceptual hierarchy, as presented in my typology of 
psychologically abusive Divine behaviors (Figure 3, p. 152).  
 
Types and Subtypes of Psychologically Abusive Behaviors 
 
Developing a classificatory typology of behaviors constituting psychological 
abuse is perhaps the most common approach to defining the construct.  Yet this ostensive 
approach (i.e. pointing to behaviors that exemplify the meaning of the construct) has 
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resulted in multiple typologies of psychologically abusive behaviors that are not easily 
adjudicated while awaiting empirical feedback that is not frequently forthcoming (for 
empirical tests of measurement reliability and  construct validity, see Auburn 2003; Lau 
et al. 2005; Tomyr et al. 2011; McGee et al. 1995) Often within a given typology, it 
appears upon closer inspection that the types and sub-types are not as discrete from one 
another as they are proposed to be. Often when comparing typologies, there remain 
significant discrepancies in definitions of the same or similarly termed constructs 
(Kobielski 2006, 9-10). Both of these methodological problems are problems of 
theoretical construction. A noteworthy example, relevant to theorizing about 
psychological abuse in Divine-human relationships, is the use of the distinction made 
between abuse and neglect discussed above within typologies of psychologically abusive 
behaviors. 
Apparently the reason for differentiating psychological “abuse” and “neglect” and 
often integrating them into the framework of psychological “maltreatment” (as discussed 
above) is to maintain an important first-order typological distinction among the specific 
actions of the abuser/neglecter: abusive-type actions that contribute negative factors and 
neglectful-type actions that remove positive factors. In other words, the abuse/neglect 
distinction is between “acts of omission (neglect) or commission (abuse)” (Claussen and 
Crittenden 1991, 6); in very similar words, “maltreatment” includes “both acts of 
omission (emotional neglect) and commission (emotional abuse)” (Tomyr et al. 2011). 
Commission and omission are terms many other researchers have also used for this 
distinction in the procedure (contributing or removing) and the consequence (positive or 
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negative for wellbeing) of actions (Auburn 2003; Garbarino 2008, Tomyr et al. 2011; 
Hibbard et al. 2012; Lau et al. 2005; c.f. Glaser [2002] who, in stipulating her definition, 
strangely makes both distinctions at once, while only one is needed: “Emotional abuse 
and neglect includes omission as well as commission,” 702). 
Distinguishing these types of actions instead in terms of “abuse” versus “neglect” 
perpetuates the obscurity in current usage of the latter term both as distinguished from 
abuse and as a subtype of abuse (as in the official APSAC practical guidelines, 1995, 
2002, 2008; APA 2013). As a subtype of abuse, which terms should be used instead to 
make this distinction within the concept of abuse? Perhaps ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ abuse? 
‘Active’ and ‘passive’ abuse (Auburn, 2003)? ‘Overt’ and ‘subtle’ (Marshall 1996)? 
These distinctions are not quite conceptually equivalent nor do they quite capture the 
commission/omission distinction commonly inhering in abuse/neglect distinctions.   
Further, each has associations in usage which might be confusing (e.g. the notion 
of ‘passive’ behavior might imply as its opposite the nonsensical notion of behaving 
inactively) whereas the commission/omission distinction has narrow history of fairly 
specific usage in Western Theistic, particularly Catholic religious’ tradition, which 
historically introduced the distinction with the theological nuance of “sins of omission” 
and “sins of commission.”  Most Westerners, I venture to guess, normally associate this 
distinction with the Christian tradition and rarely use the terms when not associating 
thereto. More problematic, arguably, these other distinctions prove more problematic 
than the commission/omission distinction for categorization of particular behaviors. 
When trying to categorize specific behaviors as direct or indirect, passive or active, overt 
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or subtle, it is not clear that the behaviors in questions belong either and entirely into one 
or the other (e.g. in which category, active or passive, are passive-aggressive behaviors?). 
For these reasons, the alternative binaries mentioned above cannot be substituted 
for the commission/omission terminology which most precisely represents the intended 
sense of the distinction (although they might be taken to represent other important 
distinctions; e.g. Marshall, 1996, compellingly argues that using the overt/subtle 
distinction prevents missing insidious forms of psychological abuse which can be 
significantly harmful). The commission/omission distinction can also be seen as sliding 
above or under these other distinctions. The abusive addition of psychologically negative 
factors—commissions of psychological abuse—can be direct or indirect, overt or subtle,  
active or passive (Follingstad 2011, mentions the un-researched possibility that “the 
omission of some actions can be reliably assessed as psychologically aggressive 
behaviors (e.g., withholding support),”( 1196; Murphy and Hoover 1999, interviewing 
women who have experienced dating violence to create the Multidimensional Measure of 
Emotional Abuse, similarly call this form of abuse “hostile withdrawal”). The 
commission/omission distinction is not about perpetrator intentions nor impact upon the 
victim, since, for instance, removing psychological positive factors—omissions—can be 
intended to, or have the impact of, contributing negative psychological factors. The 
distinction thus refers just to the basic form of the means used by the maltreating person 
to maltreat another: between actions which abusively harm by means of committing the 
addition of negative, i.e. harmful, factors and those which harm by omitting positive, i.e. 
helpful/healthy, factors deemed appropriate. This contrasting pair of terms is apparently 
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the most conceptually exact terminology currently in use for this typological distinction 
within the concept of “psychological abuse.” Still, this terminology is somewhat 
unwieldy to phrase or abbreviate since there are no adjectival forms of either noun, e.g. 
‘omissive’/ ‘comissive.’ Perhaps these could be neologized into use. 
 I opt instead for another pair of terms that also derive from a technical 
provenance of usage. Rather than deriving from theological language (i.e. “sins” of 
commission and “sins” of omission), one of the terms—antagonistic—derives from the 
language of human biomedicine and evolutionary anthropology and the other term—
antipathetic—from psychological and philosophical language. These terms connote a 
slightly different contrast than the commission/omission contrast.  Extrapolating from 
these contexts of origin into a relational context and stated in metaphorical terms of 
behavioral ‘movements’ in the relationship, antagonistic psychological abuse involves 
moving psychologically against the other person in the relationship, whereas 
“antipathetic” abuse involves moving psychologically away from the other person or the 
relationship.   In other words, the first connotes movement within the relationship over-
against the psychological needs or wants of the other person, the second connotes 
movement away from the relationship in spite of needs or wants of the other person.   
Making this distinction in these terms, I introduce “agonistic Divine abuse” and 
“antipathic Divine abuse,” making “Divine neglect” a sub-type of the latter type. 
Therefore, as emphasized in most multi-dimensional definitions of abuse, neglectfulness 
can be form of abuse (some instruments of measurement, such as the Index of 
Psychological Abuse, Sullivan et al. 1991, also include certain neglectful behaviors as 
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abusive). Likely an especially salient theme in experiences of Divine abuse is a specific 
form of psychological neglectfulness called “ignoring,” “denying emotional 
responsiveness” (APSAC guidelines in Glaser [2002] 702; see her recommendations for 
adjusting them, 709) “denying emotional availability” or “psychologically unavailable 
caretaking” (Follingstad and Dehart 2000, 893-94), as well as perceived major failures of 
caretaker “protection” where protection is appropriate to expect and vitally needed 
(Thomas 2003, 2005). If the angonistic/antipathic distinction is a first-order distinction—
not hard and fast—between types of Divinely abusive acts, what are the subtypes?  
Conceptualizing psychological abuse by virtue of specific behaviors has received 
an impressive degree of consensus across conceptual analyses. Various researchers have 
provided lists of abusive behaviors, defining and justifying the inclusion of each on the 
list. Although there are some slight differences across such lists, most include versions of 
all the categories, elaborated and specified with varying terminology, that I include in 
Figure 2 (see p. 150) and define as occurring in Divine-human relationships. 
 
Conditional Criteria of Psychological Abuse 
Follingstad (2011) and Wolfe and McIsaac (2011) both emphasize the importance 
of operational definitions that clearly, even if arbitrarily (McGee and Wolfe 1991), place 
the threshold of psychological abusiveness. In agreement with Wolfe and McIsaac (2010) 
and Garbarino (2010), I do not believe all harmful relating, whether in caretaking or 
romantic partnerships, is always abusive relating. As Glaser (2002) explains, “there is a 
continuum within the parent-child relationship [or, I imagine, in the adult romantic 
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relationship], ranging from a good through maladaptive to a sufficiently damaging 
relationship to merit being termed abusive” (700). Similarly, but with an important 
categorical caveat, Wolfe and McIsaac contend that “Poor/dysfunctional parenting 
methods occupy a wide range along our hypothetical continuum of positive-to-negative 
parenting behaviors, whereas emotionally abusive or neglectful methods warrant a 
qualitative distinction from the other methods.” (2011, 809).  
In answering the question of psychological abuse about any relationship, the most 
complicated and most decisive issue is choosing which criteria should distinguish 
psychologically abusive relating from other dysfunctional relational behaviors that are 
more and less severely harmful.  The model I present in the next Part (V) is both 
continual and categorical, distinguishing the included concepts both quantitatively 
(psychological abuse as the most severe) and qualitatively (Figure 3, p. 152).  
What are the conditions under which psychologically harmful behaviors count as 
psychological abuse? By what criteria can this threshold be placed?  Several have been 
posited as requisite for this determination, five of which seem especially important to 
decide upon in determining whether psychological abuse is occurring in supernatural 
relationships: (1) the intention of the perpetrator to harm psychologically; (2) the severity 
of psychological harm to the victim; (3) the power imbalance in the relationship; the (4) 
the persistence or patterned persistence of psychologically harmful behaviors in the 
relationship, and, affected by all of the above conditions, (5) the ability of the 
psychologically harmed person to change or exit the dynamics of the relationship. For 
convenience in discussion, I will name these five conditions with single ‘I’-alliterated 
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terms: intention (to harm), (harmful) impact, imbalance (of power), iteration (of harmful 
behavior), and intractability/inescapability (of the relationship). I argue:  
The first condition (intention) is unnecessary to include in defining psychological 
abuse, although when known seems an obvious sign of potential, if not actual, 
psychological abuse. Both the second (impact) and third (imbalance) are necessary to 
include in a definition of psychological abuse, and the causal connections between these 
two conditions should be specified. The fourth (iteration), while unnecessary for defining 
psychological abuse, is necessary (along with impact and imbalance) to include in 
defining a relationship or a person as psychologically abusive. The fifth 
(intractability/inescapability) results from combinations of the other four conditions and 
increases the direness of the situation, but is unnecessary either for the definition of 
psychological abuse or for defining a person or relationship as psychologically abusive. 
 
Intention to Harm 
Sometimes where neglect is distinguished from abuse (as discussed above) the 
criterion of intention is used (O’Hearn and Davis 1997; Maiuro 2001). The question is 
whether the verdict of psychological abusiveness requires the ruling of mal-intent, i.e. 
intent to harm, in the mind of the putative abuser (at least in “pure cases,” where intention 
is interpretable, O’Hearn and Davis 1997). Some authors use this criterion on a 
continuum distinguishing (intentionally harmful) abusive behavior from dysfunctional 
behavior that is unintentionally harmful, reflecting incompetence in the relational role but 
not the intentional misuse of power (Wolfe and McIsaac 2010; similarly, Hammarman 
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and Bernett 2000 use this mal-intent criterion to distinguish “mild” from “severe” 
emotional abuse; c.f. Rogers and Follingstad 2014). Others (McHugh, Rakowski, and 
Siderski 2013) criticize the malevolent intention criterion because it is immeasurable and 
therefore not operational and, just as importantly, because it elides the fact that some 
abusers psychologically abuse unwittingly but still severely (Marshall 1996).  
I agree with both of these criticisms of the mal-intent criterion insofar as as the 
task is to define the necessary conditions of psychological abuse. Mal-intention, I argue, 
is not a necessary condition for psychological abuse (Hibbard et al. 2012). Nor is it 
sufficient. Where there is psychological abuse there is not necessarily intent to harm; 
where there is intent to harm there is not necessarily abuse. For these reasons, I avoid 
intentionality entirely (as do Heyman and Slep 2006, 2009; Slep and Heyman 2009) in 
minimally defining Divine abuse. Psychological abuse can occur with any degree of 
Divine intention. Yet, where one person intends to harm another, worry is reasonably 
raised that psychological abuse is occurring. Having malevolent intention to harm another 
person makes one a potential psychological abuser and increases the chances that actual 
psychological abuse will happen. Insofar as it is possible reliably to measure intentions, 
intent to harm might (it is reasonable to expect) have robust predictive statistical 
significance for psychological abuse. These are empirical conjectures.   
As such, in considering whether a Divine relationship is abusive, measuring 
intentionality is impossible, except purportedly by religiously acknowledged approaches. 
Even for the most devoutly religious, discerning the intentions of the Divine is often very 
limited. Strain in relationships with Divine can involve serious confusion about Divine 
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intentionality. Certainly no researcher can interview the Divine or give the Divine some 
surreptitious test of intention-to-harm humans. There is no way to study the perpetrator in 
this case except through the attributions of the victim. Divine intentionality is not 
ascertainable at all by psychology. But aspects of a person’s Divine relational schema 
(images or concepts) that represent Divine intentionality can be ascertained. 
 
Harmful Impact 
 How badly harmed must the victim be to be considered psychologically abused? 
Or rather, what kinds of harm must be the victim have experienced? Answers to both of 
these questions—regarding the extent and type of impact of perpetrator behaviors upon 
the victim—are used to establish a threshold above which psychological harm is 
psychologically abusive harm. The first notion is quantitative, the second qualitative, and 
hence so are operationalizations of each. Glaser (2002) and Hart and Glaser (2011), 
studying child maltreatment, raise the question of whether there must be evidence of 
actual harm or rather, only behaviors that have a high potential to harm: “Evidence of 
harm to the child is not a prerequisite for recognizing psychological maltreatment,” 
(Glaser 2002, 711) and “… the definition of psychological maltreatment does not rest on 
evidence of the actual harm which these interactions have caused the child. The persistent 
existence of these aspects of interactions with the child suffices, as they are presumed to 
become harmful even if they have not yet caused visible harm.” (Hart and Glaser 2011, 
762). Importantly, they insist here that evidence of actual harm is not necessary for the 
definition, not that actual harm is unnecessary. 
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  Evidence is sought by those hoping to intervene in the situation or by the victim 
who has some awareness of the psychological abusiveness of the situation. As I have said 
more than once now, not all who are psychologically abused always know, or know well 
enough, they are being psychologically abused, and suffer the consequences regardless 
(although the limitations on awareness can be the result of trauma-buffering defense-
mechanisms that might prevent as destructive or more destructive damage). In discussing 
and modeling psychological abuse in Divine-human relationships on a continuum of 
harm (Figure 2, p. 150) as well as various behavior-types of psychological abuse (Figure 
3, p. 152), I will get more specific about types and extents of harmful impact. It is worth 
noting that a definition of abuse only in terms of the forms of behaviors, regardless of the 
forms of behavioral effects on the other person or in the relationship, might aid and abet 
recognition of potentially abusive behaviors.  But, of course, potential abuse does not 
constitute actual abuse. The latter is what I am interesting in defining here.  
 Because the extent of harmful impact (its severity) cannot precisely or universally 
delineate abusive from non-abusive harm, I will make this delineation in the definition of 
psychological abuse in terms of a type of impact: the impact that the primary effect of 
psychological harm has upon the power dynamics of the relationship. The extent of 
psychological harm (primary effect) and the extent of power imbalance (as a secondary 
effect of the psychological harm), most acutely in combination, intensify the situation. 
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Imbalance of Power 
Many researchers have emphasized the centrality of power imbalances in the 
interactional drama of psychological abuse (e.g. Stark 2007, 2010; Kacen 2011; Mills 
2008; Dukes et al. 2002; Graham et al. 1995; Dutton and Painter 1993; Zielinksa 1992), 
and several have defined psychological abuse accordingly, either in explicit terms of 
“power” or in terms of intentions or behaviors that involve the abuse of power, 
empowering oneself while, or by, disempowering another person. For O’Hearn and Davis 
(1997), studying violence between intimate adult partners, “Emotional [or psychological] 
abuse constitutes those behaviors, not involving physical force or harm, that serve to 
reduce the victim’s status (Garfinkle 1957) and render the victim more easily controlled 
by the abuser (Dutton and Golant 1995)” (376). This definition has close affinities to the 
one I will propose in the next Part (V) but is narrower and excludes certain behavior-
types I consider psychological abusive by making two of them— “degradation” and 
“dominance” (in my terms in Figure 3, p. 152)—essential to the definition. It is 
noteworthy, however, that these two behavior-types might be the most central to the 
dynamics of psychological abusiveness. Based on qualitative data from female victims of 
dating violence, Murphy and Hoover (1999) make this conjecture after finding that 
“denigration” and “dominance/intimidation” (in their similar terms) are the most 
predictive of physical abuse.  My intuition is the same.  Other authors, namely O’Leary 
(1999) and Hamby (1996), also make control/domination essential to their definitions of 
psychological abuse. Moreover, they both regard “denigration”/ “disparagement” as a 
form of “control”/ “domination.” Hamby’s Dominance Scale (1996) is designed to 
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measure three forms of domination— along with “Disparagement,” “Authority” and 
“Restrictiveness,” each of which designates a form of “deviation from an egalitarian 
relationship,” (O’Leary 1999, 10). 
A non-egalitarian relationship (in which power is imbalanced) is not always bad. 
The ontogenetic structure of the child-caretaker relationship inherently imbalances the 
dynamic of power. The child is biologically and socially dependent upon caretakers for 
everything. Even as the child grows, becoming more independently capable and self-
differentiated in his or her attachment to parents, the power imbalance might remain for a 
long time (even well into adulthood in structural independence from parents) in the 
ongoing relational dynamics. Nothing in general about such a power imbalance is 
portends harm to the child. On the contrary, it is natural and normal for healthy 
maturation. But power in a relationship, whether caretaking or romantic, can become 
very imbalanced in favor of one person’s needs or wants over-against those of the other. 
Structural or dynamic shifts that unbalance power in a relationship can precondition 
and/or follow from psychological harm. Definably, I am claiming, whenever 
psychological harm and power imbalance are mutually reinforcing, psychological abuse 
as a type of psychological harm, to whatever extents, is already occurring. The 
combination of this condition of power imbalance with condition of psychological harm 
is my qualitative distinction between abusive and non-abusive psychological harm.  
Accordingly, harmful impact and the imbalance of power are necessary, and necessary in 
combination, for defining psychological abuse. Together they suffice for this definition. 
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Iteration of Harmful Behavior 
 The persistent repetition of psychological harmful behaviors in a relationship is 
widely assumed to have a cumulative effect of intensifying the relational dynamics and/or 
the severity of negative impact to the point of abuse (e.g. Hart and Glaser, 2011: 
“Although even mild forms are undesirable and contravene children’s rights, what is less 
fully appreciated is that harm to the child is related particularly to the persistence of these 
interactions,” 762). Hart and Glaser (2011) go so far as to say that “Beyond persistence, 
we have little in the way of solid research on the severity of psychological maltreatment” 
(762). The majority of researchers consider repetition of the psychologically harmful 
behaviors—and that they occur in some or another pattern, usually unspecified—to be 
essential to the definition of psychological abusiveness.   For example: 
Isolated incidents of behaviors identified in Table 1 [as psychologically abusive] 
do not necessarily constitute psychological abuse. Psychological maltreatment 
refers to a repeated pattern of parental behavior that is likely to be interpreted by 
a child that he or she is unloved, unwanted, or serves only instrumental purposes 
and/or that severely undermines the child’s development and socialization. 
[emphasis mine] (Hibbard et al. 2012, 373). 
 
Behavioral definitions of these acts are, however, very difficult to construct. In 
part, this is because most children occasionally experience some of these acts at a 
low level. In addition, it is unlikely that single instances of psychological abuse or 
neglect are directly harmful in the same way that instances of physical abuse lead 
to injuries. On the contrary, it appears that the harm of psychological 
maltreatment results from the cumulative effect of repeated occurrences of 
psychological maltreatment [emphasis mine] (Claussen and Crittenden 1991, 6). 
 
Emotional or psychological maltreatment is defined as a repeated pattern of 
damaging interactions between a child and one or more parents/caregivers that 
becomes typical of the relationship (Kairys and Johnson, 2002). The maltreatment 
pattern may be chronic and pervasive or or in some situations stimulated by a 
potentiating factor… [emphasis mine] (Horner 2011, 436). 
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McHugh et al. similarly think that “Abuse implies a negative pattern of behavior that 
seriously injures the partner [emphasis mine]” (2013, 169) and criticize definitions which 
do not include this criterion of lacking insight into the relational phenomena: 
… endorsing one particular behavior does little to help us understand the nature of 
psychological abuse, which is conceptualized as a pattern of both overt and subtle 
behavior that acquires meaning in the context of the relationship. The more intricate 
but important aspects of the behavior are lost, such as the interpretation of the 
behavior, its intention, or the context of the interaction (172) 
 
More examples could be provided (e.g. Loring 1994; Tolman 1992). Such definitions 
obviously imply that behaviors considered singly cannot be considered abusive 
psychologically, i.e., that it is inappropriate to describe this or that particular instance of 
behavior as psychologically abusive. This implication is difficult to avoid in these 
definitions and might forestall research that assists recognition of potential psychological 
abusiveness in a relationship. Moreover, this definitional decision avoids distinguishing 
among cognates of the term, “psychological abuse,” such as psychological abusiveness, 
psychological abuser, psychologically abused, or psychologically abusive relationship, 
cognates which have slightly different referents. Each therefore requires slightly different 
definitions and might, as I will stipulate at the end of this section, require slightly 
different sets of criteria for setting the threshold.  
McHugh et al. (2013) address another critical “potential issue with this 
definition…”, the complicated question of “what constitutes a pattern (e.g., what behaviors 
have to occur, how many times, in what contexts) (178). Typically, scales and other 
measures currently employed to study psychological abuse cannot measure temporal 
patterns of behaviors” (172).  The authors cite O’Leary (2001) and Tolman (2001) as also 
 	  
138 
seeing this ambiguity. It seems there is no answer to the question that is not highly arbitrary, 
not only with regard to human-human relationships but also regarding Divine-human 
relationships. I take the stance that persistence is a necessary condition for defining the ΨA 
relationship or the ΨA person but is not necessary for defining ΨA behavior as such. 
 
Intractability/Inescapability of the Relational Dynamics 
 Another criterion not much discussed in the literature but that arises when 
considering the the cumulative effects of patterns of psychologically harmful relational 
dynamics on the balance of power in the relationship is how able the victim is to change 
these dynamics or otherwise escape the relationship. How easily or realistically can the 
victim get out of the situation? Is he or she entrapped? How feasibly can this person 
voluntarily determine the dynamics of the relationship? How susceptible to change? A 
word for this criterion is the extent of intractability, i.e. resistance to resolution.  High 
intractability which prevents existing the relationship can be called entrapment.  
The extent of freedom the victim has to remove him or herself from the situation 
of psychological abuse might index a crucial aspect of the intensity of the dynamics, as 
well as the potential severity of impact, and predict outcomes. Being entrapped either as a 
result, direct or indirect, of the other’s abusive behaviors might, in turn, increase the 
precariousness of the situation. Sometimes entrapment can occur because of the 
development of disempowering dependence upon the abuser, whether emotionally, 
socially, economically, or otherwise (Dutton and Painter 1993; Kacen 2011, 32; Graham 
et al. [1995] discuss “Love-Dependence” in Stockholm Syndrome, i.e., “typified by the 
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feeling that one cannot survive without the partner’s love,” 3). High intractability or 
inescapability mark actual or potential severity of psychological abuse.  This criterion, 
like that of persistence, is for determining whether a relationship overall is 
psychologically abusive, not necessarily whether particular behaviors are. 
These last two conditions I have considered (iteration and 
intractability/inescapability) are important for defining a relationship overall as 
psychologically abusive, while not for defining behavior-types as such. The persistence 
or, worse, patterned persistence, of harmful behaviors in a relationship is obviously 
always associated with both power imbalances and psychologically harmful impact (and 
can but need not be associated with malevolent intention to harm). The same is true of 
the compromised ability (emotionally, socially, practically—however) of the victim to 
change the psychologically abusive dynamics that have become intractable or otherwise 
to escape from the relationship.  
 
Considering Context 
 
 Another consideration besides these several criteria relevant for psychological 
abuse is inevitably important, as it conditions all assessments and applications, including 
my own, of these criteria. It is a perennial truism for conceptualizing any human 
experience that “Psychological abuse is conceptualized in a cultural and a socio-historical 
context,” (McHugh et al. 2013, 178), the result of hermeneutically intricate processes 
moved not by unquestionably universal absolutes but by values for human life, perhaps 
inevitably ethical values (Langone 1992). My discussions thus far have not avoided the 
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truth of this truism. Not only how psychological abuse is conceptualized, but also how a 
particular relationship is conceptualized in discerning whether psychological abuse is 
taking place within it, are equally questions of meaning-in-context.  
 Which contextual features of a relationship are relevant to interpreting 
psychological abusiveness?  Garbarino (2011) specifies that “the context of abuse would 
also include the age, cohort and historical era in which the abuse occurs,” and reiterates 
that “adding more contemporary behaviors or developing new scales does not solve the 
basic [‘hermeneutic’] problem” (797-798). Interestingly, empirical research by Dehart et 
al. (2010) indicated that changing information about the context of a given relational 
scenario (portrayed in vignettes) made significant differences in most participants’ 
interpretations of psychological abuse. Above and beyond scenario-specific contextual 
variables, cultural context largely determines normative expectations and estimations of 
caretaker roles or romantic roles, gender roles in these arrangements (Goldner 2004, 
Kacen 2011, Anderson and Saunders, 2003; Dukes et al. 2002; Follingstad and Dehart 
2000; McGee et al. 1997), notions of health or wellness, prioritization of virtues and 
other values cultivated, socializations processes and institutional experiences and so on.  
A whole host of additional contextual considerations become relevant with regard to 
Divine relationships. for example, factors associated with individual differences in 
contexts of religious upbringing and current contexts of religious involvement and group-
membership.  
 In this section I made a series of conceptual decisions. First, I decided that the 
concept of psychological abuse should subsume the concept of emotional abuse rather 
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than being distinguished from it and noted that even the distinction between cognitive 
and emotional/affective abuse is tricky if not untenable (given the interdependence of 
cognitive and affective processes). Second, I decided that psychological neglect should 
be considered a form of a psychological abuse and noted that the more precise distinction 
sought rather imprecisely by this abuse/neglect distinction can be made in other ways less 
confusing. Accordingly, I introduced in this typological section a distinction between 
antagonistic and antipathetic forms of psychological abuse and pointed readers ahead to 
the typological model in Figure 3, provided in the next section (p. 152). Third, I decided 
that dysfunctional and harmful ways of relating should be distinguished somehow from 
psychological abuse, but not with the criterion of malevolent intention. Although intent to 
harm is, of course, extremely pertinent to interpreting situations of psychological abuse 
(human or Divine), it should not be considered essential to situations of psychological 
abuse or a necessary condition for the definition. In Figure 2 (p. 150) in the next section, 
I model Divine abuse on a broad continuum of psychologically harmful Divine 
behaviors. 
 
Definitions of Psychological Abuse  
Having now discussed the relevant conceptual-definitional issues and the relevant 
criterial considerations for deciding upon these issues, another variety of conceptual 
issues arise regarding possible referents of the term “psychological abuse” and its cognate 
terms. In this section, I will briefly distinguish (1) the persons involved as “abuser” and 
“abused,” defined in terms of the relative positions of power and the directionality of the 
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harm; (2) “abusiveness” or, simply, “abuse” (as specific abusive behaviors and their 
consequences) and (3) the “abusive relationship,” defined by dynamic structures. 
 The definitions I offer are stated in terms of the primary effect of behavior on the 
abused person and the secondary effect (of the primary effect) for the abusing person.  
The primary effect of the behavior is some form of psychological harm to the other 
person. As a secondary effect of inducing this psychological harm, one maintains or gains 
relational power. All the definitions are based on the initial definition of psychologically 
abusive behavior. The most basic term “psychological abuse,” in my usage, can refer 
either to psychologically abusive behaviors or to suffering from such behaviors. 
Psychologically Abusive Behavior: Interpersonal behavior the effect of which is (1) 
psychological harm to another person in ways that (2) sustain or increase a power 
imbalance that is advantageous to the one behaving thusly. 
 
By this minimal conceptual definition, the person behaving thusly is a 
psychologically abusing person and the person thus psychologically harmed is a 
psychologically abused person: 
Psychologically Abusing Person: Person whose behavior in a relationship is (1) 
psychologically harmful the other in ways that (2) sustain or increase a power 
imbalance that is advantageous to this person. 
 
Psychologically Abused Person: A person who is (1) psychologically harmed by 
the behavior of another person in ways that (2) sustain or increase a power 
imbalance that is advantageous to this person. 
 
Where psychological abuse as defined occurs repeatedly over a period of time, the 
relationship overall is a “Psychologically Abusive Relationship” (adding for this 
definition a third criterion of persistence—or “iteration”—not necessarily patterned). A 
person exhibiting a significant tendency in a given relationship to behave in 
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psychologically abusive ways can be considered “Psychologically Abusive. A person 
exhibiting a significant tendency across relational contexts of behaving in 
psychologically abusive ways is a “Psychological Abuser”. 
Psychologically Abusive Relationship: Relationship in which the behaviors of one 
person are (1) persistently (2) psychologically harmful to the other in ways that 
(3) sustain or increase a power imbalance that is advantageous to this person. 
 
Psychologically Abusive Person: Person whose behavior is (1) psychologically 
harmful to another person in ways that (2) sustain or increase a power imbalance 
that is advantageous to this person. 
 
 Insofar as a person behaves in ways that are psychologically harmful to him or 
herself and in so doing sustains or increases a power imbalance favoring the other in the 
relationship over oneself, this person can be said to be Psychologically Self-Abusing. 
Psychologically Self-Abusive Behaviors: Interpersonal behavior that is (1) 
psychologically harmful to oneself in ways that (2) sustains or increases a power 
imbalance that is advantageous to the other person in the relationship. 
 
Criterial Qualifications to the Definitions 
 
“Interpersonal behavior…” 
•   behavior influencing another person  
•   influential whether through actions or inactions, proximately or distally  
 “that is psychologically harmful…” 
•   however repeatedly or not 
•   however severely or not 
•   however intentionally or not 
“…in ways that sustain or increase a power imbalance…” 
•   structurally (the conditioning circumstances of the relationship) or dynamically (the 
response patterns in the relationship) 
“…that is advantageous to the person behaving thusly.” 
•   relational advantage, i.e. in getting needs/wants met in or through the relationship 
•   however consciously or not  
“… persistently…” 
•   especially if increasingly 
•   especially if intractably  
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Criterial Distinction Between Ψ Harmful Behavior and Ψ Abusive Behavior  
 
Ψ Harmful Behavior: 
(i) behavior that psychologically harms  
Ψ Harmful Behavior is Ψ Abusive Behavior when: 
(ii) the psychologically harmful behavior has the effect of maintaining a power 
imbalance in the relationship that is advantageous to the person behaving thusly. 
 
 Thus the definitions consist in two necessary conditions for the concept of 
psychological abuse: psychological harm to the other person and the maintenance of a 
power imbalance in the relationship through (as an effect of) this psychological harm. 
Each condition itself is not sufficient for psychological abuse. Their coincidence is 
necessary and sufficient. Psychologically abusive behaviors, defined in general, are 
psychologically harmful, self-empowering and other-disempowering behaviors. 
According to this conceptual definition, psychologically abusive behavior must harm 
another person and, moreover, this harm must serve some interest(s) of the person whose 
behavior it is. By saying that the power imbalance is “advantageous,” I mean that it 
facilitates the abuser’s efforts to meet needs/wants over-against or in spite of the 
needs/wants of the abused. Thus I have implied a causal theory of psychological abuse in 
the above definitions. Moreover, psychologically harming the person can be a means, not 
just a coincident effect, of maintaining a power imbalance that facilitates these efforts. 
Conversely, behaving in ways that primarily sustain or increase a power imbalance can 
be a means to further psychological harm. Thus, these two types of effects—
psychologically harmful impact and power imbalance—are reciprocal and potentially 
cyclical in the dynamics of a psychologically abusive relationship. 
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V. Psychological Abuse in Divine Relationships 
 
Much of the motivating urgency to define as clearly and precisely as possible 
psychological abuse is for purposes of legal intervention (see Wolfe and McIsaac 2011, 
802-3). Thus, particularly regarding caretaker-child abuse, definitions are often 
formulated in legally operational ways (although rarely if ever adequate for intervention; 
O’Leary 1999, 18). By contrast, even though Divine relationships, like all relationships, 
are powerfully influenced by relational learning experiences from childhood, and even 
though caretaker-child metaphors for God (e.g. God as lovingly provident father or 
mother) often mediate these Divine relationships, no person will ever be in the position to 
arrest another person’s God. Even so, the attempt to conceptualize define Divine 
psychological abusiveness might enable theological forms of intervention that might at 
least incriminate the God/god in question. 
 
Definitions of Divine Abuse 
The focus of this thesis, as discussed above, is on internalized supernaturalistic 
theologies—in Divine relational schemas—and I expect that the conceptualizations I 
present below will be most readily applicable in contexts of Protestant or Catholic 
Christian and Jewish relationships with the Divine. This expectation owes to the fact 
mentioned above (Part III) that the majority of research demonstrating R/S struggle and 
particularly “Divine struggle” has been with people of these faiths, as well as to the fact 
that typical theologies in these traditions of faith contain beliefs and values that seem 
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likely to be preconditions or central variables mediating the processes by which 
psychological abuse could occur in these relationships. 
 I expect that my conceptualizations are at least generically cross-contextual 
among Divine-human relationships, while likely requiring specifications or alterations in 
application to particular scenarios in future empirical research. They might also require 
some degree of expansion to include other forms of theistic or religious supernatural 
relationships (or even non-theistic, non-religious supernatural relationships). Following 
from the foregoing discussions and definitions of psychological abuse and cognate terms, 
I now define psychological abuse in Divine relationships, starting with Divinely abusive 
behavior as the basis for the other definitions. By comparison to the above definitions of 
psychological abuse, I make two important alterations.  
Rather than speaking of a power imbalance, I speak of the power imbalance in the 
Divine-human relationship. In the theistic theologies that concern me, God always has 
infinitely more power than the human being in the relationship.  The extent of this power 
imbalance as experienced in the dynamics of the relationship and the extent of the 
harmful impact of Divine behaviors will both vary between these Divine relationships. 
Also, I do not say in these definitions that power imbalance is “advantageous” for 
fufilling God’s needs/wants (though this notion might make sense according to some 
divine relational schemas). I say instead, still very similarly, that the power imbalance 
“advances the purposes” of God or, in other words, “furthers the will of God.” Speaking 
of God’s needs/wants implies more distinctly some notion of lack in the Divine nature. 
Most of the theistic believers I have mind would not make theological sense of this 
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notion. Like the notion of advantageousness in fulfilling needs/wants in the definitions of 
psychological abuse, the notion of “advancing God’s purposes” or “furthering the will of 
God,” is not a necessary condition of the definition but names whom the power 
imbalance favors and in what general sense it is favorable. As above, I start by defining 
the behaviors in question because they are part of the reference of all cognate terms: 
Divinely Abusive Behavior (Divine Abuse): Divine behavior the effect of which is (1) 
psychological harm to a human being in ways that (2) sustain or increase the power 
imbalance in the relationship and advance God’s purposes. 
 
By this minimal conceptual definition, the God behaving thusly is an “Abusing 
God” and the person thus psychologically harmed is a “Divinely Abused Person:” 
Abusing God: God whose behavior is (1) psychologically harmful to a human being 
in ways that (2) sustain or increase the power imbalance in the relationship and 
advance God’s purposes. 
 
Divinely Abused Person: Person who is (1) psychologically harmed by Divine 
behavior in ways that (2) sustain or increase the power imbalance in the relationship 
and advance God’s purposes. 
 
Where psychological abuse as defined occurs repeatedly over a period of time, the 
relationship overall is a “Divinely Abusive Relationship” or “Abusive Divine 
Relationship” (adding for this definition a third criterion of persistence, though not 
necessarily patterned persistence). And a God exhibiting a significant tendency in a given 
relationship or across relational contexts to behave in psychologically abusive ways to 
human beings can be considered an “Abusive God.” 
Divinely Abusive Relationship: Divine-human relationship in which Divine 
behavior is (1) persistently (2) psychologically harmful to the human being in ways 
that (3) sustain or increase the power imbalance in the relationship and advance 
God’s purposes. 
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Abusive God: God whose behavior in relationship to human beings is (1) 
persistently (2) psychologically harmful in ways that (3) sustain or increase the 
power imbalances in these relationships and advance God’s purposes. 
 
 Insofar as a person, by virtue of being in a relationship, behaves in ways that are 
psychologically harmful to him or herself and in so doing maintains the power imbalance 
favoring God over-against oneself, this person can be said to be “Divinely Self-Abusing.” 
Divine Self-Abuse: behavior in relation to God that is (1) psychologically harmful 
to oneself in ways that (2) maintain the power imbalance in the relationship. 
 
Models of Divine Abuse 
I have made the distinction between non-abusive and abusive forms of harmful 
Divine relating in terms of the extent and type of harmful impact on the human person 
and on the dynamics of the Divine-human relationship. I now will place these distinctions 
along a wider continuum that includes qualitative distinctions between types of harmful 
but non-abusive Divine behaviors—Divine misbehaviors, mistreatment, and 
maltreatment—and behaviors (see Figure 2, p. 150) that constitute Divine abuse. These 
types of harmful behaviors are ordered on the continuum according to their seriousness, 
that is, the severity of their harmfulness.  Divine mistreatment and maltreatment are 
distinguished more vaguely and arbitrarily than Divine abuse—vaguely because these 
Divine behaviors are not the present focus; arbitrarily because the usage of these terms if 
often interchangeably or almost interchangeable.  
The term “Divine misbehavior” is the most generic concept I introduce. It 
includes all Divine behaviors that are sub-optimal for the wellbeing of the human person 
in the relationship (i.e. behaving improperly towards the human person, i.e. less than in 
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the best way Divinely possible, with harmful effects). “Divine mistreatment” is a slightly 
narrower concept meant to reflect more severe harm and also a slight qualitative 
distinction. Divine mistreatment includes Divine misbehaviors that are anti-optimal or 
counterproductive for the wellbeing of the human person (i.e. treating the person not just 
improperly but badly). Divine mistreatment is not necessary severely harmful. Further 
along the continuum of severity, “Divine maltreatment” is distinguished from Divine 
mistreatment as more severely harmful by causing damage to the person’s self-schemas. 
In other words, in Divine Maltreatment, abusive or non-abusive (but especially abusive) 
the Divine relational schemas are severely self-harmful as discussed in Part III.  “Divine 
abuse” is are more severely harmful than non-abusive forms of Divine maltreatment and 
is qualitatively distinguished from non-abusive Divine maltreatment according to the 
necessary conditions asserted in the above definitions. 
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Continuum of Psychologically Harmful Divine Behavior 
 
Figure 2 
 
Typology of Divinely Abusive Behaviors 
 
Now narrowing my focus to the the right side of this continuum of 
psychologically harmful Divine behaviors, I want to designate several possible types of 
experienced Divine behavior so as to illustrating possible manifestations and 
combinations of experiences that would suffice as instances of psychological abuse by 
one’s God/god. According to the above definitions of Divine (Ψ) Abuse, the effects, 
primary and secondary, of each type are sufficient to count these behaviors as instances 
of psychological abuse. I list seven major subtypes arranged according to the more 
general distinction between the two types of Divine abuse, antagonistic and antipathetic, 
and according to the distinctions (in Figure 2) between abusive and non-abusive but 
Divine Misbehavior
• Definition:
Psychological 
harm by sub-
optimal Divine 
behavior; i.e. the 
human is harmed 
because God is not 
behaving the best 
God could and/or 
should (according 
to the person's 
Divine relational 
schemas)
Divine Mistreatment
• Definition: 
Psychological
harm by anti-
optimal Divine 
behavior; i.e. 
Divine behavior 
the effects of 
which counter to 
the wellbeing of 
the human person.
Divine Maltreatment
• Definition: Anti-
optimal Divine 
behavior that is
more significantly 
harmful by 
damaging helpful 
self-schemas or 
supporting 
unhealthy/harmful 
self-schemas.
Divine Abuse 
• Definition: Anti-
optimal Divine 
behavior that is (1) 
significantly 
harmful to the 
human person 
(maltreatment) and 
(2) sustains or 
increases the 
Divine-human 
power imbalance 
in the dynamics of 
the relationshp.
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psychologically harmful Divine behaviors. I stipulate preliminary, minimally operational 
definitions, naming examples of specific actions involving each sub-type. I use the word 
“God” generically in these definitions. All of these types of behaviors, because the actor 
in question is supernatural and therefore superempirical, must be ascertained as 
represented in the Divine relational schemas of the theistic person. These types therefore 
reflect the ways in which God is experienced, however consciously or not. Theoretical 
and empirical research can revise this typological model, adding, subtracting, or 
rearranging, the types. In theory and in the actual experience of a Divine-human 
relationship, these types of Divinely abusive behavior can be co-present or co-involved.  
These definitions are meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive, of harmful behaviors that 
are psychologically abusive insofar as they are psychologically harmful and sustain or 
increase the power imbalance of the Divine-human relationship: 
1.   Divine Domination—God coercively controls the human person through, e.g., 
manipulating, undermining/thwarting, constant supervision, or terrorizing through 
threats of harm (direct or indirect, explicit or implicit) to oneself, others, or other 
valued things. 
2.   Divine Degradation—God reduces the value or status of the human person through, 
e.g., shaming, guilt-tripping, ridiculing, humiliating, belittling, etc.  
3.   Divine Corruption—God encourages development in ways that are harmful, or 
highly likely to cause harm, to the person, especially insofar as the human person 
is especially susceptible to (or is unable to contravene) Divine influence. 
4.   Divine Confinement—God imposes limits on the person’s freedom to explore and 
experiment with potentially healthy life experiences, including prohibiting or 
inhibiting relationships with certain other people, activities, etc.  
5.   Divine Exploitation—God takes advantage of the power differential in the 
relationship to use the human person to further Divine ends; in other words, the 
Divine takes advantage of power differential to employ the human instrumentally. 
6.   Divine Neglect—God does not provide appropriately for the needs of the human 
person, including psychological needs in the relationship, as in denying emotional 
responsiveness to the human person, e.g. stonewalling, silent treatment. 
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7.   Divine Rejection—God leaves, or does not arrive to help, the human person when 
Divine help is needed (abandoning); God directly or indirectly communicates not 
wanting the person or a relationship with the person. 
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VI. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 All of the above was meant to explain theoretically how one might undergo 
psychological abuse in relating to his or her God. In theorizing the psychodynamic 
conditions for experiences in Divine relationships that would involve psychological 
abuse, I have argued that Divine abuse is quite possible and that it is prima facie plausible 
to hypothesize, basically, that Divine abuse is not just hypothetical. Thus I presented 
preliminary and minimally operational definitions and models of Divine Abuse for 
purposes of empirical research into actual experiences. In this concluding Part, I discuss 
theoretical directions beyond the limitations of this thesis and summarize how Parts I-V 
have contributed to my central argument and overall purpose. 
 
Theoretical Limitations and Directions 
 Of the inevitably many limitations to what I have theorized and hypothesized 
preliminarily, one of the main limitations is the generality of the explanations of the 
development of psychologically abusive Divine relationships. I have not theorized 
specifically enough the possible processes through which abusive psychodynamics are 
potentiated in Divine relationships. An important example of this present limitation 
regards the brief definition of psychological self-abuse in Divine relationships. I have not 
at all explained specific behaviors of psychological self-abuse in Divine relationships, 
representations in Divine relational schemas associated with psychological self-abuse, or 
the potential role of psychological self-abuse in the dynamics of the Divine relationship.  
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 Along these lines, one might start theorizing about the unconscious dynamics of 
experiencing Divine abuse and defensive formations that prevent awareness of this abuse, 
protecting or reinforcing vital assumptions of the goodness of God in the relationship. 
Experiences of being abused by God might unconsciously motivate defensive object-
relational strategies that perpetuate the abusive dynamics (see Blizard & Bluhm, 1994; 
Glickauf-Hughes, 1997; Blizard, 2001, Thomas, 2003, 2005) self-abusively—perhaps to 
extents of pathological masochism (see Young and Gerson, 1991; Gavin, 2010; Bosgraaf, 
2013). An abusive Divine relationship can become more intractable and damagingly 
impactful through patterned interactions between experiences (however conscious or 
unconscious) of Divine abuse and representational and behavioral sequelae of self-abuse. 
This causal theory presupposes that the fundamental relational predicament 
underlying the emergence of these abusive and self-abusive psychodynamics is some 
dilemma of being in a double-bind, where the options are lose/lose. This predicament and 
its repression through unconscious defensive strategies could be articulated with 
continuing insights from Object-Relational and Attachment theories and phenomena 
often involved in intimate relationship abuse (IRA), such as “the cycle of violence” 
(Walker 1987) and “paradoxical attachments” through “trauma bonding” (e.g. Dutton and 
Painter 1993; c.f. Van der Kolk 1987). In terms of Attachment Theory, self-abusive 
mechanisms for defending the goodness of the Divine attachment figure are instinctively 
employed in order to maintain the mutuality and strength of the attachment bond. Upon 
this relationship one is dependent for survival or thriving (if not in a biological sense than 
in a psycho-spiritual sense), so one is unconsciously motivated to defend oneself against 
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the realization that this intimate relationship is injurious and God is treacherous, or that 
attaching to God is perilous. For the person attached to God and experiencing abuse by 
God, the relationship has ceased to function as a safe-haven from the evils of the world 
and has become instead a hellish place of Divine evil. 
 
Summary of Parts I-V 
 In Part I (“The Question of Divine Abuse”), I reviewed psychological, 
theological, philosophical and biblical sources as well as online sources relevant to the 
question of Divine abuse. The main intent of this review was to show that the question is 
not at all new in the relevant literature but nevertheless has not been researched 
empirically or even asked in empirical terms. I stressed both the intuitiveness and 
importance of this empirical question for research and the potential difficulty of 
broaching the question clinically, and categorized experiences of Divine abuse in the 
DSM-V among “Other Conditions that May Be the Focus of Clinical Attention” as both a 
“Religious or Spiritual Problem” and a problem of psychological abuse.   
 Part II (“Psychologizing Divine Relationships”) was an excursus of thinking 
through hermeneutical complications that should detain inquiring entries into the 
experiential realm of another person’s Divine relationship. I began with a simple model 
(Figure 1, p. 42) for comparing the ways in which metapsychological assumptions 
influence methodological approaches and, in turn, influence interpretations of problems 
experienced in Divine relationships. Where relationships with Gods are concerned, 
assumptions of supernaturalism and intersubjectivism tend to coincide on the part of the 
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theist who experiences a relationship with this God. Quite oppositely, assumptions of 
naturalism and intrapsychism tend to coincide on the part of non-theistic psychologist 
interpreting this theist’s experience of this God. Acknowledging (as in my introduction) 
that I am a non-theist and so am inclined to understand claimed relationships with Gods 
as wholly natural and intrapsychic phenomena, I maintained that the empiricism of 
psychological inquiry prevents analyzing the supernatural Subject (such as “God”) qua 
Subject. “God” can only be studied as a “god” among “gods,” i.e. the naturally developed 
representational objects with which humans relate only intrapsychically.  
 Therefore, I concluded against attempting to supernaturalize or intersubjectivize 
the psychological—non-theological—analysis of problems in supernatural relationships. 
For the theist in the Divine relationship, these limits of psychological analysis limit the 
potential to understand the problems experienced in the relationship. In this conflict or 
distantiation of psychological and theological ways of interpreting experiences in Divine 
relationships, I considered phenomenological interpretation and specified the sense in 
which the hermeneutical mode of this thesis is phenomenological. 
 In Part III (“Psychology of Divine Relationships”), I explained how relationships 
with Gods can be experienced in virtually all the ways people experience one another.  In 
terms of Attachment Theory, I explained how Gods can function as “attachment figures” 
(Bowlby [1969] 1982) symbolically and, for some people, no less powerfully 
(Kirkpatrick 1999; 2005). If one can attach to God, this attachment can have more than 
enough psychical substance and existential significance to have immense magnitude for 
mental health, for better or worse.  The psychological entailments and consequences of 
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these attachments are mediated by “internal working models” (Bowlby [1969] 1982)—or 
what I call Divine relational schemas (Baldwin 1992).  
 These relational schemas consist of very complex sets of cognitive-affective, 
conscious-unconscious “representations” (i.e. internalized experiences) of the 
relationship, oneself in the relationship, and the supernatural Other in the relationship. 
Importantly, I emphasized that relational schemas often include affectively or 
emotionally contradictory representations, and that even unconscious aspects of god-
representations can greatly determine the dynamics of the relationship.  I considered the 
implications of several unique features of attaching to Gods versus attaching to other 
human beings while adumbrating salient themes in the God-concepts of theistic 
theologies (thinking especially of Christians) relevant to the question of Divine abuse.  
As examples of the fact that people can have severely psychologically deleterious Divine 
struggles with their Divine attachment figures, I referred to some studies in the empirical 
literature of Attachment Theory. With insights from Object-Relations theories in the 
psychology of religion, I explored in more depth than earlier (in Part II) how one’s “god” 
is an intrapsychic object representing one’s “God” as a Subject. According to these 
theories and clinical studies, I explained the developmentally crucial origins and 
functions of relationships with gods. Telling the story of this psychoanalytic theory of 
god-and-self revealed psychological depth-structures of the self-transformative power—
adaptive or maladaptive—of relationships with gods throughout life. 
   These Attachment and Object-Relational theories and attendant research bolster 
my assumption that the full range of psychological wellbeing in human relationships, 
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from the healthiest to the unhealthiest and most harmful, is possible in Divine 
relationships. In concern for experiences of Divine abuse, I accentuated throughout Part 
III the development of maladaptive or pathogenic Divine relational schemas.  
  In Part IV, I reviewed literature surrounding experiences of psychological abuse, 
all of which either concerns psychological abuse between caretakers and children or 
between romantic partners. I addressed several main conceptual difficulties in defining 
psychological abuse and specified the conditions I think are necessary and sufficient for 
psychological abuse (to be used as criteria distinguishing psychological abuse from non-
abusive forms of psychological harm). At the end, I stipulated definitions of 
psychological abuse and cognate terms according to the conceptual decisions I made 
along the way.  In Part V, I transferred these definitions into the context of Divine 
relationships and made a few subtle alterations. These definitions refer to the 
representational content of Divine relational schemas as explained in Part III.  
  I created two visual models based on my definitions of Divine abuse and cognate 
terms. One (Figure 2, p. 150) is a continuum of psychologically harmful Divine 
behaviors in which Divine abuse is the most severe and is qualitatively distinguished 
from Divine maltreatment, mistreatment, and misbehavior. The other is a typology of 
Divinely abusive behaviors that distinguishes antagonistic from antipathetic sub-types of 
Divinely abusive behaviors. I list specific behaviors (as represented in Divine relational 
schemas) for each sub-type. These behaviors are Divinely abusive insofar as their effects 
are psychologically harmful to the human person and maintain the power imbalance in 
the Divine relationship. My definitions of Divine abuse centralize the psychological 
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association of representing these facts in Divine relational schemas. Certainly, these 
schemas can consist in representations of psychologically harmful Divine behaviors 
associated with representations of God as “stronger and wiser” (Bowlby [1969] 1982). 
Psychologically harmful experiences in relating to this stronger and wiser God can cause 
negative self-representations and struggles to get closer to God or further away from God. 
Insofar as the effects of these psychologically harmful self-representations sustain or 
increase the power imbalance in the relationship—and especially if these dynamics 
become intractable—psychological abuse is already definably underway.  Divine abuse is 
the experience, however conscious or unconscious, of psychological harm by God that 
disempowers the self while empowering God in the relationship. 
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